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Abstract 
ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION 
YUJI TAMURA 
Broadly" speaking, we deal with government activities and their migration-related con-
sequences in this dissertation. There are two parts. The first part examines the influence 
of social welfare provision on individual demands for immigration. In the second part, 
we study the impact of tight border control on the incidence of labour exploitation in the 
migrant smuggling market. 
In Part 1, we theoretically show that the existence of redistributive welfare programmes 
reduces the difference between individual demands for immigration by creating a common 
economic interest among heterogeneous citizens. By analysing a survey data set that 
contains individual responses to immigration-related questions in the European Union, we 
also study the importance of the perceived impact of immigration on the national labour 
market and the domestic public finance for the desirable level of immigration. 
In Part 2, our theoretical model suggests that the government's battle against migrant 
smuggling may increase the labour exploitation of migrants on average. Furthermore, 
the common use of social networks by which the information about reliable smugglers is 
transmitted to potential migrants suggests that the migrant smuggling market may converge 
to an exploitative state in the long run if smugglers are impatient. 
ix 
Partl 
Citizen's Demand for Immigration in 
the Welfare State 
CHAPTER 1 
Economically Motivated Preferences 
This chapter's contribution to the literature is to analyse economically moti-
vated preferences of citizens with respect to immigration in the welfare state 
where both intra- and intergenerational redistribution schemes exist. These 
schemes are systematically introduced into an economy where the labour 
market clears by wage adjustments. The chapter shows how the existence 
of social welfare programmes influences a citizen's economically motivated 
demand for immigration. The difference between the preferences of hetero-
geneous citizens is likely to be reduced in the welfare state particularly when 
both intra- and inter generational redistribution schemes exist. 
1.1. Introduction 
Economic costs and benefits of immigration do not fall equally on different persons who 
live in the host country. Hence individual demands for immigration differ from each other, 
while immigration policy is a national decision. Economic motivation is one of the factors 
that gives rise to contention over immigration, and the nature of contention is likely to be 
affected by the host country's environment. How is the conflict of interest in immigration 
shaped by the welfare system in the host country? This chapter systematically answers 
the question. The innovation is to derive individual demands for immigration under both 
intra- and intergenerational redistribution programmes. The economic impact of immigra-
tion on the host country has been discussed in the context of each type of social welfare 
redistribution. However, individual demands for immigration have not been analysed in the 
2 
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light of a combination of these, even though a typical welfare state carries out both types of 
redistribution. 
In order to highlight the influence of social welfare provision on the preferences of het-
erogeneous citizens, we begin with an economy where no government intervention exists. 
We then introduce intra- and intergenerational redistribution separately into the economy. 
Finally, both types of redistribution are simultaneously introduced into the economy. Un-
der each environment, we derive individual demands for immigration. We show that the 
existence of social welfare provision is likely to reduce the difference between individual de-
mands for immigration, as compared to the laissez-faire. This is more likely when there is 
both intra- and intergenerational social welfare redistribution. The results are summarised 
in the last section for ease of comparison between different settings. 
1.2. Literature 
We theoretically study individual demands for immigration in the welfare state in a 
single-country setting by simply assuming that the country attracts immigration as much 
as its government permits.! Therefore, we concentrate our discussion on theoretical work 
of immigration in the welfare state in a single-country setting. We can separate the past 
studies into two strands according to how the welfare state is defined. One defines it as 
intragenerational redistribution, and the other as intergenerational redistribution. 
1.2.1. Welfare state as intergenerational redistribution 
Theoretical studies that examine immigration under intergenerational redistribution include 
Scholten and Thurn (1996), Haupt and Peters (1998), Razin and Sadka (2000), Casarico and 
Devillanova (2003) and Krieger (2003). Intergenerational redistribution is represented by 
a balanced pay-as-you-go pension scheme in these studies. That is, defined benefits for the 
elderly are financed by taxing the young. 
lOur study is partial and limited in the sense that we do not deal with the issue of welfare magnet and fiscal 
competition, ie, agents reveal their preferences by choosing the country to live as Tiebout (1956) suggested. 
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Scholten and Thum (1996) have examined individual demands for immigration in a 
three-period overlapping-generations model where young, middle-aged and old citizens co-
exist in each period. Each agent inelastically supplies one unit of labour in each of the first 
two lifetime periods and receives a pension benefit in the last period. Agents are heteroge-
neous only in one dimension, ie, age. Labour is perfectly substitutable between the young 
and the middle-aged and between citizens and immigrants, and there is only one wage rate 
that perfectly adjusts to full employment. The wage rate then captures the negative impact 
of immigration on the labour market. 
The pension benefit in their model is defined as a fixed fraction of the prevailing wage 
rate. Accordingly, the tax rate adjusts to immigration in order to maintain the balanced 
government budget constraint, while immigration reduces the size of the per capita benefit 
via the wage rate. Immigration thus affects pensioners negatively via the wage rate even 
though they are not labour-market participants. Its impact on workers via the tax rate of 
the wage-linked pay-as-you-go pension scheme is positive. On the one hand, immigration 
increases the number of taxpayers. On the other hand, it reduces the total expenditure for 
the pension scheme by making the per capita benefit smaller via the wage rate. 
Under this setting, retired citizens are against immigration. Young and middle-aged 
citizens face two opposing effects of immigration in each period: its negative impact on 
the labour market and its fiscal effect that reduces the per capita burden of running the 
pension scheme. They found that the net wage income is concave in immigration, implying 
that a working citizen desires a quantitatively restrictive policy that allows immigration to 
the point where the net wage income is maximised. Note that, assuming that immigrants 
are young, young citizens desire more immigration than the middle-aged because young 
immigrants continue to contribute to the pension scheme in the following period when they 
are middle-aged. Accordingly, the median voter is a middle-aged citizen.2 The median 
voter in the study is myopic in the sense that middle-aged citizens do not anticipate that 
tomorrow's policy will be chosen in response to today's policy. However, since today's young 
2More precisely, this is true if 1 +n < 1 + l!n or (1 + n) n < 1 holds where n > 0 is the constant popUlation 
growth rate. Otherwise, the median voter is young in every period. 
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immigrants continue to contribute to tomorrow's pension scheme, they affect the utility of 
the middle-aged median voter tomorrow. 
Haupt and Peters (1998) extended Scholten and Thurn's (1996) analysis within the same 
framework. They introduced a strategic interaction between the middle-aged median voters 
in current and subsequent periods by assuming that the median voter in the current period is 
fully aware of the impact of today's policy choice on the choice in the subsequent period. As 
a result, the median voter in the current period desires a less restrictive policy than the one 
that Scholten and Thurn (1996) found. The reason is that, by allowing more immigration 
today, the median voter is able to lower tomorrow's immigration, which results in a smaller 
fall in tomorrow's pension benefit per capita than otherwise. 
They further analysed individual demands for immigration by fixing the tax rate instead 
of the replacement rate in the balanced budget constraint for the pension scheme. In this 
case, immigration affects workers only via the depressed wage rate, while pensioners face 
two effects on the wage-linked benefit. On the one hand, the per capita benefit is reduced 
via the depressed wage rate. On the other, it is increased via the replacement rate that 
adjusts to the number of taxpayers and the wage rate. The net impact of immigration on 
the size of the per capita benefit turned out to be strictly positive, implying that pensioners 
are pro-immigration. 
Working citizens take into account the fact that young immigrants today continue to 
contribute to the pension scheme and hold the wage rate depressed in the following period. 
In addition, young citizens and young immigrants become retired in the same period so that 
young citizens cannot benefit from immigration through the pension scheme. Accordingly, 
young citizens are against immigration. Middle-aged citizens evaluate the impact of their 
choice on today's wage rate and tomorrow's pension benefit. The authors found that their 
utility is strictly convex in immigration, and a higher tax rate tends to lower the utility from 
closed-border policy relative to the utility from open-border policy. Note that the median 
voter is still a middle-aged citizen even though the preference is not single-peaked because 
the other two groups are unambiguously split into two opposing extremes. 
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Razin and Sadka (2000), Casarico and Devillanova (2003) and Krieger (2003) also define 
intergenerational redistribution as a balanced pay-as-you-go pension scheme. However, their 
analyses were conducted in a two-period overlapping-generations model. While there is one 
less lifetime period as compared to Scholten and Thurn (1996) and Haupt and Peters (1998), 
they allow for an additional dimension of heterogeneity among citizens, ie, factor endowment. 
The benefit is common to all the elderly and is not linked to the wage rate in the first two 
of the three studies. 
In Razin and Sadka's (2000) framework, the production requires two complementary in-
puts: capital and labour. Young citizens have different amounts of perfectly substitutable 
labour as a result of the exogenously distributed heterogeneous costs of human capital in-
vestment. An immigrant is young and has a small amount of the perfectly substitutable 
labour, which is their definition of low skill. Capital is provided by old citizens via their 
savings. The wage rate and the interest rate adjust for full employment of these production 
factors under constant-returns-to-scale technology. In their analysis, the tax rate is fixed, 
and hence the per capita benefit adjusts to maintain the fiscal balance. Accordingly, pen-
sioners are in favour of immigration because it increases not only the size of the per capita 
benefit but also the rate of interest accruing to their savings. On the other hand, working 
citizens are against immigration because it depresses not only the wage rate in the period of 
entry but also the interest rate in the following period by increasing the supply of capital. 
In Casarico and Devillanova (2003), two complementary production inputs are skilled 
and unskilled labour. Capital is assumed away by setting their model as a small open 
economy. Young citizens acquire skilled labour if the net gain from human capital invest-
ment is positive. Otherwise, they remain unskilled. Immigrants are young, have perfectly 
substitutable unskilled labour and cannot acquire skilled labour. The wage rates for skilled 
and unskilled labour perfectly adjust for full employment of these labour inputs under the 
constant-returns-to-scale technology. As in Razin and Sadka (2000), the tax rate is fixed in 
the balanced government budget constraint. Immigrants depress the wage rate for unskilled 
labour but increase the wage rate for skilled labour as well as the number of taxpayers. The 
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net effect on the pension scheme is found to be an increase in tax revenue, suggesting that 
pensioners are pro-immigration. 
At first sight, one might expect that, among young citizens, owners of skilled labour 
are pro-immigration, and owners of unskilled labour are anti-immigration because immi-
grants are assumed to be young and unskilled. However, the authors note that owners of 
unskilled labour must be split into three groups. The first group consists of those who 
remain unskilled regardless of immigration that increases the skill premium. These are 
anti-immigration. The second group consists of those whose income from the unskilled 
wage without immigration is lower than the income from the skilled wage with immigration. 
They are better off permitting immigration and becoming skilled than banning immigration 
and remaining unskilled. Hence they are pro-immigration. The third group consists of 
those whose income from the unskilled wage without immigration is higher than the income 
from the skilled wage with immigration. These are forced to become skilled to minimise 
the loss if immigration takes place, but are better off banning immigration and remaining 
unskilled. Hence they are against immigration. The implication is that there are those 
who are pro- and anti-immigration among currently unskilled workers. The authors are 
aware that the use of a fixed tax rate in their analysis is arbitrary but are unable to derive 
results under a fixed per capita benefit. 
Krieger's (2003) framework is similar to Casarico and Devillanova's (2003). The differ-
ence is that he assumed the per capita pension benefit to be wage-linked. More specifically, 
individual demands for unskilled immigrants are examined under two types of pay-as-you-go 
pension. One is the scheme which defines the per capita benefit as a fraction of the prevail-
ing average wage. The other is the scheme where it is defined as a fraction of the previous 
wage. In the former, all pensioners receive the same benefit. In the latter, the pension 
benefit is perfectly correlated to the type of labour supplied in the working period. The 
author examined both cases of a fixed tax rate and a fixed replacement rate. However, the 
study ignored young citizens' human capital investment responses to immigration. When 
the tax rate is assumed as fixed, skilled workers and pensioners are pro-immigration, while 
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unskilled workers are against immigration, whichever type of pension scheme is in opera-
tion. In a sense, this finding reinforces what Casarico and Devillanova (2003) and Razin 
and SOOka (2000) suggest. 
When the replacement rate is assumed fixed, some citizens' demands for immigration 
depend on the definition of pension benefit. With the per capita benefit being defined as 
a fraction of the prevailing average wage, old citizens are anti-immigration because immi-
gration of unskilled young workers monotonically lowers the average wage. Skilled young 
citizens are pro-immigration, for such immigration not only raises the wage rate for skilled 
labour but also reduces the tax rate. Unskilled young citizens face two opposing effects on 
their net income: a reduction in the tax rate and a fall in the unskilled wage rate. It turns 
out that the maximisation of their net wage income with respect to unskilled immigration 
is likely to yield an interior quantity of immigration as the maximiser, implying that the 
median voter is young and unskilled. 
With the pension benefit being defined as a fraction of the previously received wage, old 
citizens are indifferent, for today's immigration cannot affect the wage rates in the previous 
period. Under this setting, skilled young citizens are pro-immigration for three reasons: 
a higher wage rate today , a lower tax rate today and a higher pension benefit tomorrow 
which is due to a higher wage rate today. Unskilled young citizens are likely to desire 
an intermediate amount of immigration that is lower than under the average-wage-linked 
pension because a lower wage rate today also means a lower pension benefit tomorrow. 
1.2.2. Welfare state as intragenerational redistribution 
Theoretical studies that examine immigration under intragenerational redistribution include 
Schmidt, Stilz and Zimmermann {1994}, Razin and SOOka (1995) and Epstein and Hillman 
(2003). In contrast to the previous subsection where all the four studies used an overlapping-
generations model for the workhorse, these studies indicate that researchers take fairly dif-
ferent modelling approaches when the time dimension is not explicitly incorporated. 
In Schmidt, Stilz and Zimmermann (1994), intragenerational redistribution is defined as 
an unemployment benefit. The production requires three factors: skilled labour, unskilled 
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labour and capital. They assume that the host country faces an unlimited supply of un-
skilled immigrant workers. A single trade union exists and determines the wage rate for 
unskilled labour, while the wage rate for skilled labour is competitively determined. Since 
the trade union's choice of the unskilled wage rate is not necessarily the market-clearing 
rate, unskilled workers face an unemployment risk. Unemployed unskilled workers receive 
an unemployment benefit that is financed by taxing the returns to all the employed factors. 
Under this setting, if we assume skilled and unskilled labour are complementary, the direc-
tions of the labour-market impacts of immigration are the same as without the trade union. 
That is, skilled workers benefit, while unskilled workers lose. Since immigration causes 
an increase in the unemployment of unskilled citizens, the trade union lowers the relevant 
wage rate in an attempt to cut this unemployment down. As a result, the employment of 
unskilled labour increases, and hence the wage rate for skilled labour rises. The authors do 
not explicitly analyse the impact of immigration on citizens via the unemployment insurance 
scheme. However, the model suggests the two fiscal effects of immigration: an increase in 
the number of unemployed beneficiaries and an increase in the tax revenue via an increase 
in the returns to complementary factors. 
Razin and Sadka (1995) set up a model which is almost the same as Razin and Sadka's 
(2000) except that the lifetime dimension is compressed from two to one period. The wage 
rate and the interest rate perfectly adjust for full employment. Workers have different 
amounts of perfectly substitutable labour due to exogenously distributed heterogeneous 
costs of human capital investment. If human capital investment is too costly, the workers 
choose not to invest and will have a small amount of labour, which is their definition of 
unskilled labour. Immigrants have the small amount of perfectly substitutable labour. 
Redistribution is defined such that all workers receive a common benefit that is financed 
by applying a common tax rate to all the returns to labour and capital. Moreover, the 
size of the per capita benefit adjusts to immigration so that the pre-immigration level of 
net income is guaranteed for unskilled workers. Under this setting, they show that, while 
unskilled workers are indifferent because of the redistribution scheme that fixes their net 
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income, all skilled workers have less net income with immigration than without it. Skilled 
workers are hence anti-immigration. 
Epstein and Hillman (2003) showed the possibility that individual demands for immigra-
tion are positive, even though immigrants become unemployed and receive unemployment 
benefits. The unemployment insurance scheme is financed by taxing all wage earnings. 
The production requires capital and labour, and owners of capital employ labour in an 
efficiency-wage economy where unemployment deliverately exists to extract work effort from 
employees. Employers are pro-immigration because immigrant workers increase the returns 
to capital and also extract more effort from employees by increasing the unemployment risk. 
However, immigrants also increase the tax rate by increasing the number of the unemployed. 
This affects employers because, although the returns to capital are not taxed in the model, 
lower net income for each worker gives less incentive to exert work efforts. Hence there exists 
an intermediate quantity of immigration that maximises the utility of employers. Workers 
face two opposing effects of immigration. On the one hand, immigration negatively affects 
them via an increase in the tax rate and a fall in the wage rate. On the other hand, a 
fall in the wage rate increases employers' demand for labour. Overall, workers may desire 
some immigrants if the unemployment benefit is low and if immigrants can take over the 
disciplinary unemployed posts. However, workers' demand for immigration is not as high 
as that of employers. 
1.2.3. This study 
The contribution of this study is to analyse individual demands for immigration in the 
welfare state where both intra- and intergenerational redistribution programmes are carried 
out. While a typical welfare state runs both types of transfer schemes, the theoretical 
literature on the political economy of immigration in the welfare state has not had a study 
under a setting like ours.3 We systematically introduce two social welfare programmes to a 
3Kemnitz's (2003) framework does contain both intra- and intergenerational redistribution, namely, an unem-
ployment insurance scheme and a pay-as-you-go pension scheme. However, in his model, intragenerational 
redistribution takes place not between different groups but within a group. Unskilled workers are the only 
ones who can be unemployed, and the unemployment insurance scheme is financed by contributions from 
these identical workers only. In our model, intragenerational redistribution take place between skilled and 
unskilled workers. Furthermore, his study does not deal with scenarios where benefits are fixed. Note that 
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benchmark model where no government intervention exists. This enables us to show how 
these programmes shape individual demands for immigration in the host country.4 
We find that, in comparison with the laissez-faire, the existence of social welfare pro-
vision is likely to reduce the difference between individual demands for immigration. This 
is more likely to happen when there are both intra- and intergenerational social welfare 
redistribution. 
We study a two-period overlapping-generations economy where citizens are heteroge-
neous in two dimensions: age and labour qUality. As in the literature, we concentrate 
on individual preferences with respect to the quantity of immigrants with unskilled labour. 
Intergenerational redistribution is represented by a pay-as-you-go pension scheme with a 
common benefit, eg, Razin and Sadka (2000) and Casarico and Devillanova (2003). Intra-
generational redistribution is represented by an income-support scheme that ensures every 
low-income earners a target level of gross income per capita, eg, Razin and Sadka (1995). 
Throughout this chapter, we assume that citizens are unsure of how the immigration quota 
is determined in every period. This is because we would like to see how the introduction 
of majority voting to decide on the immigration quota might affect their demands in the 
next chapter. We also delay the inclusion of endogenous human capital investment until 
the next chapter, for this endogeneity becomes important when immigration policy can be 
anticipated. 
1.3. Benchmark 
In this section, we set up a single-country model where no government intervention ex-
ists. In the subsequent sections, we introduce social welfare programmes to this benchmark 
model. Throughout the chapter, we focus on each citizen's demand for unskilled immigra-
tion in period t. In order to simplify the notation, we do not label variables related to this 
period. We will use subscript -1 to label variables related to period t - 1 and subscript + 1 
for variables related to period t + 1 when necessary. 
empirical studies that attempt to evaluate the net fiscal impact of immigration do deal with both intra- and 
intergenerational redistribution, but the framework is complex and requires numerical simulation. See for 
instance Storesletten (2000), Auerbach and Orespoulos (2000) and Lee and Miller (2000) for the US case. 
4A few results based on this chapter appear in Tamura (2006). 
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The country is inhabited by overlapping generations of individuals who live for two 
consecutive periods. In the first period of life, each person supplies labour to earn wage 
income, saves a fraction of the disposable income for the second period and spends the rest 
on consumption. In the second lifetime period, the person does not work and withdraws 
the savings that have earned interest over one period. All the second-period income is spent 
on consumption, and hence no bequest is left. 
Figure 1.1 Timing of the benchmark model 
Lifetime period Action sequence 
1st born * -+ work -+ receive wage -+ save -+ consume 
2nd reproduce * -+ withdraw savings plus interest -+ consume 
* Time point at which we evaluate each citizen's demand for immigration 
1.3.1. Production 
The production in the country requires three inputs: low- and high-quality labour and 
capital. We follow the literature and represent the production by a Cobb-Douglas function. 
Let Y denote the gross domestic product of the economy, and Hand L denote the total 
quantities of high- and low-quality labour respectively. By assuming the country is a small 
open economy, we have5 
where we assume constant returns to scale, ie, a E (0,1). Let WH and WL denote the wage 
rates for high- and low-qUality labour respectively. We define the wage rate as the marginal 
SLet Y (K, H, L) == K' H~ L' where K is the quantity of capital input and" + e + ( = 1. If the interest 
rate is defined as the marginal product of capital, r == 8Y/8K = "K,-IH(L<' By assuming the perfect 
international mobility of capital and the small size of the economy relative to the rest of the world, we fix 
-L ...L ....L 
the interest rate to obtain K = (,,/r) 1-< H 1-< L rc::(. The amount of capital thus perfectly adjusts to H 
and L under the given interest rate. By substituting this last expression into the production function at 
the beginning, we obtain Y (H, L) = AH'" Ll-o. where A == ( .. /r)~ and Q == ~ E (0,1). We normalise 
A = 1 for ease of exposition. 
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product of labour. 
(1.1) WH (H, L) == oY/oH = OtHO - 1 L 1- 0 
(1.2) wL(H,L)==oY/oL=(l-a)HO L-O 
We thus assume that the wage rates perfectly adjust for full employment. The wage 
functions are homogeneous of degree zero: it is the ratio between the stocks of high- and 
low-quality labour that influences the wage rates. Given the stock of high-quality labour, 
an increase in the stock of low-quality labour raises the wage rate for the former type at a 
decreasing rate and depresses that for the latter at an increasing rate, ie, 
(1.3) oWH/oL=0t(1-0t)HO - 1L-0 >0, 02WH/oL2<0 
(1.4) owL/oL = -a (1 - 01) H O L -0-1 < 0, 02WL/oL2 > ° 
indicating that high- and low-quality labour are complementary in the production. 
Note that, in our analysis, it does not matter whether we use the wage rates or employ-
ment opportunities as the transmission mechanism of immigration's labour-market impact 
because, in either case, the expected effect is continuous. 
1.3.2. Citizens 
Let N denote the total number of young individuals who are born in the country in period 
t. We call them citizens. We assume that citizens do not emigrate. By denoting the 
population growth rate by n > 0, we have N / (1 + n) old citizens who are born in the 
country in period t - 1. We assume the population growth rate of the country is a constant. 
Each individual is endowed with one unit of labour at birth and supplies it exogenously 
in the first period of life. We assume that the quality of a person's labour is determined by 
exogenous factors, eg, schooling norms, that prevail in the country.6 Let h E (0,1) denote 
the share of high-quality labour in the total stock of young citizens' labour. Accordingly, 
6This assumption will be relaxed in the next chapter. 
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there are hN and (1 - h) N young citizens with high- and low-quality labour respectively 
in period t. 
1.3.3. Immigrants 
We define immigration as the entry of young individuals who are born with one unit of labour 
outside the country and have not supplied labour yet. We assume the country attracts an 
infinite number of such immigrants. Immigrants stay in the country until death. They 
acquire the country's citizenship during their labour supply. The precise timing of the 
last assumption matters when we subsequently introduce social welfare programmes into 
the economy, for we assume that the access to social welfare benefits is conditional on the 
aquisition of the citizenship. 
The quality of their labour is exogenously low in the sense that it can be perfectly 
substituted for young citizens' low-quality labour. Let M denote the total number of 
immigrants entering the country in period t. Let us define immigration policy as the ratio 
of immigrants to young citizens: 
(1.5) m == MIN 
Finally, we assume that, by the time they retire, immigrants perfectly assimilate citi-
zens in terms of fertility. Blau (1992) for instance found that the fertility rate of female 
migrants from high-fertility countries to the United States was almost the same as native 
Americans because of self-selection and assimilation. Anyone who is born in the country 
is automatically given citizenship. Hence immigrants' children are citizens of the country. 
They are indistinguishable from those whose parents are born in the country, ie, the quality 
of their labour is exogenously determined in the same way as natives' children's.7 
7These 88sumptions are often employed to keep analysis tractable because it implies the impact of immigra-
tion lasts for the entry period only: see the next subsection. Krieger (2004) for instance relaxed one of these 
888imilation 888umption in the benchmark model of Razin and Sadka (2000) by observing that immigrants 
tend to have more children than citizens. His analysis is conducted under a constant wage rate with a 
pay-a&-you-go pension scheme only. We do not examine the case of different fertility rates among citizens 
and immigrants, for we have non-constant wage rates and later introduce two social welfare programmes 
rather than only one. 
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1.3.4. Labour market 
The labour force in the country in period t is the sum of the following; 
(1.6) H = hN 
(1.7) L=(I-h)N+M={I-h+m)N 
where we used definition (1.5) in equation (1.7). 
Since immigrants acquire citizenship during their labour supply, there are N + Mold 
citizens in period t + 1. The perfect assimilation assumption results in h (1 + n) (N + M) 
and (1 - h) (1 + n) (N + M) young citizens with high- and low-quality labour respectively 
in that period. This suggests that the impact of immigration lasts for the entry period 
only; both the ratio between the old and the young and the ratio between the skilled and 
the unskilled are affected by immigration only contemporaneously. 
By substituting expressions (1.6) and (1.7) into (Ll) to (1.4), we rewrite them as 
(1.8) WH (m) = o:ho - 1 (1- h + m)l-O , w~ = 0: (1- 0:) ho - 1 (1 - h + m)-O > 0 
(1.9) WL (m) = (1- 0:) hO (1 - h + m)-O , w~ = -0: (1- 0:) hO (1- h + m)-O-l < 0 
where we used a single prime to label the first derivative with respect to immigration policy. 
Immigration thus depresses the wage rate for unskilled working citizens and raises that for 
the skilled. 8 
8LaLonde and Topel (1991) found that the impact of immigration on natives' earnings is insignificant in the 
United States. Altonji and Card (1991) found a significantly negative but small effect of immigration on 
natives' wages in the country. Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1992: Tables 7.7 and 7.8) found that immigration 
reduced earnings of unskilled workers relative to skilled workers in the country by increasing thc supply 
of unskilled labour. Friedberg and Hunt (1995) reviewed these and other studies on thc labour-market 
impact of immigration in the United States in detail and concluded that it is negative but trivial. See also 
LaLonde and Topel (1997: 819-827) for another review. The past studies typically examined correlations 
between native wages and the presence of immigrants by location, eg, US metropolitan areas, and found 
them negative but weak or insignificant. This might be because of natives' rcactions to immigration, eg, 
moving to another location or industry. Winter-Ebmer and ZweimUller (1996) separated their data by 
native mobility and found that the growth of foreign workers slowed the growth of wages for unskilled native 
workers who stayed with the same firm, while the wage growth among those who moved to another firm was 
not affected in Austria. Borjas (2003) defined labour skill in terms of both education and work experience 
and made the size of the native workforce in each skill group stable over time, lessening the complication 
that arises from natives' reactions to immigration in the labour market. He then found a 10% increase in 
immigration in a skill group depresscd the corresponding wage by 3 to 4 percent in the L'nited States. De 
New and Zimmermann (1994) found not only a negative wage impact 011 unskilled natives but also a small 
positive wage effect on skilled natives in Germany. Gang and Rivera-Batiz (1994) suggest that education. 
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We assume the wage rate for low-quality labour is lower than that for high-quality labour 
in the country without immigration. 
Assumption 1.1 WL (0) < WH (0) or equivalently 
(1.10) h<o. 
Inequality (1.10) states that the share of young citizens with high-quality labour in the gross 
domestic product is higher than their share in the pre-immigration labour force. Expressions 
(1.8) and (1.9) imply WL (m) < WH (m) "i/ m E [0,00) if Assumption 1.1 holds. 
1.3.5. Consumption 
Let Cl and C2 denote the first- and the second-period consumption by an individual respec-
tively. A young person maximises the following Cobb-Douglas lifetime utility function: 
where (3 E (0,1) represents the preference for the first-period consumption. 
Let z denote the lifetime income of an individual. The maximisation of the utility then 
yields the optimal first-period consumption equal to (3z and the optimal second-period con-
sumption equal to (1 - (3) (1 + r) z where r > 0 is the rate ofinterest.9 By substituting these 
into u, we obtain the indirect utility, (3fJ [(1 - (3) (1 + r)]l-fJ z, where (3fJ [(1 - (3) (1 + r)]l-fJ 
is a positive constant. Hence we focus on the lifetime income when we examine the prefer-
ence of a young citizen. 
The utility of an old citizen depends only on the second-period consumption. Since 
there is no bequest, all the second period income is spent on consumption. We can then 
focus on the second-period income when we examine the preference of an old citizen. 
work experience and unskilled labour are complementary inputs. Ottaviano and Peri (2006) show that 
the p08itive wage effect is likely to be dominant because immigrants and natives are imperfect substitutes. 
These studies then indirectly support our wage equations (1.8) and (1.9). 
9Form the Lagrangian, C(C"C2'~) = U(Ci,C2)+~[Z-CI-C2/(l+r)J. Due to the monotonicity as-
sumption on the individual utility, we can treat the consumer budget constraint as equality rather than 
inequality. 
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1.3.6. Income 
Without the government sector, the lifetime income of an individual is simply 
(1.11) (1 + r) s z=y-s+ =y 
1+r 
where Y denotes the gross income in the first lifetime period and s denotes the amount 
saved in that period. Since each young person is endowed with one unit of labour, we have 
YL = WL and YH = WHo The reason why we introduce an additional notation, y, is because 
we will have YL f WL when we introduce intragenerational redistribution later on. 
An old citizen lives on his/her savings plus interest, ie, 
(1.12) x = (1 + r) Ll 
where x denotes the second-period income. 
1.3.1. Preferences without a social welfare programme 
Our first proposition states policy preferences of citizens in this benchmark setting where 
there is no social welfare provision. We examine their preferences before young ones work 
and old ones withdraw savings. The precise timing is given in Figure 1.1 at the beginning 
of this section. 
Proposition 1.1 Without social welfare redistribution, young citizens with high-quality 
labour desire an open-border policy, while young citizens with low-quality labour desire a 
closed-border policy. Retired citizens are indifferent. 
Proof. Immigration affects young citizens' preferences according to expressions (1.8) and 
(1.9), as equation (1.11) shows. Equation (1.12) suggests that immigration does not affect 
retirees because they made their savings decisions in period t - 1 and hence cannot change 
these in the second lifetime period. o 
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This result is purely a consequence of the labour-market impact of immigration. These 
polarised extreme preferences of workers are the characteristics of the standard factor-
proportion model. 
1.4. Income Support 
Let us introduce an income-support scheme to the economy. The scheme financially 
supports those workers who earn less than adequately. Let w > 0 denote the minimum level 
of gross income that the government would like to ensure every worker has. We assume 
it is higher than the wage rate for low-quality labour and lower than that for high-quality 
labour in the economy without immigration, ie, w (0) E (WL (0), WH (0)). Accordingly, in 
the pre-immigration economy, any worker endowed with low-quality labour receives 
(1.13) b(O) = w(O) - wdO) > 0, 
while workers with high-quality labour do not. Therefore, YL (0) = w (0) and YH (0) 
WH (0). 
The income-support scheme is financed by applying a common tax rate, denoted by jJ., 
to the gross income of all workers. The balanced government budget is therefore given by 
(1.14) 
where we have the total revenue on the left hand side and the total expenditure on the right. 
Equation (1.14) suggests that the income-suppport scheme intragenerationally redistributes 
income from skilled to unskilled workers.10 
lOWe do not tax interest earnings of old citizens. Such taxation clearly makeH the scheme both intr8- and 
intergenerational1y redistributive. As a result, old citizens will be affected by immigration via the tax rate. 
The taxation of interest earnings leads to ambiguity in many cases that we consider in this chapter bl'cause 
the savings decision depends on it in the next period. 
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Figure 1.2 Timing of the income-support model 
Lifetime period Action sequence 
1st born * -+ work -+ receive net wage (incl. benefit) -+ save -+ consume 
2nd reproduce * -+ withdraw savings plus interest -+ consume 
* Time point at which we evaluate each citizen's demand for immigration 
1.4.1. Income 
Under the income-support scheme, the lifetime income of an individual is given by 
(1.15) (1 + r) s z=(I-p)y-s+ =(I-p)y l+r 
where we observe that, compared to the benchmark, gross income is now reduced by taxation. 
In addition, a worker with low-quality labour has a fixed level of gross income, for the person 
receives b given in expression (1.13). An old citizen lives on his/her savings plus interest, 
ie, equation (1.12) in the benchmark model. 
1.4.2. Preferences under a fixed tax rate 
If the tax rate is fixed at some positive fraction, we can rearrange the government budget 
constraint (1.14) as 
(1.16) pWHH +wLL w = =---=--.-::-(1- p)L 
By substituting the equilibrium conditions (1.6) to (1.9) into it, we obtain 
(1.17) w = 1- 0(1- p) ( h )0 I-p I-h+m 
which implies that the target level of gross income per capita is strictly decreasing in immi-
gration policy at an increasing rate, ie, 
(1.18) w' = -ahQ 1 - a (1 - p) < 0 (1 - h + m)l+O 1 - p 
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(1.19) w" = 0 (1 + o) he
Q 1- 0 (1- J.L) > 0 
(1 - h + m}2+Q 1 - J.L 
In the beginning of this section, we made an assumption that w (0) E (WL (0), WH (0» 
holds. By substituting expressions (1.8), (1.9) and (1.17) into this assumption, we can 
rewrite it as J.L E (0, Q~h) where Q~h E (0,1) by Assumption 1.1. Accordingly, by fixing 
the tax rate at some J.L E (0, "~h), expressions (1.8) and (1.18) imply w(m) < WH (m) V 
mE [0,00). We also guarantee w (m) > wL (m) V mE [0,00) because w (m) > WL (m) => 
J.L > 0 V m E [O,oo}. Hence expression (1.13) is true for all m E [O,oo}. We then have 
1IL (m) = w (m) and 1IH (m) = WH (m) V m E [O,oo}. 
Proposition 1.2 Under the income-support scheme with the tax rate being fixed at some 
J.L E (0, .. ~h), retired citizens are indifferent, young citizens with high-quality labour desire an 
open-border policy, and young citizens with low-quality labour desire a closed-border policy. 
Proof. Expression (1.12) implies the income of a retiree is unaffected by immigration. By 
expression (1.15), we have zH = (1 - J.L) wH > 0 as expression (1.8) implies, and z~ = 
(1 - J.L) w' < 0 as expression (1.18) implies. o 
The preference outcome is the same as for the benchmark. However, notice that the 
desire of unskilled young citizens for closed-border policy arises not simply because of the 
negative labour-market impact of immigration. It is rather the consequence of intensified 
competition for a share in the income-support scheme's resource, for immigration increases 
the number of net beneficiaries. 
1.4.3. Preferences under fixed target gross income 
If the target level of gross income per capita is fixed at some wE (WL (0), wH (0», we can 
rewrite the government budget constraint (1.14) as 
(1.20) (w - WL) L w - wL J.L= = 
wHH + wL oh" (1 - h + m)-" + w 
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which implies that the tax rate is strictly increasing in immigration policy at a decreasing 
rate, ie, 
(1.21) 
(1.22) 
Proposition 1.3 Under the income-support scheme with the target level of per capita gross 
income being fixed at some w E (WL (0), WH (0)), retired citizens are indifferent, and young 
citizens with low-quality labour desire closed-border policy. If a :5 1/2, young citizens with 
high-quality labour desire an open-border policy. Otherwise, they desire either a closed-
border or a restrictive policy. 
Proof. Expression (1.12) implies the income of a retiree is unaffected by immigration. 
By expression (1.15), we have z~ = -WJ1.' < 0 as expression (1.21) implies, and z~ = 
(1 - J1.) w~ - WHJ1.'. By substituting expressions (1.8), (1.20) and (1.21) into the latter, we 
obtain 
, oh2o.- 1 (1- h + m)-2o. [OWL - (20 - 1)w] 
zH = 2 
[oho. (1 - h + m)-o. + w] 
The sign of this derivative is determined by the sum of the two terms in the square brackets 
in the numerator. If 0:5 1/2, it is positive. If 0> 1/2 and OWL (0) :5 (20 -1)w, we have 
z~ :5 0 'V m E [0,(0) as expression (1.9) implies. If 0> 1/2 and OWL (0) > (20, -1)w, 
is the ideal policy for young citizens with high-quality labour. o 
We now observe that skilled young citizens may no longer desire an open-border policy. 
The intuition is that the positive impact of immigration on the returns to high-quality 
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labour may be offset by the corresponding increase in the per capita burden of running the 
income-support scheme. 
We observe that argmaxzH (m) is strictly decreasing in w when 0> 1/2 and OWL (0) > 
(20 - 1) w. A higher target level of gross income per capita implies that the impact of 
immigration on the tax rate is larger. 
1.5. Pension 
Let us remove the income-support scheme for the moment and introduce a pay-as-you-
go pension scheme to the benchmark economy. I I Young citizens pay for the provision of 
pension benefits to old citizens. The pension benefit per capita is common to all old citizens 
and is denoted by P ~ O. The scheme is financed by applying a common contribution rate, 
denoted by "Y, to the gross earnings of all young workers. The balanced government budget 
for the pension scheme is given by 
(1.23) 
where we have the total revenue on the left hand side and the total expenditure on the right. 
Figure 1.3 Timing of the pension model 
Lifetime period Action sequence 
1st born * -+ work -+ receive net wage -+ save -+ consume 
2nd reproduce * -+ withdraw savings plus interest, receive pension -+ consume 
* Time point at which we evaluate each citizen's demand for immigration 
1.5.1. Income 
Under the pension scheme, the lifetime income of an individual is given by 
(1.24) (1+r)s P+1 P+1 z=(1-"Y)Y-s+ +--=(1-,)y+--1+r 1+r 1+r 
llEven under this setting, ie, the welfare state is represented by the public pension only, the country may 
well attract immigrants sufficiently. Sana and Massey (2000) found that Mexican workers whose jobs do 
not provide them with old-age social security are more likely to migrate to the United States. 
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where we observe that the first-period gross income is reduced by the pension contribution, 
but there is a pension benefit received in the second lifetime period. Since we have removed 
the income-support scheme, YL = WL and YH = WHo 
The income of an old citizen is given by 
(1.25) x = (1 + r) B-1 + P 
1.5.2. Preferences under a fixed contribution rate 
Suppose the contribution rate is fixed at some "( E (0,1) which results in p (0) > O. We 
then rewrite the government budget constraint (1.23) as follows: 
(1.26) p= "(y ="((1+n)hO (1_h+m)1-0 
H-1 + L-1 
which implies that the per capita pension benefit is strictly increasing in immigration policy 
at a decreasing rate, ie, 
(1.27) p' = "((1 + n)wL > 0 
(1.28) p" = "((1 + n)wL < 0 
Note that our assmuption of immigrants' perfect assimilation results in 
-YY+1 ( )hO( h )1-0 (1.29) P+1 = H + L = "( 1 + n 1 - + m+1 
which implies that the pension term in the lifetime-income expression (1.24) is unaffected 
by immigration policy in period t. In this chapter, we concentrate on policy preferences 
without paying attention to the determination of immigration policy in each period. In 
other words, m+1 is taken as given. 
Proposition 1.4 Under the pension scheme with the contribution rate being fixed at some 
"( E (0,1), retired citizens and young citizens with high-quality labour desire an open-border 
policy, and young citizens with low-quality labour desire a closed-border policy. 
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Proof. Expressions (1.25) and (1.27) imply x' = p' > O. By expression (1.24), we have 
z~ = (1 - 1) w~ > 0 and z~ = (1 - 1) w~ < O. o 
The introduction of a pay-as-you-go pension scheme with a fixed contribution rate thus 
makes retirees pro-immigration rather than indifferent. The proposition suggests that 
citizens are divided into two extreme opinions. 
1.5.3. Preferences under fixed per capita pension 
If the per capita pension benefit is fixed at some positive value, we can rearrange the gov-
ernment budget constraint (1.23) as follows: 
(1.30) 
which implies that the contribution rate is strictly decreasing in immigration policy at an 
increasing rate, ie, 
(1.31) l' _ - (1- a)p 
- (1 + n) hQ (1 _ h + m)2 Q < 0 
(1.32) /I (2 - a) (1- a)p 1 = (l+n)hQ(I-h+m)3 Q >0 
It is reasonable to assume 1 (0) E (0,1) which requires p E (0, H_~iOL1)' ie, the per capita 
pension benefit is less than the pre-immigration gross domestic product divided by the 
number of old citizens. 
Proposition 1.5 Under the pension scheme with the per capita pension benefit being fixed 
at some p E (0, (1 + n) hQ (1 - h)l-Q), retired citizens are indifferent, young citizens with 
high-quality labour desire an open-border policy, and young citizens with low-quality labour 
desire either a closed-border or a restrictive policy. 
Proof. Expression (1.25) implies the income of a retiree is unaffected by immigration. By 
expression (1.24), we have zH = (1 - 1) wH - WH1' > 0 as expressions (1.8) and (1.31) 
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imply, and zI, = (1 - "Y) wI, - WL"Y'· By substituting expressions (1.9), (1.30) and (1.31) 
into the latter, we get 
, (1 - a) [p - (1 + n) aho (1 - h + m)l-O] 
zL = ------~--------------.. ------~ (1 + n) (1 - h + m)2 
The sign of this derivative is determined by the sum of the two terms in the square brackets. 
The following expression suggests that z1 < 0 when zI, = O. 
Hence if p > a (1 + n) hO (1- h)l-O, we have 
Otherwise, argmax ZL (m) = O. o 
The introduction of a pay-as-you-go pension scheme with a fixed per capita benefit may 
thus make unskilled young citizens desire some positive quantity of immigration even though 
immigration has a negative labour-market impact on them. This is because the positive net 
fiscal contribution effect of immigration dominates the negative labour-market effect when 
the total welfare expenditure requirement is higher than the share of high-quality workers 
in the gross domestic product, ie, (H-l + L-d p > aY. We also observe that the ideal 
policy for unskilled workers is increasing in the size of the per capita pension benefit and 
decreasing in the population growth rate when zI, (0) > O. 
1.6. Welfare State I 
We now examine the cases where both the pay-as-you-go pension scheme and the income-
support scheme operate in the country. To this end, we first assume that there is a balanced 
government budget constraint for each scheme.12 The advantage of this approach for our 
12This modelling approach is used for example by Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (2005) and Van Groezen, Leers 
and Meijdam (2003). 
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analysis is that we can distinguish between the effects of intra- and intergenerational social 
welfare redistribution. 
The balanced budget constraint for the income-support scheme is given by equation 
(1.14). As for the pension scheme, we need to modify equation (1.23) because the gross 
income of a young citizen with low-quality labour is not W L but w due to the income-support 
scheme, ie, 
(1.33) 
Figure 1.4 Timing of the model with both income support and pension 
Lifetime period Action sequence 
1st born * -+ work -+ receive net wage (incl. benefit) -+ save -+ consume 
2nd reproduce * -+ withdraw savings plus interest, receive pension ~ consume 
* Time point at which we evaluate each citizen's demand for immigration 
1.6.1. Income 
The lifetime income of an individual is given by 
(1.34) (1 + r) S PH PH z=(l-J.'--y)Y-S+ +--=(I-J.'--Y)Y+--l+r l+r l+r 
where YH = WH and YL = w. The income of an old citizen is given by expression (1.25). 
1.6.2. Preferences under a fixed tax rate and a fixed contribution rate 
Suppose first that the tax rate for the income-support scheme and the contribution rate for 
the pension scheme are respectively fixed at some J.' E (0, Ot~h) and -y E (0,1) such that 
J.' + -y < 1 holds. With a fixed tax rate, the relevant budget constraint for the income-
support scheme is given by expression (1.17). As for the pension scheme, since the budget 
constraint (1.33) contains w which is endogenous in m in this subsection, we substitute 
(1.16) into (1.33) to obtain 
(1.35) P=-l -y (l+n)hQ(l-h+m)l-Q 
-I' 
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which implies that the per capita pension benefit is strictly increasing in immigration policy 
at a decreasing rate, ie, 
(1.36) 
(1.37) 
p' = -1 -y (1 + n) WL > 0 
-I' 
p" = -1 -y (1 + n)w~ < 0 
-I-' 
Compared to expression (1.26), the per capita pension benefit (1.35) is larger because the 
income-support scheme results in a higher contribution by each unskilled young citizen than 
without the scheme. 
Proposition 1.6 Under the income-support scheme with the tax rote being fixed at some 
I' E (0, Q~h) and the pension scheme with the contribution rote being fixed at some -y E (0,1) 
such that I-'+-Y < 1 holds, retired citizens and young citizens with high-quality labour desire an 
open-border policy, and young citizens with low-quality labour desire a closed-border policy. 
Proof. Expressions (1.25) and (1.36) imply x' = p' > O. By expression (1.34), we have 
zn = (1 - I-' - -y) wn > 0 as expression (1.8) implies, and z~ = (1 - I-' - -y) w' < 0 as 
expression (1.18) implies. 0 
The result is the combination of Propositions 1.2 and 1.4. At a glance, it appears 
identical to the case where only the pension scheme exists with a fixed contribution rate. 
However, the difference is that unskilled young citizens desire zero immigration not because 
the relevant wage rate is depressed but because the generosity of income support in terms 
of the target level of gross income per capita is reduced by the entry of low-income earners. 
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1.6.3. Preferences under a fixed tax rate and fixed per capita pension 
Let us continue to assume that the tax rate for the income-support scheme is fixed at some 
P. E (0, Or:h). Now suppose that, instead of the contribution rate, the pension benefit per 
capita is fixed at some p E (0, (1 + n) hOr (1 - h)l-Or) which implies l' (0) E (0,1). Let us 
also assume p. + l' (0) < 1. The relevant government budget constraint for the income-
support scheme is given by expression (1.17). As for the pension scheme, we substitute 
(1.16) into (1.33) to obtain 
(1.38) (1- p.)p l' - ___ oO.-~"':":"_----;---=-
- (1 + n) he> (1 - h + m)l Or 
which implies the contribution rate is strictly decreasing in immigration policy at an in-
creasing rate, ie, 
(1.39) I -(l-p.)(l-O')p <0 l' = (1 + n) he> (1 _ h + m)2-Or 
(1.40) " (1 - p.)(2 - 0')(1 - 0') p > 0 l' = (1 + n) hOr (1 _ h + m)3 Or 
Compared to expression (1.30), the contribution rate (1.38) is smaller again because the 
income-support scheme results in a higher contribution by each unskilled young citizen than 
without the scheme. 
Proposition 1. 7 Under the income-support scheme with the tax rote being fixed at some 
p. E (0, Or:h) and the pension scheme with the per capita pension benefit being fixed at some 
p E (0, (1 + n) hOr (1 - h)l-Or) such that p. + l' (0) < 1 holds, retired citizens are indifferent, 
and young· citizens with high-quality labour desire an open-border policy. Young citizens 
with low-quality labour desire either a closed-border or a restrictive policy. 
Proof. Expression (1.25) implies the income of a pensioner is unaffected by immigration. 
By expression (1.34), we have zH = (1- p. - 1') wit - WH1" > 0 as expressions (1.8) and 
(1.39) imply, and zi, = (1 - p. - 1') w' - W"'('. By substituting expressions (1.17), (1.18), 
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(1.38) and (1.39) into the latter, we obtain 
I [1 - (1 - Jl) oj [p - (1 + n) oh" (1 - h + m)l-,,] 
zL = (l+n)(l-h+m)2 
The sign of this derivative is determined by the sum of the two terms in the second square 
brackets in the numerator. Since 
11 2 [1 - (1 - Jl) oj [l¥ (1 + n) oh" (1 - h + m)l-" - p] 
ZL = (1 + n) (1 _ h + m)3 ' 
we have Z'£ < 0 when z£ = O. Hence if p > (1 + n) oh" (1 - h)1-0, we have 
( p )~ argmax ZL (m) = (1 + n) oh<> - (1- h) > O. 
Otherwise, argmax ZL (m) = O. o 
The result is the combination of Propositions 1.2 and 1.5. Note that the preference of 
unskilled young citizens is the same as in Proposition 1.5 where only the pension scheme 
exists with a fixed per capita pension benefit. A comparison of the expressions for z£ 
in this proposition and Proposition 1.5 indicates that the net income per capita for the 
unskilled young is made more sensitive to immigration by the income support scheme even 
if w is endogenous, ie, 1 - 0 < 1 - (1 - Jl) o. However, the peak of ZL is given by the same 
immigration policy as in Proposition 1.5. As before, we observe argmaxzL (m) is increasing 
in p and decreasing in n when z£ (0) > O. 
1.6.4. Preferences under fixed target gross income and a fixed contribution rate 
Suppose that the target level of gross income per capita is fixed at some wE (WL (0), WH (0» 
and the contribution rate for the pension scheme is fixed at some 'Y E (0,1) such that 
Jl (0) + I < 1 holds. The relevant government budget constraint for the income-support 
scheme is given by expression (1.20). As for the pension scheme, expression (1.35) no longer 
applies because w is not endogenous in immigration policy in this subsection. We rearrange 
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equation (1.33) as follows: 
(1.41) p=-y(1+n)[wHh+w(1-h+m)] 
which implies that the per capita pension benefit is strictly increasing in immigration policy 
at a decreasing rate, ie, 
(1.42) p' = 1 (1 + n) (w~h + w) > 0 
(1.43) p" = 1 (1 + n) w'lih < 0 
Note that, compared to expression (1.35) for the case of a fixed tax rate for the income-
support scheme, the per capita pension benefit (1.41) is larger only if W > (~-~\(t?:)WL 
holds. Compared to expression (1.26) without the income-support scheme, the per capita 
pension benefit (1.41) is larger because W > WL. 
Proposition 1.8 Under the income-support scheme with the target level of gross income 
per capita being fixed at some w E (WL (0) ,WH (0)) and the pension scheme with the contri-
bution rote being fixed at some -y E (0,1) such that 1-' (0) +1 < 1 holds, retired citizens desire 
an open-border policy, and young citizens with low-quality labour desire a closed-border pol-
icy. The preference of young citizens with high-quality labour is either a closed-border or a 
restrictive policy. 
Proof. Expressions (1.25) and (1.42) imply x' = p' > O. By expression (1.34), we have 
z£ = -WIL' < 0 as expression (1.21) implies, and zn = (1 -IL - 1) wn - WHIL'. The first 
positive term of zn is strictly decreasing in m, while expression (1.21) suggests that the 
second negative term is strictly increasing in it. By substituting expressions (1.8), (1.20) 
and (1.21), we get 
Zl H 
aha - 1 (1 - h + m)-a 
------~------~--~2 x 
[aha (1- h + m)-a +w] 
{(1 - 21a)wwL - -y (1- a)w2 - aha (1 - h + m)-a [w - (1 - -ya) wLJ} 
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The sign of this derivative is determined by the sum of the three terms in the braces. If 
1 ::; 2/,0, it is unambiguously negative. Otherwise, it can be positive. The sign of the 
second derivative is unambiguously negative when evaluated at z~ = 0, ie, 
z" H = 
02hOl - 1 (1 - h + m)-0I-1 w 
3 x 
[Oha (1 - h + m)-OI + w] 
{ oha (1 - h + m)-OI [w - (1 - /,0) wLJ- (1 - 2/,a) WWL + /' (1 - 0) w2 
+oha (1 - h + m)-OI [w - (1 - /,a) wLJ - (1 - 2/,a) WWL 
-"Ya (1 - 0) hOI (1- h + m)-o. w 
_a2 (1 - a) (2 - a) (1 -/,0) h3o. (1- h + m)-301 w-1} 
which suggests that the first three terms in the braces sum to zero when z~ = O. This in 
turn suggests the sum of the fourth and the fifth terms is negative. Hence z,!! < 0 when 
~=~ 0 
The result is the combination of Propositions 1.3 and 1.4. We are unable to explicitly 
solve for arg max Z H (m) under the current setting and cannot compare the result with 
Proposition 1.3 where w was fixed without the pension scheme. Note, however, that an 
open-border policy is no longer a possibility for skilled young citizens while it was a possibility 
in Proposition 1.3. This is because the existence of the pension scheme reduces the positive 
impact of immigration on the skilled wage rate by /,w~, and hence the first term of z~ 
cannot continue to dominate the second term. 
1.6.5. Preferences under fixed target gross income and fixed per capita pension 
Finally we consider the case where the target level of gross income per capita is fixed 
at some w E (WL (0), WH (0)) and the per capita pension benefit is fixed at some p E 
(0, (1 + n) hOI (1 - h)l-OI) such that JL (0) + /' (0) < 1 holds. The relevant government bud-
get constraint for the income-support scheme is given by (1.20). As for the pension scheme, 
expression (1.38) no longer applies because w is not endogenous in m in this subsection. We 
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rearrange equation (1.33) as follows: 
(1.44) "Y= P (1 + n) [wHh +w(l- h + m)] 
which implies that the contribution rate is strictly decreasing in immigration policy at an 
increasing rate, ie, 
(1.45) , -P(wH h + w ) 0 "Y = 2 < (1 + n) [wHh+w(l- h + m)] 
(1.46) " 2P(WHh+w)2 "Y = 3 (1 + n) [wHh + w (1 - h + m)] 
pw" h 
H >0 
(1 + n) [wHh + w (1 - h + m)]2 
Note that, compared to expression (1.38) for the case of a fixed tax rate for the income-
support scheme, the contribution rate (1.44) is smaller only if w > (~=L)ttJ:)WL holds. 
Compared to expression (1.30) without the income-support scheme, the contribution rate 
(1.44) is smaller because w > WL. 
Proposition 1.9 Under the income-support scheme with the target level of gross income 
per capita being fixed at some w E (WL (0) ,WH (0» and the pension scheme with the per 
capita pension benefit being fixed at some p E (0, (1 + n) hO (1 - h)1-0) such that IL (0) + 
"Y (0) < 1 holds, retired citizens are indifferent. Young citizens desire either a closed-border 
or a restrictive policy. Young citizens with high-quality labour desire at least as much 
immigration as young citizens with low-quality labour. 
Proof. Expression (1.25) implies that m does not affect the income of a pensioner. By 
expression (1.34), we have z£ = - (IL' + "Y')w and ZH = (1 - IL - "Y) w~ - (IL' + "Y') WHo By 
using expressions (1.21) and (1.45), we get 
, , (1 + n) aho (1 - h + m)l-o w - (wHh + w) p 
P. +"Y = 2 
(1 + n)(l- h + m)2 [aho (1- h + m)-O + w] 
where the two terms in the numerator are strictly increasing in m. Hence there exists 
arg maxzL (m) > 0 if (1 + n) aho (1 - h)l-O w < (w~ (0) h + w) p. Otherwise, we have 
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argmaxzL(m) = O. Since (1 - JL - "() w~ (arg maxzL (m» > 0 'V mE [0,00) and w'fI < 0, 
argmax ZH (m) 2: argmax ZL (m) 'V mE [0,00). 0 
The result is the combination of Propositions 1.3 and 1.5. If immigration's fiscal 
contribution to the pension scheme initially dominates its negative impact through the 
income-support scheme, the sum of the tax rate and the contribution rate is minimised at a 
certain value of m. While this is what young citizens with low-quality labour desire, young 
citizens with high-quality labour are likely to demand more immigration due to its positive 
impact on the wage rate for high-quality labour. However, this positive impact diminishes, 
and hence they do not desire an open-border policy. 
1.7. Welfare State II 
In the previous section, we assumed that there was a balanced budget constraint for 
each social welfare programme. This approach was useful for distinguishing between the 
two opposing effects of immigration: a positive effect via intergenerational redistribution 
and a negative effect via intragenerational redistribution. It illuminates the usual argument 
related to immigrants' fiscal impact: they use social welfare services but also contribute 
support to the aging population in developed countries. 
Let us now combine the two government budget constraints (1.14) and (1.33) into one 
as follows: 
(1.47) (wHH +wL) T = Lb+ (H-l + L_t>p 
where T is the tax rate. We have the total revenue on the left hand side, and the total 
expenditure on the right hand side. This is the case where the distinction between the two 
tax rates is only a matter of formality, and the allocation of the total tax revenue to different 
programmes has nothing to do with the difference in these tax rates. 13 The timing of the 
model remains the same as in the previous section and is given in Figure 1.4. 
l3See for instance the Institute for Fiscal Studies Briefing Notes 9 (Adam, S., 2004, A survey of the UK tax 
system) and 13 (Crawford, C., Shaw, J., 2004, A survey of the UK benefit system) that suggest that the 
National Insurance Contribution is just another way of raising the tax revenue in the UK. 
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1.1.1. Income 
The lifetime income of an individual is given by 
(1.48) (l+r)s PH P+l z = (1 - 7") Y - s + + -- = (1 - 7") Y + --l+r l+r l+r 
where YH = WH and YL = w. The income of an old citizen is given by expression (1.25). 
1.1.2. Preferences under a fixed tax rate and fixed per capita pension 
Suppose the tax rate is fixed at some 7" E (0,1), and the pension benefit at some P E 
(O,(l+n)hCt (l-h)l-Ct) such that w(O) E (WdO),WH(O» holds. We rewrite the bal-
anced government budget constraint (1.47) as follows: 
(1.49) 
which implies 
(1.50) I P - (1 + n)[l - (1 - 7") oj aN' (1 - h + m)l-Ct 
w = (1-7")(1+n)(1-h+m)2 
(1.51) 
2 {~ (1 + n) [1 - (1 - r) a] ahct (1 - h + m/-o - p} 
w"=~~----------~------------~3--------~ (1 - 7")(1 + n)(l - h + m) 
These expressions suggest w" < ° when w' = O. Compared to expression (1.16) for the case 
without the pension scheme, the target gross income per capita (1.49) is either smaller or 
larger, depending on the size of 7" relative to J1. and the total expenditure for the pension 
scheme. 
Proposition 1.10 Under the income-support and pension schemes with the tax rate be-
ing fixed at some 7" E (0, 1) and the per capita pension benefit being fixed at some P E 
(0, (1 + n) hO (1 - h/-o ) such that w (0) E (WL (0), WH (0» holds, retired citizens are in-
different, young citizens with high-quality labour desire an open-border policy, and young 
citizens with low-quality labour desire either a closed-border or a restrictive policy. 
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Proof. Expression (1.25) implies the income of a retiree is unaffected by immigration. By 
expression (1.48), we have zit = (1 - r) wit > 0 as expression (1.8) implies, and z£ = 
(1 - r) w'. Expressions (1.50) and (1.51) imply w" < 0 when w' = O. Hence if p > 
(1 + n) [1- (1- r) oj ahO: (1- h/-O:, we have argmaxw (m) = 
-.l..-
argmaxzL (m) = C1 + n) [1- ~ _ r)aJ ahO: r- Q - (1- h) > O. 
Otherwise, argmaxzL (m) = O. o 
The intuition is that immigration can increase the total tax revenue by increasing both 
the number of taxpayers and the returns to complementary production factors, ie, high-
quality labour in this model. However, immigration also increases the number of income-
support beneficiaries as well as the size of per capita income support as a result of a depressed 
unskilled wage rate. Accordingly, even if w' (0) > 0, the positive effect can dominate the 
negative effect only up to a certain m because the positive effect is diminishing while the 
negative effect is increasing in immigration. 
Note that when w' (0) > 0 the ideal policy for young citizens with low-quality labour is 
increasing in the per capita pension benefit. Even young citizens who can be substituted 
by immigrants in the labour market become more pro-immigration under a more generous 
pension scheme. This is because, with a fixed tax rate, a larger per capita pension benefit 
implies a smaller income support benefit per capita. As a result, the required m to maximise 
w is higher when p is larger with T fixed. 
The same ideal policy is strictly decreasing in the tax rate and also the population 
growth rate. When n is large, the per capita burden of the pension scheme is not large, 
which suggests that immigrants' fiscal contribution is not very important. When r is large 
with a fixed per capita pension benefit, other things being equal, w is already likely to be 
generous. Hence the maximisation of w does not require much immigration. Notice that, 
compared to Propositions 1.5 and 1.7, argmax ZL (m) when w' (0) > 0 is larger. It did not 
depend on the tax rate in those propositions, but it does so in Proposition 1.10 because the 
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tax revenue must be shared with the pension scheme under the current setting. In other 
w9rds, because the per capita pension benefit is fixed, the positive impact of immigration 
on the pension scheme leaks to the income-support scheme through the single tax rate. 
1.7.3. Preferences under a fixed tax rate and fixed target gross income 
Let us now suppose that the tax rate is fixed at some r E (0,1), and the target gross income 
at some w E (wdO) , WH (0» such that p (0) > 0 holds. We can rewrite the balanced 
government budget constraint (1.47) as p = (wH::~i):l-Lb or 
which suggests 
(1.53) p' = (1 +n){[l- (1- r)oJwL - (1- r)w} 
(1.54) p" = (1 + n) [1 - (1 - r) oj wI. < 0 
That is, the per capita pension benefit is concave in immigration policy. Compared to 
expression (1.26) for the case without the income-support scheme, the pension benefit (1.52) 
is either smaller or larger because, while the tax revenue must be shared with the income-
support scheme, the same scheme also prevents an unskilled young citizen's tax payment 
from falling. 
Proposition 1.11 Under the income-support and pension schemes with the tax rate being 
fixed at some r E (0,1) and the target level of gross income per capita being fixed at some 
w E (wdO) , WH (0» such that p (0) > 0 holds, young citizens with low-quality labour are 
indifferent, young citizens with high-quality labour desire an open-border policy, and old 
citizens desire either a closed-border or a restrictive policy. 
Proof. Expression (1.48) suggests the income of young citizens with low-quality labour 
is unaffected by immigration. It suggests z~ = (1 - r) w~ > 0 as expression (1.8) im-
plies. Expression (1.25) implies x' = p', and expressions (1.53) and (1.54) suggest that, if 
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[1 - (1 - r) a] wdO) > (1- r) w, we have argmaxp(m) = 
( 
[1 - (1 - r) a] (1 - a)) ~ 
argmaxx(m)= h-(I-h»O. (1- r)w 
Otherwise, arg max x (m) = O. o 
Note that old citizens is neither indifferent nor in favour of an open-border policy, which 
has not been observed so far. This is because of an increasing burden that immigration 
imposes on the income-support scheme which then requires a larger and larger share of the 
tax revenue as immigration increases. In fact, the ideal policy for pensioners when pi (0) > 0 
is strictly decreasing in the generosity of the income support programme. Furthermore, it 
is strictly increasing in the tax rate because immigrants' fiscal contribution becomes larger 
under a higher tax rate through their impact on w H and by increasing the number of 
taxpayers. Notice also that unskilled young citizens are indifferent because their net income 
is not affected by immigration with rand w fixed. 
1.1.4. Preferences under fixed target gross income and fixed per capita pension 
Finally let us assume the per capita pension benefit and the target level of gross income per 
capita are respectively fixed at some p E (0, (1 + n) ha (1 - h)l-a) and wE (WL (0) ,WH (0)) 
such that r (0) E (0,1). We rewrite the balanced government budget constraint (1.47) as 
follows: 
(1.55) 
which implies 
(1.56) 
, ahCf (I-h+m)l-Cf w -Ifn(wnh+w) 
r = 2 [wHh+w(l-h+m)] 
The two terms in the numerator are strictly increasing in m. That is, the tax rate is convex 
in m. Notice that expression (1.56) is equal to 1-" + "Y' in Proposition 1.9 where both per 
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capita benefits are fixed in the two government budget constraints. With wand p fixed, we 
have r (m) = I' (m) + 'Y (m). 
Proposition 1.12 Under the income-support and pension schemes with the target level of 
gross income per capita being fixed at some w E (WL (0) ,WH (0)) and the per capita pension 
benefit being fixed at some p E (0, (1 + n) hQ (1 - h)l-a) such that r (0) E (0,1) holds, 
old citizens are indifferent, and young citizens desire either a closed-border or a restrictive 
policy. Young citizens with high-quality labour desire at least as much immigration as young 
citizens with low-quality labour. 
Proof. Expression (1.25) implies the income of a retiree is unaffected by immigration. By 
expression (1.48), we have z£ = -wr' and zH = (1 - r) wH - wHr'. Expression (1.56) 
suggests that, if ahQ(1-h)1-Q w < rt.;(wH(O)h+w) holds, we have argminr(m) = 
argmax ZL (m) > O. Otherwise, argmaxz£ (m) = O. Since expression (1.8) implies 
(1- r)wH (m) > 0 'V m E [0,00) and w'H < 0, we have argmaxzH (m) ~ argmax Z£ (m). 
o 
As expected from expression (1.56), we obtain the same result as in Proposition 1.9 
under the two government budget constraints. 
1.8. Summary 
This chapter has demonstrated how individual demands for immigration might be af-
fected by the existence of welfare programmes and also different institutional settings, eg, 
fixed benefits vs fixed tax rates. Table 1.1 summarises all the results for ease of comparison. 
The main conclusion is that the existence of social welfare provision makes the preferences 
of heterogeneous citizens less polarised. 
When there is no government transfer, the factor-market impact of immigration po-
larises young citizens' preferences into two extremes: unrestricted immigration and zero 
immigration, while leaving retired citizens indifferent (Proposition 1.1). 
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When there is only intragenerational redistribution from high- to low-income earners, 
young citizens' preferences are again polarised while leaving retired citizens indifferent if 
only the expenditure side of this redistributive scheme adjusts to immigration (Proposition 
1.2). However, if the revenue side adjusts to immigration, the preference of skilled young 
citizens may tend to that of the unskilled young, while retired citizens still remain indifferent 
(Proposition 1.3). 
When there is only intergenerational redistribution from young to old citizens, skilled 
young citizens and old citizens desire unrestricted immigration if only the expenditure side 
of the redistribution scheme adjusts to immigration. Their preference opposes to that of 
the unskilled young who desire zero immigration (Proposition 1.4). However, if the revenue 
side adjusts to immigration, the preference of unskilled young citizens may tend to that of 
the skilled young, while retired citizens become indifferent (Proposition 1.5). 
When there are both intra- and intergenerationaI redistribution schemes, skilled young 
citizens and retired citizens desire unrestricted immigration if each scheme has its own 
budget, and if only the expenditure side adjusts to immigration in both schemes. Their 
preference opposes that of the unskilled young who desire zero immigration (Proposition 
1.6). 
If the expenditure side of the intragenerationaI redistribution scheme adjusts to immi-
gration, and if the revenue side of the intergenerational redistribution scheme does so, then 
retired citizens become indifferent, while the preference of unskilled young citizens may tend 
to that of the skilled young (Proposition 1. 7). 
If the revenue side of the intragenerational redistribution scheme adjusts to immigration, 
and if the expenditure side of the intergenerational redistribution scheme does so, then 
the preferences of retired citizens and unskilled young citizens become polarised, while the 
preference of skilled young citizens tend to that of the unskilled young (Proposition 1.8). 
This implies that the median voter is likely to be skilled young. 
If only the revenue side adjusts to immigration in both schemes, the preferences of both 
skilled and unskilled young citizens may tend towards each other, while leaving the retired 
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indifferent (Proposition 1.9). This case is the same as when both schemes are managed 
under a single budget whose revenue side adjusts to immigration (Proposition 1.12). 
If the intra- and intergenerational redistribution schemes are run under a single budget, 
and if only the expenditure for intragenerational redistribution adjusts to immigration, then 
the preference of unskilled young citizens may tend to that of the skilled young, while leaving 
retired citizens indifferent (Proposition 1.10). If only the expenditure for intergenerational 
redistribution adjusts to immigration, then the preference of retired citizens tend towards the 
preference of skilled young citizens, while leaving the unskilled young indifferent (Proposition 
1.11). 
Propositions 1.5, 1.7, 1.9 (1.12), 1.10 and 1.11 suggest the possibility that no one is 
completely against unskilled immigation due to the existence of social welfare provision. 
Among these, only Proposition 1.9 (1.12) implies that the two interest groups move closer 
to each other in terms of preference. In this case, the same public-finance impact of 
immigration is felt by heterogeneous young citizens via taxation, which causes them to 
share one common interest. In other words, the welfare state has the effect of causing 
individual demands for restrictive but not closed-border policy among individuals whose 
preferences are otherwise polarised to two opposite policy directions. 
Although we examined scenarios where either the tax rate or the per capita benefit is 
fixed while the other is adjustable, both may adjust in practice. However, our results in 
Table 1.1. can easily suggest what would happen to individual preferences when both the 
tax rate and the per capita benefit adjust to immigration. For instance, Propositions 1.7 
and 1.8 suggest that preferences of young citizens with different labour skills might become 
closer to each other. 
In this chapter, we did not consider the determination of immigration policy. In some 
circumstances, it might be reasonable to assume that citizens can anticipate how national 
decisions are made regarding immigration. For instance, citizens might be able to anticipate 
a referendum to take place to decide on the immigration quota, eg, Switzerland. Therefore, 
in the next chapter, we examine the policy determination based on our analysis in this 
chapter. 
Table 1.1 Citizen's ideal immigration policy 
Welfare statet Fixingt Citizens~ 
Young 
None 
IS only 
PS only 
IS& PS 
(2 be) 
High-quality labour 
o 
/1. o 
w o if a ~ 1/2; C if a > 1/2 & z~ (0) ~ 0; 
1 (Set-_oW:) ;; h - (1 - h) if a> 1/2 & z~ (0) > 0 
"/ o 
p o 
/1.,,,/ o 
/1.,p o 
w, "/ R if z~ (0) > 0; C otherwise 
w, p At least as much as the unskilled young desire 
Low-quality labour 
C 
C 
C 
C 
= (l+n)ethQ ) 1-0 - (1 - h) if z~ (0) > 0; 
C otherwise 
C 
= (l+n)etha) 1-0 - (1 - h) if z~ (0) > 0; 
C otherwise 
C 
R if z~ (0) > OJ C otherwise 
Prop~ 
Old 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
0 1.4 
1.5 
0 1.6 
1.7 
0 1.8 
1.9 
Continued ... 
~ 
...... 
Table 1.1 (Continued) 
(Welfare state t) (Fixing*) (CitizensU) 
(Young) (Old) 
(High-quality labour) (Low-quality labour) 
IS & PS 7",p 0 ( p r20 (l+n)[l (l T)<>J<>ho - (1 - h) 
(1 be) if z£ (0) > OJ C otherwise 
I 
7", W 0 (ll-(l-T)a](l-a)) a h _ (1 - h) (l-T)w 
if x' (0) > OJ C otherwise 
w,p At least as much as the R if z£ (0) > OJ C otherwise 
unskilled young desire 
tIS = income support, PS = pension, bc = budget constraint(s) 
:j: J.t = income-support tax rate, W = target gross income per capita for the young 
"I = pension contribution rate, p = pension benefit per capita, 7" = tax rate under a single budget constraint 
# 0 = open border, C = closed border, R = restrictive (positive but not 00), '" = indifferent 
~ proposition number 
(Prop~) 
1.10 
1.11 
1.12 
(= 1.9) 
""" 
l-=> 
CHAPTER 2 
Policymaking by Plebiscite 
This chapter contributes to the literature by analysing referendum outcomes 
when citizens are allowed to vote on the immigration quota in the welfare 
state where both intra- and intergenerational redistribution schemes exist. 
The framework in the previous chapter is extended such that human capi-
tal investment decisions of citizens respond to the anticipated immigration 
quota. We find that an open-border policy is the stable majority voting equi-
libiTUm under endogenous human capital acquisition, assuming an unlimited 
supply of unskilled young immigrants and a positive population growth rate. 
2.1. Introduction 
Our analysis in the previous chapter showed that the existence of social welfare pro-
grammes can make individual demands for immigration less polarised among heterogeneous 
citizens. However, they hardly share the same ideal m defined by (1.5), and disagreement 
remains among them. Hence we are interested in the determination of immigration policy 
in this chapter. We will use the framework which we called Welfare State II (Section 1. 7) 
in the previous chapter. That is, we have only one balanced government budget constraint 
for intra- and intergenerational redistribution schemes. 
We introduce a simple rule for determining the unskilled immigration quota. We assume 
that the government unexpectedly introduces a referendum to determine it in period t. The 
time point of the referendum is the same as that at which we evaluated each citizen's demand 
for immigration in the previous chapter (Figure 1.4). That is, the quality of each young 
citizen's labour has been determined, but the labour has not been supplied yet. In addition, 
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we assume that, in period t when the referendum unexpectedly takes place, citizens come to 
know that majority voting is planned to take place at the same time point in every future 
period. 1 
Notice that, in our framework, the determination of future policy does not depend on 
the preceding policy. Young immigrants gain the citizenship of the country during their 
labour supply, which means that they become entitled to not only social welfare benefits 
but also the right to vote on immigration policy when they are retired. However, young 
immigrants assimilate the fertility behaviour that prevails in the country. Their children are 
citizens at birth and are indistinguishable from the children of natives. These assumptions 
yield the same composition of the citizen population in terms of both age and skill at the 
pre-referendum stage in every period. Accordingly, today's immigration policy does not 
change tomorrow's policy choice in our framework. 
In the previous chapter, we reviewed Haupt and Peters (1998) whose three-period 
overlapping-generations structure introduced such dependency of policymaking over time. 
In their case, the age composition of the population changes because immigrants are young 
and continue to work in the following period. Changes in the age composition of the popula-
tion can also be introduced in our two-period overlapping-generations framework by relaxing 
the assumption of a constant population growth rate. For instance, Krieger (2004) assumed 
different fertility behaviours among natives and immigrants within Razin and Sadka's (2000) 
framework where the welfare state is represented by a pay-as-you-go pension scheme only. 
We do not examine the importance of different fertility behaviours in this chapter, for we 
would like to keep our welfare-state model of intra- and intergenerational redistribution 
programmes analytically tractable. 
As discussed by Benhabib (1996) and subsequently formalised by Ortega (2004), immi-
gration is also likely to change the composition of the future electorate in terms of factor 
ITamura (2004) examined cases where only one referendum takes place in period t to determine the im-
migration quota which is applied to either that period only (temporary policy) or all the periods from t 
onwards (permanent policy). The approach has however been criticised by an anonymous referee of Journal 
of Population Economics. Permanent policy fixes m for the future, which is rather unrealistic. Temporary 
policy ignores the effect of policy determination on preferences. Majority voting outcomes for the latter are 
simply based on the preferences we derived in the previous chapter, which can also be interpreted as cases 
with myopic voters. To examine more realistic cases, we assume that a referendum takes place in every 
period. 
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endowment. This is the case, for instance, if there is a correlation between parents and 
their children in terms of skill endowment. The point they made is that immigration policy 
can be cyclic ceteris paribus because the initial majority demand immigrants with factors 
that are complementary to theirs, eg, the skilled majority demand unskilled immigration, 
which allows the unskilled to form the majority in the future. The future majority then de-
mand skilled rather than unskilled immigration. This is an important issue in the political 
economy of immigration policymaking but is not analysed in this chapter. The reason is to 
reduce complexity and obtain results analytically under both intra- and intergenerational 
redistribution. In Ortega (2004), there is no government engaging in redistribution, but the 
model already exhibits complexity due to foresighted voting. We also assume that citizens 
are foresighted, but our perfect assimilation assumption makes our welfare state analysis 
simpler and enables us to introduce endogenous human capital investment subsequently. In 
Ortega (2004), each agent's skill is exogenous. 
This chapter's main finding is that, when human capital investment decisions of natives 
respond to anticipated referendum outcomes, the young native population becomes predom-
inantly high-skilled and opens the border for low-skilled immigration if such immigration is 
almost unlimitedly available and if the adjustment takes place only via the expenditure side 
of the intergenerational redistribution scheme. The intuition is simple. A young citizen 
would invest in human capital only if the net gain were positive. The net gain is positive for 
every young citizen as far as immigration continues to raise the wage rate for high-quality 
labour. This is because, under the income-support scheme, young citizens would not be 
affected by immigration if they remained low-skilled. Accordingly, if the supply of unskilled 
immigration is almost unlimited, most of young citizens desire a combination of investing in 
human capital and opening the border for immigration. With a positive population growth 
rate, young citizens form the majority against the elderly and make it happen. 
We begin by maintaining the assumption that the quality of each citizen's labour is 
exogenously given. Under this assumption, we state majority voting outcomes. We will 
then relax the assumption by endogenising the quality of each young citizen's labour in 
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unskilled immigration. In the last section, we discuss our analysis in this and the previous 
chapters. 
2.2. Majority Voting in Welfare State II 
The framework we use in this section was introduced in section 1.7 of the previous 
chapter. That is, the welfare state is represented by the income-support and pension 
schemes, which are operated under one balanced budget constraint (1.47). The timing of 
the model is given in Figure 1.4 in section 1.6 of the previous chapter. The time horizon is 
infinite. An unlimited supply of immigrants with low-quality labour exists. 
We assume that citizens have perfect foresight. Every citizen participates in a referen-
dum except those who are indifferent. We also assume that they are able to vote for any 
m E [0, 00). We do not consider m < 0, ie, no emigration. 
2.2.1. When the target level of gross income per capita is endogenous 
The first case is that of subsection 1.7.2 where the tax rate and the per capita pension 
benefit are fixed in the balanced government budget constraint (1.47). Accordingly, the 
target level of gross income per capita is the endogenous welfare-state variable, as given in 
expression (1.49). 
Proposition 2.1 When the tax rate and the per capita pension benefit are respectively fixed 
at some T E (0,1) and p E (0, (1 + n) hO (1 - h)l-O) such that w (0) E (wdO) , WH (0)) 
holds, a referendum results in (i) an open-border policy if h > 1/2 and (ii) the policy that 
allows 
(2.1) 
{ 
_1_ 
( l+n)[l (l-T)O]OhO) 1-0 - (1 - h) > 0 if w' (0) > 0 
argmaxw (m) = 0 
otherwise 
if h < 1/2. 
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Proof. Expression (1.25) implies that retired citizens are indifferent. Hence the value of h 
determines the majority. The preferences of young citizens are implied by expression (1.48) 
and stated in Proposition 1.10. o 
The result indicates that, with T and p being fixed, the conflict of interest exists between 
young citizens of two different types. Immigration does not affect the income of an old 
citizen. Expression (2.1) suggests that when Wi (0) > 0 the preferences of unskilled young 
citizens tend towards that of the skilled young when the pension scheme is generous. A high 
per capita pension benefit implies that immigrants' tax contribution becomes important. On 
the other hand, their preferences become polarised when the population growth rate and/or 
the tax rate are/is high. 
2.2.2. When the per capita pension benefit is endogenous 
In the case of subsection 1.7.3 where the per capita pension benefit is endogenous in immigra-
tion, the second-period component of the lifetime income (1.48) is affected by immigration 
policy which is determined in period t + 1. However, as we emphasised in the introduction, 
the choice in period t does not affect the choice in period t + 1 in our framework. In other 
words, young citizens are not able to manipulate m+l by carefully selecting m. 
Proposition 2.2 When the tax rote and the target level of gross income per capita are 
respectively fixed at some T E (0,1) and w E (wdO) , WH (0)) such that p (0) > 0 holds, a 
referendum results in (i) an open-border policy if h> l~n and (ii) the policy that allows 
(2.2) ",gmaxp(m) ~ { 
if h < l~n' 
1-
( II-C1- T)O]e 1- O»)" h - (1 - h) > 0 (1 Tj", 
o 
if pi (0) > 0 
otherwise 
Proof. Expression (1.25) suggests Xl = pl. Expressions (1.53) and (1.54) imply that p is 
concave in m, and N / (1 + n) old citizens desire arg max p (m). Proposition 1.11 suggests 
that hN young citizens with high-quality labour desire an open-border policy. o 
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The proposition suggests that disagreement exists between skilled young citizens and 
the elderly. With a fixed tax rate, the former receive only the positive wage impact of 
immigration. However, the latter receive the fiscal impact of immigration on both intra-
and intergenerational redistribution schemes via the per capita pension benefit. We know 
from sections 1.4 and 1.5 that immigrants are net beneficiaries of the income-support scheme 
and net contributors of the pension scheme. The combined effect results in the per capita 
pension benefit being concave in immigration. Young citizens with low-quality labour are 
indifferent because both T and ware fixed. 
2.2.3. When the tax rate is endogenous 
In the case of subsection 1.7.4 where the target level of gross income per capita and the 
per capita pension benefit are fixed, the majority voting outcome is simply implied by 
Proposition 1.12. 
Proposition 2.3 When the target level of gross income per capita and the per capita pension 
benefit are respectively fixed at some wE (WL (0) ,WH (0)) andp E (0, (1 + n) hOI (1- h)l-"') 
such that T (0) E (0,1) holds, a referendum results in (i) a closed-border policy unanimously if 
z~ (0) :5 0, (ii) the policy that allows argmaxzH (m) E (0,1) if z~ (0) > 0 and h> 1/2 and 
(iii) the policy that allows arg min l' (m) E [0, (0) which is at most as large as arg max ZH (m) 
if h < 1/2. 
Proof. Expression (1.25) implies that retired citizens are indifferent. Hence the value of h 
determines the majority. The preferences of young citizens are implied by expression (1.48) 
and stated in Proposition 1.12. o 
The proposition suggests that no citizen desires an open-border policy when the tax 
rate absorbs the fiscal impact of unskilled immigration on both intra- and intergenerational 
redistribution schemes. It also suggests a possibility that a closed-border policy might be 
unanimously selected. This would be the case if the negative fiscal effect of immigration 
via the income-support scheme is dominant. 
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2.3. Majority Voting under Endogenous Skill Acquisition 
We have so far assumed that the quality of each young citizen's labour is exogenously 
determined after the birth and before the referendum in each period. Since majority voting 
is unexpectedly introduced in period t, h continues to be fixed. However, the quality of 
each young citizen's labour in all the subsequent periods may be endogenous in immigration 
policy. Since a referendum is anticipated from period t + 1 onwards, the human capital 
of a young citizen may be adjusted to anticipated immigration policy. Chiswick (1989) 
emphasised the importance of potential endogeneity that citizens' human capital investment 
decisions respond to immigration. Ignoring this endogeneity may under- or overestimate 
the potential impact of immigration. In her model, citizens adjust their human capital 
investment decisions to immigration ex post. In this chapter, this adjustment takes place ex 
ante. That is, we examine the case where young citizens make a human capital investment 
decision before a referendum takes place.2 
Figure 2.1 Timing of the human capital model 
Lifetime period Action sequence 
1st born, invest * ~ work ~ receive net wage (incl. benefit) -+ save, consume 
2nd reproduce * ~ withdraw savings plus interest, receive pension ~ consume 
* Time point at which a referendum takes place 
2.3.1. Human capital investment by young citizens 
Let i E {I, 2, ... , N} be an index for young citizen i in period t. We assume that each citizen 
is born with an ability parameter, ei E [0,1], that is uncorrelated with the quality of the 
parent's labour. The parameter represents the cost of human capital investment in terms 
of labour. The quality of young citizen i's labour becomes high-quality if ei is disposed out 
of the unit endowment before the labour supply (and before the referendum). Hence the 
21f parents make this decision, we need to distinguish two cases. One is that of altruistic parents who 
maximise the utility of their children. The other is that of selfish parents who maximise their own utility. 
The former yields the same results as the case where young citizens make a human capital investment 
decision by themselves. 
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citizen can supply 1-ei units of high-quality labour if investing in human capital. Without 
human capital investment, the citizen can supply one unit of low-quality labour. 
Accordingly, the lifetime income of a young citizen is given by 
(2.3) z· = (1- r) (1- O'c')Y' + PH 
I II • 1+r 
where Oi E {O, 1} indicates whether citizen i invests or not, and 
(2.4) Yi = { W 
WH otherwise 
The investment decision function is given by 
(2.5) Oi = { 
0 if (1 - ei) WH < w 
1 otherwise 
which suggests that everyone likes to obtain high-quality labour if the net income is the 
same, ie, Oi = 1 when (1 - ei) WH = w. This last equation gives us the threshold value of 
the ability parameter: a parameter value above the threshold implies that human capital 
investment is too costly for the young citizen in the sense that an amount of high-quality 
labour becomes too small to benefit from a higher return. For ease of analysis, let us 
assume that the ability parameter is distributed uniformly within each cohort born in the 
country. Then, the threshold value of the ability parameter gives the proportion of high-
quality workers in the young citizen population, ie, 
(2.6) h = _W..:;H'---_W_ 
WH 
which shows that h now responds to the labour-market condition as well as the welfare 
generosity through human capital investment decisions of young citizens.3 
3Topel (1997: 69-72) for instance provides some evidence that human capital investment responds positively 
to the wage gap between skilled and unskilled labour in the United States and Sweden. 
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2.3.2. When the target level of gross income per capita is endogenous 
When the tax rate and the per capita pension benefit is fixed, the introduction of a refer-
endum in every period did not affect the preferences of citizens in subsection 2.2.1. This 
is because immigration affects only the contemporaneous income of young citizens, and its 
impact does not linger in the next period. Since the referendum in period t is unexpected, 
h has been fixed before the majority voting without taking into account the impact of 
immigration. This suggests that Proposition 2.1 remains true for the outcome in period t. 
However, human capital investment decisions in the subsequent periods adjust to con-
temporaneous immigration because majority voting is then anticipated. Citizens take into 
consideration correctly anticipated referendum outcomes in making human capital invest-
ment decisions. That is, m+l affects individual preferences not only directly but also 
indirectly via h+l' At the same time, h+l affects the referendum outcome in period t + 1. 
Hence m+l and hH are jointly determined even though the determination of h+l preceeds 
The first task is to examine the behaviour of h+l with respect to mH' Expression 
(2.6) contains w which is endogenous under the current setting. Hence we rewrite it as 
w = (1 - h) WH and substitute expression (1.49) into it, ie, 
rhWH + (1- h +m)wL - ffi 
(1 - h) WH = (1 _ r) (1 _ h + m) 
where, since all the endogenous variables are contemporaneous, we drop the time subscript. 
But bear in mind that we are examining any future period but t. By substituting the wage 
expressions (1.8) and (1.9) into it and then rearranging the resulting expression, we get 
G(m,h(m)) == (1-r)o(1-h)h",-1(1-h+m)2-", 
- [1 - (1- r) oj h'" (1 - h + m)l-'" + ffi = O. 
We apply the implicit function theorem to this, ie, hi = - (8Gj8m) j (8Cj8h). It turns 
out that the denominator is negative, ie, 
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8G/8h - (1 - 7") 0 [1 - (1 - h) oj ha- 2 (1 - h + m)2-a 
- (1 - 7") 0 (2 - 0) (1 - h) ha- 1 (1 - h + m)l-a 
- [1- (1 - 7") oj [(1 + m) 0 - hJ ha- 1 (1- h + m)-a 
The third term is negative because the sum in its second square brackets is positive due to 
out assumption of WH (0) > WL (0) or 0 > h (0). 
The sign of hi then depends on the numerator, ie, 
8G = ( h )a{(I-7")O(2-0)(I-h)(I-h+m) -[I-(I-7")oJ(I-0)} 
8m I-h+m h 
which can be either positive or negative. The second term in the braces is a negative 
constant. However, the first term is endogenous in immigration both directly and indirectly 
via h. Without knowing hi, we do not know how this positive term changes with respect 
tom. 
The ambiguity arises because, if the target level of gross income per capita is increasing 
in initial immigration as we found in the previous chapter, expression (2.6) suggests that the 
fraction of high-quality labour in the citizen workforce might increase or decrease, depending 
on how w changes in relation to the wage rate for high-quality labour. However, to know 
the behaviour of wand WH with respect to m, we need to know the behaviour of h with 
respect to m. Hence the behaviour of h with respect to m remains ambiguous from periods 
t + 1 onwards, and we are unable to derive the outcome for period t + 1 onwards. 
2.3.3. When the per capita pension benefit is endogenous 
When w is exogenously fixed, however, we can derive the sign of hi unambiguously. 
Lemma 2.1 If the target gross income per capita is fixed such that wE (WL (0), WH (0)), 
the proportion of high-quality workers in the young citizen population is strictly increasing 
in immigration. 
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Proof. We rearrange expression (2.6) as (1 - h) WH - W = 0 and define 
F(m,h(m» == 0(1- h)hO - 1 (1- h + m)l-O - w 
where we substituted expression (1.8). By the implicit function theorem, we have h' = 
- (oF/om) / (oF/oh) where 
and 
~~ = _oho - 2 (1- h + m)-O ({1- 0)(1 + m) + [(1 + m) a - h] h} < 0 
because we assume 0 > h (0). Hence h' > O. o 
Accordingly, we have 
(2.7) h'= (l-a)(I-h)h >0. (1 - 0) (1 + m) + [(1 + m) 0 - h] h 
The second derivative of h with respect to m is given by 
h" = (1- 0){(1- 0)(1 + m) + [(1 + m) a - h] h} -2 X 
(2.8) {(I - a) (1 - h) [(1 + m) h' - h]- (1 - a) (1 + m) hh' 
- [(1 + m) 0 - h] h2h
' 
- (1 - h) h2 (0 - h')} 
The last term in the braces in the second to the third line is negative because expression 
(2.7) suggests h > h' and we assume a > h(O). Expression (2.7) suggests that the first 
term is also negative. Hence we have h" < O. 
Lemma 2.1 requires us to check whether wH > 0 and w~ < 0 still hold because immi-
gration now increases the supply of high-quality labour as well as that of low-quality labour. 
As discussed in subsection 1.3.1, it is the ratio between the stocks of high- and low-quality 
labour that determines the wage rates. Therefore, as far as h' < 1, wH > 0 and w~ < 0 
continue to hold. Expression (2.7) shows in fact h' < 1. 
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For later use, we derive the first derivatives of the wage expressions with respect to 
immigration. The first derivative of the wage rate for high-quality labour is given by 
W~ = OwH/8m + (8WH/8h) h' or 
(2.9) w~ = a (1 - a) ha - 2 (1 - h + m)-a [h - (1 + m) h'] 
By substituting expression (2.7) into it, we get 
(2.10) W~ = a (1- a) ha (1 - h + m)l-a > 0 (1 - a) (1 + m) + [(1 + m) a - h] h 
We thus confirm that the wage rate for high-quality labour is strictly increasing in immi-
gration even though h is also strictly increasing in m. 
Similarly, we have 
(2.11) I -a (1 - a) hl+
a (1- h + m)-a < 0 
wL= (1- a) (1 + m) + [(1 + m) a - h] h 
Expressions (2.10) and (2.11) ensure WH > WL V m E [0,00). A comparison be-
tween these expressions and expressions (1.8) and (1.9) reveals that the first derivatives 
under endogenous h are the corresponding first derivatives under exogenous h multiplied by 
h(l-h+m) 
(l-a)(l+m)+[(l+m)a hJh· 
We would now like to know whether the per capita pension benefit remains concave in 
m as in subsection 1.7.3. Expression (1.52) implies 
(2.12) p' = (1 + n) {[I - (1 - r) a] [(1 - h') WL + h'wH]- (1 - h') (1 - r) w} 
(2.13) p" = (1 + n) {[I - (1 - r) a] [(1 - h') w~ + (WH - WL) h" + h'W~] + h" (1 - r) w} 
The sign of the first derivative depends on the sum of the two terms in the braces in expres-
sion (2.12). The sign of the second derivative turns out to be negative. Expression (2.8) 
implies that the second term in the braces in expression (2.13) is negative. To find out the 
sign of the first term, we examine the sum of the three terms in its second square brack-
ets. We have (1 - h') wI, and (WH - WL) h" negative and h'WH positive. By substituting 
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expressions (1.8), (1.9), (2.7), (2.8), (2.10) and (2.11) as necessary, we manipulate the sum 
of these to get 
-WL {(o: - h') h (1 - h + m) + (l Q)(J~~r~~r;~.':n)Q h]h} 
{(1-0:)(1+m)+[(1+m)0:-hjh}2 
which proves pI! < 0 unambiguously. Hence p is concave in m. 
It is clear from expression (2.12) that arg maxp (m) under endogenous h differs from 
that under exogenous h. By comparing it with expression (1.53), there is an additional 
positive term, (1 + n) [1 - (1 - r) o:ll~~,wH' appearing in (2.12). This is the effect of 
immigration that induces human capital investment by young citizens who would otherwise 
remain unskilled. That is, immigration causes an additional contribution to the welfare 
system by increasing the supply of high-quality labour by young citizens. 
We now turn to the preferences of citizens. First, expression (1.25) suggests that old 
citizens in period t desire arg maxp (m) that was implied by (1.53) and stated in Proposition 
2.2 because h has been fixed by the time when the first referendum is introduced. However, 
from period t + 1 onwards, rational old citizens take into consideration the response of 
human capital investment decisions to anticipated immigration. Therefore, for all these 
future periods, argmaxp(m) is implied by expression (2.12) rather than (1.53). 
In the previous section, we reasoned that young citizens with low-quality labour remain 
indifferent because their action when young can change their income neither in the first-
nor in the second-period of their life. In the current framework, the quality of labour is 
endogenous in the majority voting outcomes in the contemporaneous and the next periods 
from period t + 1 onwards. With human capital investment decisions being endogenous in 
immigration policy, an open-border policy is the stable politico-economic equilibrium. 
Proposition 2.4 Suppose human capital investment decisionmaking is given by expression 
(2.5). If the tax rate and the target level of gross income per capita are respectively fixed 
at some r E (0,1) and W E (WdO),WH(O» such that p(D) > 0 holds, the referendum in 
period t results in (i) an open-border policy if h (0) > l~n and (ii) the policy that allows 
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argmaxp(m) that is given by expression (2.2) in Proposition 2.2 if h(O) < lin' (iii) The 
referendum in every period after t results in an open-border policy. 
Proof. (i) and (ii) are due to the timing when the first referendum is unexpectedly intro-
duced. As for (iii), consider period t + 1. Lemma 2.1 and expression (2.6) suggest h+l -> 1 
as m+l -> 00. This implies that approximately4 all young citizens desire an open-border 
policy because it increases their first-period income by increasing the returns to high-quality 
labour. Since n > 0, young citizens can form the majority. o 
Note that we are assuming the existence of an unlimited supply of unskilled young 
immigrants. If this is true, almost all young citizens can have a higher first-period income 
through the combination of an open-border policy and human capital investment. Knowing 
that the population growth rate is a positive constant, young citizens know that they can 
form the majority. Hence they invest in human capital and vote for an open-border policy 
when a referendum takes place. 
If the supply of unskilled young immigrants is limited to say m, then an open-border 
policy is selected only if h (m) > lin' The proportion of young citizens who are indifferent 
will then be 1 - h (m). 
Note that, with fixed w, there is no young citizen who is forced to acquire high-quality 
labour as a consequence of immigration. In other words, when a young citizen decides to in-
vest in human capital, there is always a positive gain. This is the reason why approximately 
all young citizens would like to invest in human capital and is different from the framework 
used by Casarico and Devillanova (2003) and Tamura (2004). In their framework, there 
is a situation where some young citizens become skilled even though they prefer to remain 
unskilled without immigration to becoming skilled with immigration because the net income 
for an unskilled worker without immigration can be higher than that for the same worker 
who becomes skilled with immigration. This is possible when the gross income of unskilled 
workers is decreasing immigration. However, it is fixed in this and the next subsections. 
4For example, a young citizen who was born with the ability parameter equal to 1 will not invest in human 
capital, for that will leave the person no first-period income as expression (2.3) suggests. 
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2.3.4. When the tax rate is endogenous 
We now assume that the per capita pension benefit and the target level of gross income per 
capita are exogenously given. Since w is fixed, expressions (2.7) implies that h is increasing 
in m in every period after t. The balanced government budget constraint (1.55) implies 
T' = 
(2.14) 
where expression (2.11) implies that the first term is positive. The second term is negative. 
To check whether T is convex in m, we get 
- (1- h')(w - WL) - (1- h + m}wIJ 
(l-h+m)(w-wd+r-;;. hw~+2h'W~+h"WH _h"w 
[hwH+(l-h+m)w] 
Expression (2.14) suggests that the first term is zero when T' = O. Hence T is convex in 
m if the sum of the second and the third terms is positive. However, the sign of this sum 
remains ambiguous. Expression (2.3) suggests zit. = -WT' for those who do not invest in 
human capital and ZlH = (1- ci) [(1- T)wk - wHT'l for those who acquire high-quality 
labour. Since we do not know the behaviour of the tax rate with respect to immigration, 
we are unable to obtain the outcome for period t + 1 onwards. 
In period t, the referendum is introduced unexpectedly after the quality of each citizen's 
labour is determined. Hence the outcome is the same as in Proposition 2.3. 
2.4. Discussion 
In this and the previous chapters, we examined individual demands for immigration in 
the welfare state where both intra- and intergenerational redistribution schemes exist. The 
previous chapter showed how the existence of these schemes might influence the demands. 
We found that heterogeneous citizens' demands for immigration could become less polarised 
under intra- and intergenerational redistribution programmes. Furthermore, no one might 
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be completely against immigration in the welfare state represented by both intra- and inter-
generational redistribution schemes. The fiscal effects of immigration may create a common 
ground for different citizens in thinking of the costs and benefits of immigration. 
In this chapter, we introduced majority voting as a rule for determining the immigration 
quota in every period. By construction, our framework in the previous chapter is not 
affected by this rule, whether citizens have foresight or not. This is because citizens are 
not able to take action in response to immigration: they are assumed to be immobile both 
geographically and occupationally. Accordingly, the introduction of majority voting does 
not change their preferences. 
In order to introduce citizens' reactions to immigration, we extended our analysis by 
endogenising human capital investment decisions of young citizens in immigration. In the 
case where the per capita pension benefit is endogenous in immigration, we could solve the 
model. We found that approximately all young citizens would invest in human capital, 
acquire high-quality labour and vote for an open-border policy if the supply of unskilled 
young immigrants were unlimited. With a positive population growth rate, this is the stable 
equilibrium. If the supply of unskilled young immigrants is limited, this limit determines 
the proportion of skilled young workers in the citizen labour force. 
This last point indicates the first limitation of our analysis. That is, the studies that 
assume an unlimited supply of immigrants, including ours, ignore a constraint imposed by 
the supply side. In reality, not only the availability is limited, but also the supply is 
endogenous in the conditions of origin and destination countries. Therefore, our analysis 
is partial in nature, and an open-border policy might not be the stable majority voting 
equilibrium even if all the other assumptions hold. Further research is necessary to examine 
general equilibrium in a model with more than one country where the overall supply of mobile 
workers is limited, although the existence of both intra- and intergenerational redistribution 
schemes is likely to make the analysis demanding. 
Our analysis is also limited in the sense that skilled immigrants are not considered to-
gether with unskilled immigrants. Our focus on unskilled immigration follows the literature. 
However, the skill distribution of immigrants is often bimodal, ie, immigrants tend to be 
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either low-skilled or highly skilled, but not medium-skilled. Therefore, it would be fruitful 
to examine the determination of immigration policy in terms of both quantity and quality. 
For ease of analysis, we followed the literature and assumed perfect assimilation by 
immigrants. With two-period lives, this assumption resulted in a framework where the 
policy choice in one period did not depend on the policy selection in the preceding period. 
However, perfect assimilation might be a too strong assumption. A model that exhibits 
such dependency might be more realistic. 
Finally, the determination of immigration policy may not be independent of the deter-
mination of other policies, such as taxation and welfare provision. Analysing these together 
may lead to an insight into immigration policy in the welfare state. In Dolmas and Huff-
man (2004) and Kemnitz (2002), for example, immigrants may vote on tax policy. Hence 
the determination of immigration policy takes into account how immigrants may influence 
taxation by voting in the future. In these two chapters, we did not study this issue in order 
to focus on the influence of the welfare state on individual demands for immigration, rather 
than the influence of immigration on the welfare system. 
Although the results are not presented in this thesis, we did analyse the case where 
citizens select on the tax rate, the per capita benefits and immigration by issue-by-issue 
majority voting. In doing this, we also introduced endogenous labour supply as in Meltzer 
and Richard (1981). In such a case, an equilibrium vector is likely to contain corner solutions 
such as zero pension benefit, and which corners arise depends on the ordering of issues. 
In sum, although our analysis suffers from several limitations, we were able to examine 
individual preferences in a tractable framework where the welfare state was represented by 
both intra- and intergenerational redistribution schemes. Introducing more reality into 
our model would have made our analysis intractable, and we would have needed numerical 
simulation as did Dolmas and Huffman (2004) and Ortega (2004). 
CHAPTER 3 
EU15 Citizen's Demand for European Immigration 
This chapter studies a survey data set that contains individual responses 
to immigration-related questions in the European Union on the eve of the 
2004 expansion. We examine the importance of the perceived impact of 
immigration on the national labour market and the domestic public finance 
for individual opinions on the desirable level of immigration from poorer 
European countries. We find that the unemployed are different from the 
others neither in the perception of the labour-market impact of immigration 
nor in the opinion on the desirable level of immigration. Employers perceive 
a more positive impact of immigration on the national labour market and 
desire more immigration, but the positive perception is not a reason why 
they desire more immigration. The perceived fiscal impact of immigration 
is important for the desirable level of immigration among those citizens who 
depend on non-pension welfare benefits under a generous welfare system. 
This also applies among low-income citizens. 
3.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, we analyse individual demands for immigration in the context of the 
European Union enlargement in 2004. The main data we examine were collected in Round 
1 of European Social Survey (ESS hereafter) which was conducted during the period 2002-
2003. The timing of the survey makes the data interesting, for the European Union was 
expanded to include ten new member countries a year after the survey was completed. In 
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other words, the survey data provide us with an opportunity to retrospectively study the 
determinants of EUI5 citizens' demands for immigration on the eve of the 2004 enlargement. 
On 1 May 2004, the European Union's 2003 Accession Treaty entered into force, and 
the Union expanded to include ten new member countries-the Czech Republic, the Slovak 
Republic, the Republics of Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Slovenia. Citizens of these republics except Cyprus and Malta, however, were not given 
full access to the labour markets of all the fifteen pre-expansion member countries (EUI5 
hereafter). EUI5 countries are able to control inflows from the eight new member countries 
(EUS hereafter) until 30 April 2011 by relying on the Transitional Arrangements for the 
Free Movement of Workers set out in the treaty. 
During the first phase of the Transitional Arrangements-I May 2004 to 30 April 2006-
Ireland and Sweden decided to open the national labour markets to all EUS countries im-
mediately. The United Kingdom also welcomed migrant workers from the new members, 
although they were subject to a compulsory registration scheme: EUS workers were required 
to register with the Home Office within 30 days once they started their employment in the 
country. The other twelve of EUI5 maintained a work permit regime, combined with quotas 
in some of them, against EUS workers. l 
The second phase of the Transitional Arrangements-I May 2006 to 30 April 2009-
has already began. While Ireland, Sweden and the UK decided not to introduce new 
restrictive measures, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain have lifted restrictions against EUS 
workers. Finland has also opened its labour market to them, although they are subject to 
a registration scheme. Belgium, Denmark, France and Luxembourg remain restrictive but 
have announced their intentions to simplify the procedures for EUS workers accessing their 
national labour markets. In the Netherlands, the government is planning to facilitate EUS 
workers' access to certain sectors and professions. Austria and Germany have decided to 
maintain existing restrictions against EUS workers.2 
lCommission of the European Communities (2006b) 
2The information from http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/free _movement/enlargement _ en.htm (Up-
dated: 21 June 2006) and the Commission's News: The European Commission welcomes Italy's decision to 
lift all restrictions on the free movement of workers (Released: 21 July 2006) 
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Did these decisions regarding the Transitional Arrangements reflect the citizens' opin-
ions? ESS Round 1 provides a picture relevant to the first phase of the 'fransitional 
Arrangements. Figure 3.1 shows stacked bars for each EU15 country, representing the cit i-
zens' responses to the following question "To what extent do you think your country should 
allow people from poorer countries in Europe to come and live here?,,3 Since the 2004 en-
largement to include the 10 countries was well known at the time of the survey, EU15 citizen 
respondents may well have referred to these countries when thinking of "poorer countries in 
Europe" in the question.4 
The figure clearly indicates that the Swedish decision to liberalise its labour market to all 
the EU8 countries immediately reflected the citizens' general opinions about the permissible 
level of immigration from poorer countries of Europe. The Irish decision also seems to 
agree with the majority preference. It appears that the aggregated preferences of the 
citizens of Italy, Germany and Belgium were close to Ireland's, but the governments did 
not lift the restrictions against EU8 workers immediately. The UK's decision to maintain 
a compulsory registration scheme for EU8 workers may well reflect the fact that roughly 
half its citizens had more restrictive opinions than the other half. We also observe that 
restrictive opinions were fairly dominant in Greece, Portugal, Austria and Finland on the 
eve of the 2004 enlargement. 
3In Figure 3.1, the category 'missing' contains responses 'refusal to answer', 'don't know' and 'no answer'. 
More details about the data are given in Section 3.3. 
4In fact, Cyprus, one of the 10 new member countries, had a higher GDP per capita than Greece, Portugal 
and Spain, as Table A3.1 in the appendix shows. However, the country gained full access to the EU15 
labour market on 1 May 2004 in any case. 
Fig. 3.1 
To what extent do you think your country should allow people from poorer countries in Europe to come and live here? 
Share of each response category by country (%) 
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This chapter attempts to explain the opinions of EU15 citizens in Figure 3.1 by utilising 
the rich survey data provided by ESS Round 1. Each of these responses implicitly indicates 
the extent of a citizen's support for the EU's Free-Movement-of-Workers principle. Hence 
our study is of some interest to policymakers, as it may suggest what should be done to 
increase support for the idea of Free Movement of Workers, which is one of the fundamental 
principles of the EU. The Commission recently analysed the opinions of EU citizens as 
potentially mobile workers and found that job insecurity in the destination is one of the most 
important factors that has discouraged the mobility of labour in the Union.5 We provide 
a complementary study that explores opinions of EU citizens as hosts of mobile workers 
from within the Union and from EU8 in particular. Their opinions matter to policy making 
in democracies and might contribute to preventing the Free-Movement-of-Workers principle 
from improving an allocation of labour resources in the Union. 
This chapter also contributes additional evidence to the growing empirical literature 
on understanding the motives behind individual demands for immigration in developed 
countries. One of the questions frequently asked in the literature is "How important are 
economic motives for determining opinions of individuals in host countries on the desirable 
level of immigration?" which is also our main concern in this chapter.6 Recent studies have 
additionally examined whether the signs of statistically significant economic factors support 
what economic theory predicts. In the next section, we review these empirical studies that 
examined the importance of economic factors to the formation of individual opinions on the 
desirable level of immigration. Table A3.2 in the appendix provides a summary of these 
studies. 
5Commission of the European Communities (2006a) 
6We recognise the importance of non-economic factors in the formation of opinions on the desirable level of 
immigration and hence will try to control these by referring to previous studies. 
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3.2. Literature 
We concentrate on two economic factors because most of the previous studies are con-
cerned with these, namely, the impact of immigration on the national labour market and 
the domestic public finance. 7 
3.2.1. Labour market concern 
Almost all previous studies in the literature asked whether a respondent's concern with the 
labour-market impact of immigration in the host country matters to his/her willingness to 
allow immigrants to come and live in the country. For instance, Espenshade and Hempstead 
(1996) found that, in the US, those who thought that immigrants would mostly take jobs 
that the citizens did not want were more likely to indicate a preference for increased immi-
gration. Citrin, Green, Muste and Wong (1997) found that those US citizens who thought 
that Hispanics and Asians would generally take jobs away from Americans were more likely 
to prefer reduced immigration. A similar result was obtained by Bauer, Lofstrom and Zim-
mermann's (2000) cross-country study. Dustmann and Preston (2004) derived a measure 
representing the labour-market concern of each white English respondent and found that a 
higher concern is associated with a preference for reduced immigration of ethnic minorities 
only among non-manual workers. Dustmann and Preston (2006) found that such a measure 
has no influence on opinions of Europeans about whether immigration is generally good or 
bad for the host economy. These studies relate perceptions, represented by either responses 
to certain questions or derived underlying concerns, to opinions, and the causal relation runs 
from the perceived concern to the expressed opinion. 
Other studies often used a respondent's status of labour supply, skill-based occupational 
category, skill-based earning level, level of education or some combination of these as ex-
planatory variables. Economic theory suggests that an increase in the supply of similarly 
skilled labour would intensify competition in the labour market, resulting in either an in-
creased risk of unemployment or depressed returns to labour of the type in question. If 
7We are not aware of any empirical study that deals with other economic effects of immigration, sllch as a 
change in demand for goods and services and the price effect of immigrant labour. 
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respondents use this reasoning in giving opinions as to the preferred level of immigration, 
we would find signs of coefficients on these variables as theory predicts. 
Provided that respondents prefer employment to unemployment, the status of being 
unemployed may be expected to have a negative coefficient, for they might see immigration 
as contributing to increased labour-market competition. This is not confirmed in the cross-
country studies by O'Rourke and Sinnot (2006) and Gang, Rivera-Batiz and Yun (2002) and 
the US study by Citrin, Green, Muste and Wong (1997). Kessler and Freeman (2005) found 
it statistically significant, but the sign of the coefficient changes across samples taken from 
different years. Bauer, Lofstrom and Zimmermann's (2000) cross-country study also found 
it insignificant with respect to the preferred level of immigration, but.it had a significantly 
positive sign when the dependent variable was the agreement with the statement that im-
migrants take jobs away. Oustmann and Preston (2004) found that neither the county-level 
unemployment rate nor the experience of unemployment was a significant determinant of 
white English respondents' opinions about the desirable level of immigration. Oe Melo, 
Miguet and MUller (2004) did find that the canton-level unemployment rate had a negative 
influence on the Swiss vote against an immigration restriction proposal in 2000. 
Mixed results as to the relationship between the status of being unemployed and the 
preferred level of immigration are probably due to ambiguity about labour substitutability 
arising in questions regarding the type of immigrants and the heterogeneity of the unem-
ployed population. Skill-based occupational categories are perhaps better measures to 
analyse the influence of labour-market concern as to the desired level of immigration, al-
though ambiguity still remains with respect to the type of immigrants generally. That is, 
questions are ambiguous with regard to the labour type of immigrants in asking for opinions 
on the preferred level of immigration. O'Rourke and Sinnot's (2006) cross-country study 
found that workers in high-skill occupations were likely to prefer more immigration. This 
is more likely to be true in countries with higher GOP per capita, but less likely to be so in 
countries under high income inequality. Mayda's (2006) cross-country study also found that 
workers in high-skill occupations were likely to prefer more immigration in countries with 
higher GOP. She also used the ratio between immigrants and natives by occupation as an 
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explanatory variable and found that workers in occupations with a high share of immigrants 
were likely to oppose immigration. 
A respondent's level of skill-based earnings is another proxy used to examine the impact 
of labour-market concern. Evidence for its importance for the formation of opinions about 
the level of immigration is rather mixed. Scheve and Slaughter (2001) used the average 
occupational wage and found it significant among labour-force participants. Mayda (2006) 
used a measure of relative income and found statistical significance such that wealthier 
respondents preferred more immigration. Dustmann and Preston (2004) also used a relative 
income measure and found it significant only when asked about the immigration of ethnic 
minorities. Citrin, Green, Muste and Wong (1997) found that the level of income does not 
matter to opinions on the desirable level of immigration. Facchini and Mayda (2006) used 
the log of real personal income whose coefficient was found insignificant. Espenshade and 
Hempstead (1996) found the level of household income significant only among low-income 
earners. 
A respondent's level of education appears as an explanatory variable in almost all past 
studies. The complication with this variable is that it is correlated with labour skill. 
Studies that specifically aimed to test predictions of economic theory used it as a proxy 
for labour skill, while the others interpreted it as education translating into, for instance, 
open-mindedness. Both arguments appear right. However, in our analysis, we will use 
educational attainment in addition to non-education measures of labour skill. In other 
words, we do not use education as a proxy for labour substitutability. 
Bauer, Lofstrom and Zimmermann (2000), Gang, Rivera-Batiz and Yun (2002), Kessler 
and Freeman (2005) found the level of education significant: the more educated a respondent 
is, the more immigration the person preferred. Scheve and Slaughter (2001) argued that 
education is a proxy for labour skill by finding years of education significant only among 
labour-force participants. Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter (2005) used educational attain-
ment as a proxy for the level of income and found it significant only among the educated 
in the US. Dustmann and Preston (2004) and Brenner and Fertig (2006) also found edu-
cational attainment significant only among the educated. On the other hand, Espenshade 
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and Hempstead (1996) found educational attainment statistically significant only among the 
less educated who preferred reduced immigration. Citrin, Green, Muste and Wong (1997) 
did not find years of education significant after controlling other factors. 
Most interesting findings regarding the impact of education were given by Mayda (2006) 
and Facchini and Mayda (2006). Education and its interaction with the country-level native-
to-immigrant education-level ratio were used in these studies. Education itself was found 
significantly negative, while the interaction term was found significantly positive with a 
larger magnitude than the former. Assuming that education represents labour skill, this 
finding seems to support the theoretical prediction that respondents oppose immigration of 
similarly skilled labour, eg, the educated are less restrictive if immigrants are less skilled on 
average than natives. 
3.2.2. Public finance concern 
In addition to the labour market, immigration has also been thought to influence natives 
economically via social welfare programmes in developed countries. The concern is that 
immigrants might be net beneficiaries in the welfare state. Tax burden per capita might then 
increase, or benefit per capita might be reduced. In the former case, an increased burden 
might fall disproportionately on high-income households under progressive tax systems. In 
the latter, current beneficiaries might be given smaller shares of a pie to accommodate newly 
joining beneficiaries. Fertig and Schmidt (2002) found that less educated respondents in 
Germany are more concerned with immigrants being a tax burden. They also found that 
this concern is stronger in regions with a lower share of foreigners. Does public-finance 
concern matter to the formation of opinions on the preferred level of immigration? 
Espenshade and Hempstead (1996) found no significant influence of a respondent's per-
ception that most new immigrants do not end up on welfare. Citrin, Green, Muste and 
Wong (1997) on the other hand found a significant coefficient on the agreement with the 
statement that Hispanics and Asians cause higher taxes due to more demands for public 
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services. Dustmann and Preston (2004) derived a measure representing public-finance con-
cern and found it significant with respect to the immigration of ethnic minorities, but not 
among uneducated respondents. 
Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter (2005) used educational attainment as a proxy for the 
level of income. They first interacted it with an indicator that the state where a respondent 
lived was characterised by both a generous welfare system and high presence of immigrants. 
This interaction term was found significant only among the educated (interpreted as high-
income earners) particularly in states under a progressive tax system. They found a similar 
result by interacting education with an indicator that the state where a respondent lived had 
relatively many immigrant households receiving cash benefits. These findings may suggest 
that public-finance concern is equivalent to a worry about an increase in tax burden per 
capita rather than a reduction in benefit per capita, assuming that education represents the 
level of income. 
Facchini and Mayda (2006) also used education as a proxy for the level of income. 
They interacted it with both the country-level average skill level of immigrants relative to 
that of natives and the country-level average labour tax rate. The sign of the coefficient 
was significantly negative, suggesting that more educated respondents (interpreted as high-
income earners) prefer less immigration in a state where the tax rate is high and immigrants 
are unskilled relative to natives. They also interacted education with both the country-level 
average skill level of immigrants relative to that of natives and a country-level measure of 
tax progressivity. The sign of the coefficient was again significantly negative, suggesting 
that more educated respondents prefer less immigration in a state where the tax system 
is progressive and immigrants are unskilled relative to natives. However, when they used 
the country-level average public transfer instead of the tax-related measures, the interacted 
term was found insignificant. These results seem to confirm that the public-finance concern 
is equivalent to a worry about an increase in tax burden per capita rather than a reduction 
in benefit per capita, assuming that education represents the level of income. 
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3.2.3. This study 
This chapter examines the importance of both labour-market and public-finance concerns 
for determining individual opinions on the permissible level of immigration in the context of 
the pre-expansion European Union. It is close to Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter (2005) and 
Facchini and Mayda (2006) in its inquiry, but we also use relevant immigration-related per-
ceptions as explanatory variables as did Espenshade and Hempstead (1996), Citrin, Green, 
Muste and Wong (1997) and Bauer, Lofstrom and Zimmermann (2000). 
Our main findings are the following. The status of being unemployed explains neither 
the opinion on the desirable level of immigration from poorer countries nor the perception of 
immigration's labour-market impact. Employers do not care about immigrants' impact on 
the national job market in giving their opinions on the desirable level of immigration even 
though they tend to perceive it as positive. However, they do prefer more immigration from 
poorer countries than the other citizens. We find some evidence that citizens who are more 
exposed to labour-market competition with immigrants tend to perceive a more negative 
impact of immigration on the number of job opportunities. This concern may partially 
explain why they prefer less immigration than the others. 
Among those citizens who rely on non-pension welfare benefits, the generosity of welfare 
provision contributes positively to the relationship between the perceived fiscal impact of 
immigration and the desirable level of immigration. However, among pensioners, it seems 
to contribute negatively to the relationship. We also find some evidence that the perceived 
fiscal impact of immigration matters to the desirable level of immigration among low-income 
citizens under a generous welfare system. We remain inconclusive regarding the effect of 
tax progressivity on the importance of public finance concern for the desirable level of 
immigration. 
3.3. Data 
Round 1 of European Social Survey conducted in 2002 to 2003 is the main source of 
the data we analyse.8 ESS is a biennial survey that covers more than 20 countries. The 
SEdition 5.1 released at http://ess.nsd.uib.no/on 15 December 2004 
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target population of each country contains all persons at the age of 15 or over who reside 
in the country. The survey consists of core and rotating modules, and one of Round 
1 's two rotating modules is dedicated to revealing immigration-related opinions by using 
almost 60 questions. 9 The immigration module was framed by giving each respondent 
the following introduction: "People come to live in [your country] from other countries for 
different reasons. Some have ancestral ties. Others come to work here, or to join their 
families. Others come because they're under threat. Here are some questions about this 
issue." 10 
As is common in many survey data, all the information related to a respondent were 
given by the person in question, have not been verified and are hence prone to subjective 
bias and errors. We simply assume that all the collected information are correct. As listed 
in Table A3.2, this data set has already been analysed by a few studies in the literature, 
ie, Dustmann and Preston (2006), Hainmueller and Hiscox (forthcoming) and Brenner and 
Fertig (2006). 
We concentrate on the then member countries of the European Union. The subset 
contains 29,110 observations. We focus on the citizens in each of these 15 countries by 
discarding 1,362 observations. ll We additionally eliminated 2 observations in Italy whose 
ages were recorded 5 and 14 respectively, ie, deviations from the survey's target population. 
Accordingly, we have 27,746 observations left for analysis. We use listwise deletion to 
maximise the sample size, and hence the number of observations in estimated models are 
not always the same. 
3.3.1. Explained variable 
Our dependent variable is measured by responses to the following question: "To what extent 
do you think your country should allow people from poorer countries in Europe to come and 
9See Chapter 3 (Part 1) of ESS Round 1 2002/2003 Technical Report (Edition 2, June 2004) for the aim 
and outline of these questions, available at the website. 
tOBy the use of "live", the permanency of immigrants' stay is deliverately made ambiguous. 
IlWe use the responses to question CIS that BSked each respondent whether the person WBS a citizen of the 
country where he/she WBS subjected to the questionnaire. The citizenship of a respondent is thus based on 
the person's own assessment. Out of the eliminated 1,362 observations, 1,340 were non-citizens, and either 
'refusal to answer', 'don't know' or 'no answer' WBS recorded for the rest. 
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live here?" As illustrated in Figure 3.1 in the introduction, the variable has 4 ordered 
categories: none, a few, some and many. We call this ordered categorical variable host. 
3.3.2. Explanatory variables 
Our measure of a citizen's perception of immigration's impact on the national labour market 
is the response to the following question: "Would you say that people who come to live here 
generally take jobs away from workers in this country, or generally help to create new jobs?" 
Each respondent was asked to choose one out of 11 categories that were ordered from 0 
(= take away) to 10 (= help create). The eleven numbers were placed in order along a 
straight line with an equal interval between an adjacent pair in the interview. Therefore, we 
assume that each response is a score given on an interpersonally comparable scale to measure 
labour-market concern, and we treat the variable as continuous. We call this variable labor. 
A citizen's perception of immigration's impact on the domestic public finance is similarly 
measured on a scale of 11 categories by using the following question: "Most people who come 
to live here work and pay taxes. They also use health and welfare services. On balance, do 
you think people who come here take out more than they put in or put in more than they 
take out?" We call this variable fiscaL 
We include variables that are likely to affect labour-market concern. First, we have an 
indicator for the status of being unemployed and looking for a job in the last seven days 
( unemploy). By using this, we would like to check whether the status of being unemployed 
is an important determinant of labour-market concern but does not matter to the formation 
of demand for immigration, which the majority of the past studies in the literature have 
found. Approximately 14 percent of the sample belongs to this category.12 
Second, we create a continuous measure which indicates labour substitutability between 
each respondent and immigrants. Table 3.1 shows the share of foreigners in each indus-
try's total employment in a country dvided by the share of foreigners in the country's total 
12We do not include those who were unemployed but were not looking for a job. Hence the dummy variable 
is not contaminated by the welfare-dependent unemployed, provided that the respondents were honest. 
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employmentP Unfortunately, we do not have corresponding figures for Belgium. The 
table indicates which industries in each country have a relatively large share of foreigners, 
ie, those whose figures are greater than unity. Noticeably, in all the countries, the hotel 
and restaurant industry used many foreign workers (category h). Another industry is of 
household activities (category p), eg, housemaids. In the other industries, we see variations 
across countries. We also confirm our expectation that the use of the average skill level 
of immigrant workers, which tends to be low, is not suitable for representing labour substi-
tutabiIity. While the construction sector (category f) hired many foreign workers in more 
than half the countries, they also seem to have been highly present in the education sector 
(category m) in Finland and the health and social service sector (category n) in the United 
Kingdom. The required skills in immigrant-concentrated sectors thus vary significantly.14 
Since ESS collected a tw~digit NACE Rev.1 code for each respondent, we know to which 
NACE Rev.1 major industrial group he or she belonged. We assign the relevant Eurostat 
figure in Table 3.1 to each ESS observation. We call this variable isub. 
We construct another similar measure of labour substitutability between each citizen and 
immigrants. This is based on the skill-based occupational classification, ISCO-88(COM), 
rather than industry. We call this osub. Unfortunately, we do not have corresponding 
figures for Belgium, France and Sweden, while only Belgium is missing for isub. Table 3.2 
again indicates that skill levels themselves are not good indicators of labour substitutability 
because of the variations across occupations and countries. 
130ECD has produced a similar table in its annual publication, Trends in International Migration, but it 
does not give the figures as we do here. In addition, ours is more disaggregated than DECO's in terms of 
industry. 
14As we discussed in Subsection 3.2.1, education has often been used to represent the skill level of labour 
in the literature. However, education is likely to have its own impact directly on a person '8 preferences 
regarding immigration other than an indirect effect through the labour market. For instance, education 
might nurture a more open mind and give wider viewpoints, which might result in less restrictive attitudes 
towards immigration. Therefore, we do not regard education as labour skill. In addition, the distinction 
between low- and high-skills are useful for discussions in theoretical models, but the point of argument boils 
down to labour substitutability between immigrants and natives that is likely to be affected by other factors 
than skills and educational attainments, eg, connections, sector-specific labour demand and work-permit 
policy. 
Table 3.1 Extent of non-citizens' presence by industry and country (isub) 
Countryt NACE Rev. 1 major division t 
a b c d e g h j k m n 0 p q 
at .42 .82 1.21 .25 1.53 .91 2.23 .89 .39 1.36 .07 .43 .70 1.09 1.62 3.14 
be 
de .45 1.35 1.07 .90 3.32 1.00 .40 1.10 .23 .47 .67 .97 1.30 
dk 1.00 .49 .65 1.12 .23 .46 .86 3.27 .97 .34 1.66 .27 .98 .74 .91 1.00 12.86 
es 1.88 .64 .78 .66 .45 1.46 .71 2.06 .66 .35 .87 .19 .50 .52 .87 5.61 
fi .35 .42 .19 .93 .19 .72 .97 2.90 .82 .36 1.62 .33 1.57 .57 1.08 11.58 
fr .80 1.14 1.02 .25 2.51 .90 1.90 .64 .40 1.46 .27 .49 .57 1.05 4.32 9.57 
gb .34 .40 .75 .78 .57 .56 .88 1.82 1.06 1.12 1.23 .76 1.00 1.23 .97 2.54 
gr 1.21 1.12 .59 1.03 .16 2.86 .53 1.35 .41 .14 .64 .11 .24 .30 .56 7.94 
ie .43 1.05 .61 .94 .37 .68 .77 2.14 .76 .78 1.35 .28 .68 1.08 .97 2.16 
it 1.08 1.04 1.07 1.31 .34 1.50 .67 1.66 .73 .23 .54 .16 .43 .58 1.01 
lu .44 .00 1.23 .88 .13 1.72 .98 1.74 .62 1.10 1.37 .12 .34 .72 .90 1.94 1.99 
nl .85 .25 1.97 1.22 .29 .51 .89 2.20 .83 .57 1.87 .24 .70 .48 .90 
pt .44 .43 .89 .60 .65 2.65 .68 1.80 .58 .31 1.38 .29 .49 .81 1.46 1.84 
se .40 .21 .51 1.18 .29 .57 .82 2.68 .88 .55 1.28 .38 .95 .96 .91 4.02 
Source: Eurostat Census 2001, http:/ /europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat NB: .. = not available 
E h fi . d fi d ( # non-citizens emploved in the industrial group) / ( # non-citizens emploved in all groups) . h t 
ac gure IS e ne as # all employed in the industrial group # all employed in all groups In eac coun ry. 
A figure greater than 1 indicates that the share of non-citizens in the corresponding industrial group's employment is relatively high. 
t Refer to the note of Figure 1 for country abbreviations. t a = agriculture, hunting, forestry; L = fishing; c = mining, quarrying; d = manufacturing; 
e = electricity, gas, water supply; f = construction; g = wholesale/retail trade, repair of m·otor vehicles, motorcycles and personal/household goods; 
h = hotels. restaurants; i = transport, storage, communication; j = financial intermediation; k = real estate/renting/business activities; 
I = public administration, defence, compulsory social security; 111 = eduactiou; n = health/social work; 0 = other cOllllllunity /social/personal service activities; 
p = household activities; q = extraterritorial organisations/bodies 
~ 
Table 3.2 Extent of non-citizens' presence by skill-based occupational category and country (o8ub) 
Countryt I-digit ISCO-88(COM) codet 
0 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
at .08 .62 .59 .52 .46 1.01 .17 1.18 1.56 
be 
de .98 .50 . 51 .56 1.31 . .53 1.23 1.87 
dk .04 .37 .83 .57 .52 .86 .49 .57 1.38 
es .25 .69 .52 .55 .50 1.15 .77 .95 .67 
fi .66 1.34 .73 .60 1.04 .35 .84 .91 
fr 
gb 1.26 1.11 1.44 1.10 .86 1.02 .29 .56 .89 
gr .26 .26 .23 .22 .77 .52 1.78 .62 
ie .15 .95 1.07 1.12 .71 1.17 .33 .78 .73 
it .00 .73 .74 .62 .52 .92 .80 1.23 1.16 
lu .07 1.00 1.02 .73 .68 1.12 .38 1.33 1.02 
nl .58 .84 .58 .76 .86 1.01 1.44 
pt .25 .78 .94 .69 .37 .98 .42 1.41 .54 
se 
Source: Eurostat Census 2001, europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat NB: .. = not available 
E h fi . d fi d (# non-citizens emploved in the occupational group) / (# non-citizens employed in all groups) . h t ac gure IS e ne as # all employed in the occupational group # all employed in all groups III eac coun ry. 
A figure greater than unity indicates that the share of non-citizens in the corresponding occupational group's employment is relatively high. 
Observations for fr are not categorised by ISCO-88(COM) in ESS, and hence the figures are not given. 
t Refer to the note of Figure 1 for country abbreviations. 
t The categorisation is based on skill requirements: the lowest (9), the second lowest (4 to 8), the third (3) and the highest (2). 
Groups 0 and 1 are not well defined in terms of skill. See Elias and Birch (1994). 
o = armed forces; 1 = legislators, senior officials, managers; 2 = professionals; 3 = technicians, associate professionals; 4 = clerks; 
5 = service workers, shop and market sales workers; 6 = skilled agricultural and fishery workers; 7 = craft and related trades workers; 
8 = plant and machine operators, assemblers; 9 = elementary occupations 
9 
2.67 
2.23 
1.64 
2.71 
1.66 
.90 
4.17 
.96 
1.97 
1.49 
2.21 
1.64 
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76 
There is an argument that, while employees are afraid of labour-market competition 
increased by immigration, employers would potentially benefit from the availability of im-
migrant workers. They are seen as owners of complementary production factors. If this 
is the case, we would expect employers to be pro-immigration. To test this, we create a 
dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a respondent employed at least one person and zero 
otherwise. 1S We call this variable employer. 
We try a few alternative measures of the level of income for testing the importance of 
public-finance concern. ESS contains each respondent's estimate of monthly net household 
income in 12 ordered categories in terms of Euros. Over 20 percent of the observations 
were recorded as missing. The categories do not share an equal interval. Furthermore, the 
responses are comparable across countries only in nominal terms. Since we analyse individ-
ual opinions, and since we examine the importance of economic self-interest, we transform 
the estimated figures into per capita income. We assign the mid-value of each category's 
income range. The highest category has no upper bound and hence no mid-value. However, 
it contains only 0.78 percent of the whole sample and, at the country level, at most 2.79 
percent of the British sample. Therefore, we drop the observations in the highest category. 
We then divide the mid-values by the corresponding number of household members. 
We then adjust for international price differences by dividing the resulting figures by 
corresponding purchasing power parities (PPPs) for 2002. Eurostat provides PPPs accord-
ing to ESA95 (European System of Accounts 1995).16 Under the system, there are two 
measures of consumption. One is final consumption expenditure: a sector's expenditure 
on consumption goods and services, and the other is actual final consumption: a sector's 
acquisition of consumption goods and services. The difference is based on the treatment of 
some goods and services not financed by but supplied to households, eg, social transfers in 
15We need to be cautious, however, in interpreting our results. Question F13 asked each respondent "How 
many employees do or did you have if any?", which suggests that the respondent could be an employee 
at the time of being interviewed because the person might have referred to (a) any past hiring or (b) 
self-employment. 
16 http://forum .europa.eu .int I ire I dsis I nfaccount I info I datal esa95 I en I titelen.htm 
77 
kind. We use the PPPs based on the household final consumption expenditure (category 
eOll), for the data we have are of net incomeY We call the variable obtained this way inc. 
The second measure of income is obtained by dividing the pre-PPP-adjusted figures 
by the corresponding national mean. The variable measures the relative income position 
of each respondent in her/his country. For instance, 1.5 means that the respondent's net 
income is 50 percent higher than the national average. We call it reline. 
As a third measure of income, we try a respondent's perception of the sufficiency of 
household income. ESS contains responses to the question "Which of the descriptions 
comes closest to how you feel about your household's income nowadays: living comfortably, 
coping, difficult or very difficult?" with only 1.36 percent of the sample missing. Since 
individuals have different needs, spending habits as well as shares of household income, this 
subjective measure of income sufficiency might work better. We create sufine dummies. 
If immigrants are perceived to contribute negatively to government coffers overall, and 
if the adjustment is thought to take place through a change in taxation rather than benefits, 
then respondents with high income are more likely to oppose immigration than those with 
low income under a progressive tax system. To test if this is the case, we use a simple 
measure of tax progressivity used by Facchini and Mayda (2006). It is the difference between 
the average wage tax rates for single persons without a child who earn 67 percent and 167 
percent of the annual wage earnings of an average production worker respectively. We call 
this variable tp. We also have an alternative which adds the corresponding employee's social 
security contribution to tp. We call this tp2. Figure 3.2 plots tp against tp2 and shows 
that these measures provide similar information on tax progressivity. However, we also 
see that, for the Netherlands, tp indicates a more progressive system while tp2 indicates 
a less progressive system among the countries. These two measures of tax progressivity 
are country-level variables, which will be interacted with individual-specific variables in our 
analysis. 
17Question F30 asked each respondent the following question: "Using this card, if you add up the income 
from all sources, which letter describes your household's total net income? If you don't know the exact 
figure, please give an estimate." The presented card showed 12 ordered income groups. 
Fig. 3.2 
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We also have a measure of welfare generosity: the average net replacement rate over 5 
years of unemployment calculated by DEeD (2004).18 If the adjustment is thought to take 
place through a change in taxation, respondents with high income are more likely to oppose 
immigration than those with low income under a generous social welfare system. We call 
this country-level variable nrr, which will be interacted with individual-specific variables in 
our analysis. 
If the adjustment to immigration is thought to take place through a change in benefits, 
and if immigrants are thought to be net beneficiaries of the welfare system, then existing 
beneficiaries of social welfare programmes are more likely to oppose to immigration than 
those who do not benefit from the welfare system. To test if this is the case, we create 
dummies that indicate beneficiaries of welfare programmes. We use dummies that indicate 
whether the main source of the respondent's household income is pension or any other social 
welfare benefits (benefit). We also have a dummy for the status of being a lone parent with 
at least one child living together (parentl), for such lone parents are most likely to benefit 
from the welfare systems in these countries. 19 
If both net contributors and net beneficiaries oppose immigration, there may be fears 
of both tax increases and benefit cuts. 
Both public-finance and labour-market concerns may be affected by the types of immi-
grants and respondents' images associated with them. We have responses to the question 
"Thinking about people coming from other countries within Europe to live here nowadays, 
would you say most of them are from richer or poorer countries, or about half and half?" 
Using the responses, we create origin dummies. If respondents think that the type of immi-
grant worker depends on the wealth of their origin countries, for instance, those who think 
existing immigrants mainly came from poorer countries may oppose immigration from such 
countries because they may regard it as an increase in the supply of labour that is already 
plentiful in their labour markets. 
18The net replacement ratio is defined as the ratio of the net income during unemployment to the net 
income during employment. In other words, it is the proportion of in-work net income that is maintained 
for someone becoming unemployed. The un weighted average is taken over four types of family, and we used 
the figures with social assistance in addition to unemployment insurance. See DECD (2004: Table 3.3b). 
19See DECD (2003: 27). 
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We have two proxies for the presence of immigrants. One is based on the responses to 
the question "How would you describe the area where you currently live? Almost no ethnic 
minority, some or many?" We create ethlive dummies for each respondent's perception of 
the presence of ethnic minorities in her/his living environment. Another is a country-level 
measure: the share of non-citizens in the country's total population. We call it fshare. 
We include the highest educational attainment of each respondent in all estimations. 
But we do not interpret it as a proxy for the level of his/her labour skill. We interpret 
it as education. ESS sorted respondents into 7 groups according to a modified version of 
ISCED97, and we create edu dummies. 
We include various control variables. We have purely exogenous variables such as a 
respondent's gender (female) and approximate age in 2003. We also include an indicator 
of whether at least one parent of a respondent was born abroad (fparent). 20 
We control respondents' self-assessed political orientation (polit) and exposure to the 
media on current affairs and politics (media in hours). The latter indirectly measures a 
respondent's interest in current affairs and politics, provided that he/she was exposed to 
the media in his/her own initiative. Exposure to the media might also influence individual 
opinions to lean towards a certain direction. 21 
We include the self-reported level of each respondent's general wellbeing (happy) and 
his/her perception of the state of the national economy (econ). The former would influence 
the mood of each respondent and might make any opinions tend to either a negative or a 
positive direction. The latter would also make each respondent's views either optimistic or 
pessimistic overall. 
20Th is variable is easily constructed by using Questions C25 and C27. We prefer this to other similar 
dummies that indicate whether a respondent was born abroad (C20) and is an ethinc minority (C24) because 
/parent contains a higher proportion of positive responses, although still only about 10 percent of the whole 
sample. In any case, these are highly associated with each other. The weighted-sample cross-product ratios 
are 51.10 between /parent and an indicator that a respondent was born abroad and 13.70 between /parent 
and an indicator he/she is an ethnic minority. 
21See Appendix C for the creation of media. Inclusion of polit is motivated by the fact that several 
researchers, those who work in political science in particular, often included similar measures of political 
orientation. However, as Nordhaus (in Blinder and Krueger, 2004: 392) questioned "Am I conservative 
because I don't like taxes, or do I dislike taxes because I'm conservative?", self-asscssed political oricntation 
here is also potentially endogenous. We naively assume polit is exogenous in this study. 
Table 3.3 Summary statistics 
Definition mean f s.d f median min. max. obs. ESS no. 
host Permissible number of immigrants from poorer European countries 1.59 0.81 2.00 0.00 3.00 26,641 D7 
o = none; 1 = a few; 2 = some; 3 = many 
labor Perceived labour-market impact of immigration on job opportunities 4.52 2.19 5.00 0.00 10.00 26,601 D25 
o = take jobs away; 5 = neutral; 10 = help create jobs 
fi.,cal Perceived net contribution of immigrants to government coffers 4.25 2.21 4.00 0.00 10.00 26,181 D26 
o = take more out; 5 = neutral; 10 = put more in 
unemploy 1 = unemployed and looking for a job in the last seven days 0.03 0.18 0.00 0.00 1.00 27,673 FBa,b 
isub Immigrants' penetration into industries based on NACE Rev.1 1.01 0.79 0.90 0.00 12.86 22,433 F24 
osub Immigrants' penetration into occupations based On ISCO-88(COM) 1.00 0.53 0.B4 0.04 4.17 19,541 F21-23 
employer 1 = employer in any industry 0.05 0.22 0.00 0.00 1.00 27,746 F13 
parentI 1 = lone parent with at least one child living together 0.05 0.22 0.00 0.00 1.00 27,746 F58-61,64 
benefit 1 = social welfare benefits other than pension are the main household income source 0.04 0.20 0.00 0.00 1.00 27,746 F29 
pension 1 = pension is the main household income source 0.23 0.42 0.00 0.00 1.00 27,746 F29 
inc Real net income per capita in thousands 0.97 1.04 0.60 0.00 13.05 21,490 F30,! 
reline Intra-country relative net income per capita 1.00 0.B1 0.81 0.Ql 20.00 21,490 F30,1 
sufine Perceived sufficiency of household income 2.06 0.79 2.00 0.00 3.00 27,380 F31 
o = very difficult; 1 = difficult; 2 = manageable; 3 = comfortable 
friend o = no immigrant friend; 1 = a few; 2 = several 0.61 0.71 0.00 0.00 2.00 27,597 D47 
origin o = most European immigrants come from poorer countries; 1 = half half; 2 = richer 0.21 0.46 0.00 0.00 2.00 26,645 D2 
ethlive o = almost no ethnic minority in the residential area; 1 = some; 2 = many 0.70 0.68 1.00 0.00 2.00 27,230 D39 
crime o = immigrants make crime situations worse; 5 = neutral; 10 = better 3.26 2.09 3.00 0.00 10.00 26,882 D30 
culture o = immigrants undermine cultural life; 5 = neutral; 10 = enrich 5.57 2.43 6.00 0.00 10.00 26,379 D28 
polit o = right; 5 = centre; 10 = left 5.12 2.10 5.00 0.00 10.00 24,365 B28 
media Hours spent on the media on current affairs and politics per weekday 1.50 1.15 1.25 0.00 9.75 27,619 A2,4,6 
econ o = dissatisfied with the state of the national economy; 5 = neutral; 10 = satisfied 4.15 2.27 5.00 0.00 10.00 26,939 B30 
happy o = unhappy; 5 = neutral; 10 = happy 7.31 1.90 8.00 0.00 10.00 27,635 C1 
edu o = less than primary; 1 = primary or basic (1st); 2 = lower secondary or basic (2nd); 2.82 1.47 3.00 0.00 6.00 27,634 F6 
3 = upper second; 4 = postsecondary (non-tertiary); 5 = tertiary (1st); 6 = tertiary (2nd) 
fparent 1 = at least one parent born abroad 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.00 1.00 27,716 C25,27 
age Approximate age in 2003 based on the year of birth 46.85 18.10 47.00 15.00 l10.00 27,593 F3 
female 1 = female 0.52 0.49 1.00 0.00 1.00 27,717 F2 
Source: ESS 2002-2003; Eurostat NB: t weighted 
<Xl 
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Table 3.3 (Continued, country-level variables) 
Definition mean s.d median min. max. 
tp Facchini and Mayda's (2006) measurement .11 .03 .13 .05 .17 
of tax progressivity, 2002 
tp2 tp (wage tax only) plus employee's .11 .03 .10 .07 .17 
social security contribution 
nrr A verage net replacement rate over 5 years .64 .21 .72 .05 .81 
of unemployment, 2002 
fshare Share of non-citizens in the total population, 2002 .07 .08 .04 .02 .38 
Source: DECD (2003: Tables 1 and 3; 2004: Table 3.3b; 2005: Table A.1.5) 
We also include controls specific to immigration issues: each respondent's security con-
cern with respect to immigrant residents (crime), concern over cultural invasion due to 
immigration (culture) and closeness to immigrants (friend dummies). 
In all estimation, we include 14 country dummies (gb as the reference) to capture un-
observable country-specific factors. We will not report the coefficients on these country 
dummies.22 We also weigh each observation in all estimation: see the appendix concerning 
the weight. 
3.3.3. Illustration 
Let us briefly illustrate the relationships between the variables of our main interest before 
regression analysis. 
3.3.3.1. Labour market concern. The monotone association between host and labor is 
statistically significant and positive:23 we obtain Goodman and Kruskal's I approximately 
equal to .345 with the asymptotic standard error equal to .006. 
We expect that repondents who belong to an industry or an occupation where the 
presence of immigrants is relatively high are likely to be substituted by them more easily 
than those in the other sectors. In this case, respondents with high isub or osub might 
fear a negative labour-market impact of immigration more than the other respondents do. 
Figure 3.3a shows overlapping histograms of labor for those who belong to an industry with 
high presence of immigrants (isub ;?: 1) and the others (isub < 1) respectively. It shows 
22The estimates are available upon request. 
23See Goodman and Kruskal (1954; 1963) and Agresti (2002). 
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that the distribution of the subset of the sample with isub ~ 1 is slightly thicker to the left 
of the scale for labour-marlet concern compared with the distribution of the rest. That is, 
the proportion of respondents who perceived the labour-market impact of immigration on 
job opportunities as negative is slightly higher among those with isub ~ 1 than among the 
rest of the sample. 
In Figure 3.3b, we use occupation instead of industry. It shows that the difference 
between respondents with osub ~ 1 and those with osub < 1 is clearer than the industry-
based one. It indicates that there are more of those whose occupations are relatively 
common among immigrant workers, who perceived labour-market impact of immigration on 
job opportunities as negative. The use of unemploy gives a similar picture in Figure 3.4, 
although the monotone trend is disturbed at the ninth point on the labor scale. 
3.3.3.2. Public finance concern. The monotone association between host and fiscal is 
statistically significant and positive: we obtain Goodman and Kruskal's "f approximately 
equal to .358 with the asymptotic standard error equal to .006. 
Citizens may be more concerned with public-finance impacts of immigration in countries 
with more generous welfare provision and a higher presence of immigrants, provided they 
think immigrants are net users of welfare systems. Figure 3.5a plots our measure of welfare 
generosity against the share of non-citizens in the country's total population, while figure 
3.5b does the same without the outlier, Luxembourg. Based on the location of the mean 
in these pictures, I create hssfe = 1 for Germany, Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg and 0 
otherwise. This variable is similar to Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter'S (2005) measure of fiscal 
exposure to immigration.24 Figure 3.6 then shows overlapping histograms of fiscal by hssfe. 
It indicates that a higher proportion of citizens perceived immigrants as net beneficiaries of 
welfare systems on average in countries with more generous welfare provision and a higher 
presence of immigrants. 
24Ideally, we would like to have a more direct indicator of how welfare-dependent immigrants are in each 
country, eg, the proportion of total welfare expenditure taken by immigrants. Unfortunately, we do not 
have a measure of welfare use by immigrants. 
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Fig.3.5b 
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Fig. 3.7 fiscal by benefit 
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Figure 3.7 shows overlapping histograms of fiscal for the respondents whose main source 
of household income is social welfare provision other than pension and the rest. We observe 
a higher proportion of respondents perceiving negative net contributions of immigrants to 
government coffers among those with benefit = 1 than the rest. Figure 3.8 replaces benefit 
with pension, and we obtain a similar picture. 
Interestingly, if we focus on lone parents living with at least one child, who were likely 
to benefit most from welfare programmes in these countries, we find that the proportion of 
respondents who perceived the negative net fiscal impacts of immigration is slightly lower 
among them than the rest. This is shown in Figure 3.9. 
3.4. Estimation 
We would like to test whether the perception of the impact of immigration on the 
national labour market and domestic public finance matters to the person's demand for 
immigration from poorer European countries. The causality is thus from the perceived 
impact of immigration to the demand for it. Given the data, we had the following model 
for respondent i in our mind: 
hosti h (labori' fiscali, Hi, Xi) + ehi 
labori I (Li' Xi) + eli 
fiscali = !(Fi,Xi) +eli 
where H is a vector that contains perceived impacts of immigration other than labor and 
fiscal, L is a vector containing factors that affect labor but neither host nor fiscal, F is a 
vector containing factors that influence fiscal but neither host nor labor, and X is a vector 
of factors that affect all host, labor and fiscal. The error terms, eh, el and e/, should be 
correlated to each other because unobserved factors in the error terms belong to the same 
individual. 
However, we are unable to estimate this model in this chapter. First, ideally, we would 
like to treat not only host but also labor and fiscal as ordered categorial variables. If we do 
so, labor and fiscal add 20 endogenous dummy variables to the equation for host because 
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there are 11 ordered categories in labor and fiscal respectively. Second, even if we treat labor 
and fiscal to be continuous because of the way the responses were collected, say, the ordered 
probit estimation of the equation system requires trivariate normality due to the correlated 
error terms. Third, we made an attempt to estimate the equation system by collapsing the 
4 ordered categories of host into two and using Stata's ivprobit. This attempt turned out 
to be unfruitful: insufficient variations in our instrumental variables meant that Stata could 
not maximise the loglikelihood function. 
Accordingly, we estimate the three equations separately in this chapter. This clearly 
limits the validity of our results in this chapter. The assumption that labor and fiscal are 
econometrically exogenous in the equation for host is likely to be faulty because they are 
likely to be correlated with eh, as we have already explained. In addition, in each equation, 
we have variables such as the satisfaction with the state of the national economy (econ) and 
the perceived origin of European immigration (origin), which are also subjective responses. 
They are also likely to be correlated to the error terms. The validity of our results thus 
depends on the exogeneity of explanatory variables in each equation. Our approach thus 
resembles that of Blinder and Krueger (2004). 
We first estimated the equations for labor and fiscal respectively by both ordered pro bit 
and OLS. The results are similar, and hence we report only OLS results. The vector, 
L" contains our measure of labour substitutability between a respondent and immigrants 
(isub, or osub,), the status of being unemployed (unemploy;) and the status of being an 
employer (employer,). The vector, Fi , contains the three indicators for net social welfare 
beneficiries (pension" benefit, and parentI,). A measure of per capita income (inci, relinc, 
or sufinc,) appears in both vectors. In addition, we include interaction terms in F, that 
might capture how a citizen's public-finance concern depends on the welfare state. For 
instance, we have benefit, ""nrr, whose coefficient would be significantly positive if there is 
a positive relationship between the perceived fiscal impact of immigration (fiscal.) and the 
generosity of social welfare provision in the country (nrr,) among those whose household 
income mainly came from non-old-age social welfare benefits. 
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We then estimated the equation for host by ordered probit. We do not estimate it 
by OLS, for the intervals between the 4 ordered categories are not obvious. Let host: 
denote citizen i's demand for immigration from poorer countries of Europe. This is a latent 
variable, for we observe only one of the four ordered categories that is closest to demand but 
not the demand itself. In this chapter, we are interested in how ceteris paribus a change 
in an explanatory variable would affect this latent variable rather than the probability that 
a particular category of host is chosen. Hence we report the estimated coefficient on each 
explanatory variable. 
Since we do not know the metric of host" which is latent, we report its estimated standard 
deviation. If host· = x' f3 + e where x is the vector of all explanatory variables, f3 the vector 
of corresponding parameters and e ......, N ID (0,1), the estimated standard deviation is 
u == Jvar(host·) = J~'var(x)~+var(e) 
where ~ is the vector of estimated coefficients, var (x) the variance-covariance matrix for 
observed x and var (e) = 1 by assumption. We can then standardise the estimated lh 
parameter, ~j' by dividing it by the estimated standard deviation of the latent dependent 
variable. For example, suppose Xj is a dummy variable and ~i < 0. Then, host· was ~i/i1 
standard deviations lower for a person with Xj = 1 than someone with Xj = 0, other things 
being equal.25 
The vector, Hi, in the equation for host contains our measures of non-economic concerns 
related to immigration (crimei and cu.ltu.rei). We will first examine the importance of 
labour-market concern and public-finance concern for individual demand for immigration 
separately. We then include both concerns on the right-hand side. If the inclusion of both 
concerns significantly affects the estimates, it implies that focusing only on either one of the 
economic concerns is misleading. 
25For the computation of the latent variable's standard deviation, we used Long and Freese's (2003: 170) 
li.teoef. .td command in Stata. 
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3.S. Explaining economic concerns 
Before examining the determinants of the desirable level of immigration, we estimate 
models for explaining individual perceptions of immigrants' impacts on the number of job 
opportunities (labor) and government coffers (fiscal) respectively. We use these perceptions 
to explain host· in Section 3.6. However, by examining determinants of labor and fiscal, 
we may anticipate whose host· would be more affected by these economic concerns than the 
others. 
Since our sample is not small, we work at the significance level of 5 percent or less 
throughout the rest of the chapter, although the significance level of 10 percent is also 
indicated in the result tables. We find evidence of heteroscedasticity in every estimation. 
Hence reported standard errors are all heteroscedasticity-robust. 
3.S.1. Explaining labor 
We present OLS estimates of 11 models for explaining labor in Table 3.4. The results from 
orderd probit are similar, and hence we do not report them. Each model includes a constant 
and 14 country dummies whose coefficients are not reported in the table. 26 Model i does 
not include explanatory variables which are directly related to the labour-market. 
We begin with model ii where we have two explanatory dummy variables of interest, 
unemploy and employer, together with the set of all the explanatory variables appearing in 
model i. We find the estimated coefficient on unemploy statistically insignificant, although 
its sign is negative as expected. That is, the status of being unemployed and looking 
for a job does not make a difference in perceiving immigrants' impact on the number of job 
opportunities. This result conflicts with that of Bauer, Lofstrom and Zimmermann (2000).27 
On the other hand, we find the estimated coefficient on employer significantly positive, 
although its size is not large: it suggests that, other things being equal, the perceived 
impact of immigration on the number of job opportunities is only .073 point higher among 
employers than the rest on the labor scale of 10 points. 
26 Available upon request 
27See Subsection 3.2.1 above. 
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Most of the estimated coefficients on the other explanatory variables are as expected. 
Those who thought that most European immigrants originated from richer countries (orig-
inr) perceived a more positive impact of immigration on the number of job opportunities, as 
compared to the others who thought that they came from both richer and poorer countries 
equally (the reference group) or mainly from poorer countries (originp). Other things being 
equal, their labor score is found .193 higher than the rest. 
The estimated coefficients on ethlive dummies indicate that those who lived in an area 
with either almost no ethnic minorities (ethliveO) or many of them (ethlive2) perceived a 
more negative impact of immigrants on the number of job opportunities than those who lived 
in an area with some ethnic minorities (the reference group). Furthermore, the presence of 
many ethnic minorities in living environments seems to lead to a more negative perception 
than little presence of them. 
The estimated coefficients on educational attainment dummies (the reference group, 
edu9) together show a monotone tendency that respondents who attained higher formal 
education were likely to perceive a more positive impact of immigration on the national 
labour market than those with lower formal education. The estimates on eduO and edu6 
suggest that the difference between the lowest and the highest educated is approximately 1 
point on the labor scale. 
The more immigrant friends a respondent had, the more positive impact of immigration 
on the number of job opportunities the person perceived (the reference group, friendO). 
Respondents who had at least one foreign-born parent perceived immigrants' labour-market 
impact more positively than the others. The estimated coefficient on fparent is over 6 times 
larger than the one on employer. 
Respondents' satisfaction with the current state of the national economy (econ), self-
assessed political orientation (polit), exposure to the media on current affairs (media) and 
general wellbeing (happy) are all found significant factors, while respondent's gender and 
age are found insignificant. For instance, about 7 additional hours of exposure to the media 
on current affairs per weekday seem to increase the labor score by half a point. 
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Table 3.4 OLS models for explaining labor 
ii iii iv v 
isub -.026 
.016 
osub 
-.242 
.047 
sufineO -.457 ... -.585 -.658 ••• 
. 118 .103 .159 
sufinc1 -.126 -.147 -.234 
.105 .106 .081 
sufine3 .101 .118 • .113 .. 
.065 . 062 .053 
unemploy -.287 -.217 -.232 -.100 
.243 .219 .208 .225 
employer .073 •• .048 .027 -.021 
.031 .033 .026 .019 
originp -.078 -.080 -.084 -.057 -.108 
.053 .054 .057 .074 .083 
originr . 195 ... .193 ... .187 ••• .245 ••• .245 • •• 
. 047 .048 .046 .054 .051 friendl .461 ••• .456 ... .456 ... .466 ... .449 • •• 
. 060 .058 .059 .070 .070 friend2 .755 ••• .752 . .. .743 ••• .768 ... .714 • •• 
.067 . 068 .064 .061 .080 
ethliveO -.171 ••• -.173 ••• -.181 ••• -.174 ... -.182 . .. 
.031 . 032 .033 .043 .056 
ethlive2 -.289 ... -.288 ... -.275 ••• -.312 ... -.316 • •• 
.034 . 033 .033 .040 .057 
econ .121 ••• .120 ••• .113 ••• .120 • •• .123 • •• 
.011 .011 .012 .014 .019 
polit .084 ••• .085 ... .085 ... .080 . .. .067 . .. 
.019 . 019 .017 .015 .015 
media .068 .. .068 .065 .. .074 .049 
.024 .024 .024 .030 .033 
happy . 079 ... .076 ... .065 ••• .059 ••• .068 ... 
.013 . 012 .011 .012 .009 
eduO -.464 ... -.470 ... -.404 •• -.379 -.260 
.131 .128 .138 .155 .217 
edul -.291 .. -.293 •• -.260 -.291 • -.288 • 
.131 .134 .138 .143 .145 
edu2 -.163 •• -.162 •• -.147 •• -.202 •• -.119 . . 
.074 . 074 .067 .070 .040 
edu4 .167 .163 .162 .180 .161 
.108 .105 .096 .104 .122 
edu5 . 424 ... .421 ... .405 ... .389 .. . .433 ... 
.102 . 100 .090 .101 .087 
edu6 .695 ••• .688 ••• .646 ••• .723 • •• .622 .. . 
.093 . 090 .081 .096 .105 
fparent .441 ••• .446 ••• .435 • •• .359 •• .309 • • 
.135 . 134 .135 .122 .127 
female .019 .019 .018 .026 .029 
.023 .022 .018 .023 .022 
age .002 .001 .001 .004 .003 
22,Qg1 
.002 .002 .002 .003 
06s. 22,054 21,881 18,338 15,821 
Jt2 
.139 .139 .142 .151 .139 
NB: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors appear in a small font, adjusting for intra-
country correlation. To avoid perfect multicollinearity, the be dummy is dropped in models 
including isub, while dummies for be, fr and se are dropped in models including osub. 
The levels of significance are indicated by • (10%), .. (5%) and ... (1%). 
Dummies for edu, ethlive, friend, origin and sujinc are respectively jointly significant at the 
1% level in each model except viii and xi where origin dummies are jointly significant at the 
2% level. Refer to Table 3.3 for the descriptions of the variables. 
In models iii to v, we add our measure of subjectively assessed household income suf-
ficiency, sufine dummies (the reference group, sufine2), to model ii. In models vi to viii, 
we use our measure of real net income per capita (ine) instead. In models ix to xi, we 
use our measure of intracountry relative net income per capita (reline) instead. In each of 
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these 3 sets of 3 models, the second model includes our measure of labour substitutability 
between citizens and non-citizens by industry and country (isub), while the third model uses 
a similar measure based on occupational categories (osub) instead. 
In model iii, we find that sujinc dummies are jointly significant. The sign and size of 
each estimated coefficient suggests a monotone trend, ie, a respondent who regarded his/her 
household income as insufficient for living was likely to perceive a more negative labour-
market impact of immigration. It is however the group of those who felt their life was very 
difficult with their household income (sufincO = 1) that significantly differ from the rest. 
The estimated coefficient on sufincO suggests that their labor score is lower than the others 
by almost half a point. 
The estimated coefficient on unemploy remains insignificant. That on employer is also 
insignificant as a result of including sujinc dummies. The signs of the other estimated 
coefficients remain the same as in model ii, and their magnitudes are also roughly the same. 
In model iv, we add our measure of labour substitutability between citizens and immi-
grants by industry and country. We find isub statistically insignificant, although it has the 
negative sign as expected. We thus do not confirm our expectation that respondents who 
belonged to industries that were more penetrated by immigrant workers in each country 
perceived a more negative impact of immigration on the number of job opportunities than 
the others. Note that the inclusion of isub slightly increases the adjusted R2 even though 
the sample size drops due to the lack of the Belgian data on isub. Both unemploy and em-
ployer continue to be insignificant. The size of the estimated coefficients on sufincO, edu6 
and originr increases respectively by the inclusion of isub, while that on /parent decreases. 
The other estimated coefficients remain roughly the same as in model iii. 
In model v, we use osub instead of isub. Its estimated coefficient is significantly negative 
as expected. It suggests that, for instance, those who belonged to the lowest-skill occupa-
tional group (category 9 in Table 3.2) are likely to have marked .33 ~ .242 (1.87 - .50) point 
lower on the labor scale than those who were in the highest-skill occupational group (cate-
gory 2) in Germany. The use of this alternative measure of labour substitutability between 
citizens and immigrants further strengthens the effect of sufinc dummies both statistically 
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and in terms of magnitude. Both unemploy and employer remain statistically insignificant. 
Moreover, the sign of the estimated coefficient on employer is now negative. The partial 
effect of the extent of exposure to the media on current affairs is now insignificant. The 
size of the coefficient on /parent is further reduced. Note that, while a significant monotone 
trend among edu dummies is roughly preserved, we see the size of the estimated coefficients 
on the lowest and the highest, eduO and edu6, becomes smaller. In addition, we find eduO 
no longer significant. 
Table 3.4 ~Continued) 
vi vii viii ix x xi 
isub -.004 -.002 
.027 .027 
osub -.284 **. -.276 .** 
.053 .051 
ine .053 .053 .055 
.057 .059 .051 
reline .083 • .084 .088 • 
.047 .050 .047 
unemploy -.332 -.384 • -.268 -.323 -.375 • -.261 
.220 .190 .227 .219 .188 .226 
employer .149 ... . 133 ** • . 112 ••• .140 ... .124 ... .105 .. 
.034 . 032 .035 .035 .034 .036 
originp -.109 .. -.114 •• -.127 -.110 •• -.114 .. -.126 
.045 .047 .074 .045 .046 .074 
originr . 198 ... . 225 ••• . 216 .. .199 ... .226 .. . .217 •• 
.058 .071 .082 .058 .071 .083 friendl .478 ... .464 ••• . 443 ... .475 ... .462 ••• .441 ... 
.059 .074 .076 . 059 .075 .076 friend2 . 765 **. .790 ••• . 722 ••• .764 ••• .789 ••• .722 ••• 
.056 .061 .062 .055 .060 .059 
ethliveO -.181 ••• -.177 ••• -.167 •• -.181 .** -.177 **. -.168 •• 
.044 .054 .074 .044 .054 .074 
ethlive2 -.276 ••• -.338 ... -.301 ... -.276 ... -.337 ... -.303 ... 
.029 .031 .031 .028 .030 .032 
econ . 126 ••• .127 **. . 139 ... .126 ... .127 ... .139 ••• 
.014 .015 .016 .014 .015 .016 
polit . 086 ... .086 ... .075 .086 ... .087 ... .075 . .. 
.013 .014 .017 .013 .014 .017 
media . 067 • .079 • .045 .067 • .079 • .045 
.033 .038 .042 .033 .038 .042 
happy . 069 ** • .069 ... . 081 ... . 069 ... .069 ... .081 ••• 
.019 .020 .018 .020 .020 .019 
eduO -.592 ••• -.575 •• -.571 •• -.569 ••• -.552 •• -.550 •• 
.162 .200 .200 .167 .203 .203 
edul -.344 •• -.418 .. -.388 • -.329 • -.403 •• -.374 • 
.152 .172 .184 .156 .177 .190 
edu2 -.205 .. -.294 •• -.184 •• -.201 .. -.290 •• -.183 •• 
.093 .104 .065 .093 .105 .066 
edu4 . 240 •• .261 •• .217 • .235 •• .256 •• .212 • 
.096 .103 .116 .094 .102 .115 
edu5 . 420 ••• .415 ••• .465 ... .415 ... .409 ... .459 ••• 
.106 .111 .087 .104 .108 .083 
edu6 .631 ... .686 ••• .493 •• .607 ••• .660 ... .461 .. 
.103 .121 ,161 .102 .122 .166 
/parent .379 ••• .321 •• .252 • .380 ••• .320 •• .252 • 
.125 .135 .131 .125 .135 .132 female -.033 -.011 -.018 -.032 -.010 -.017 
.036 .031 .032 .035 .030 .032 
age .002 .005 • .003 .002 .005 .003 
17;B¥~ .~Qij .QQ~ .003 .~02 .003 obs. 15, 4 12,95 17,918 15, 40 12,959 
R,2 
.155 .164 .153 .156 .164 .153 
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In models vi to viii, we use ine instead of sufine dummies. We find our measure of real 
net income per capita insignificant in all 3 models. The estimated coeffcient on unemploy 
remains statistically insignificant in these models. Interestingly, the inclusion of inc does not 
make the positive coefficient on employer that was found significant in model ii insignificant, 
while that of sufinc dummies did so in models iii to v. In fact, the size of the estimated 
coefficient on employer is larger than in model ii. However, we cannot make a comparison· 
between sufine and inc models because ine suffers from over 20 percent of missing values. 
In model vi, the estimated coefficient on originp is significantly negative, and the origin 
dummies together maintain a monotone trend. We find media insignificant. The size of the 
estimated coefficients on eduO and edul are large and larger than in the previous models, 
which may in turn indicate that sufineO and low educational attainment are correlated, ie, 
those with the lowest educational attainment tend to regard their household income very 
insufficient for living. The rest of the coefficients are similar to those in model iii. 
In model vii, we find isub insignificant. In model viii, we find osub significantly negative, 
and the size is similar to the one in model v. The use of osub rather than isub makes the 
coefficients on originp and /parent insignificant. The positive coefficient on edu6 is reduced 
as a result of including osub. 
In models ix to xi, we use reline, our measure of intracountry relative net income per 
capita. We find it insignificant in all the 3 models. The estimated coefficient on osub 
remains significantly negative, and the size is similar to model viii. As in models vi to viii, 
we find unemploy insignificant. The coefficient on employer is significantly positive in all 
the 3 models, and the size is similar to the corresponding ones in models vi to viii. The 
use of osub also makes the coefficients on originp and /parent insignificant and reduces the 
positive coefficient on edu6 as in model viii such that the positive effects of edu6 and edu5 
are almost the same. 
To summarise, being an employer seems to suggest that the person is likely to perceive 
a more positive impact of immigration on the number of job opportunities: .1 to .15 point 
higher on the labor scale (models vi to xi). However, this is not confirmed when we use 
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our measure of subjective income sufficiency rather than estimated income (models iii to v). 
Being unemployed and looking for a job does not suggest that the person is likely to perceive 
a more negative impact of immigration on the number of job opportunities (models iii to 
xi). Belonging to an occupation that is more represented by non-citizens in the country 
indicates that the person is likely to perceive a more negative impact of immigration on the 
number of job opportunities (models v, viii and xi), but belonging to an industry that is 
more represented by non-citizens in the country does not make any difference (models iv, 
vii and x). The higher the attained formal education is, the more positive the person's 
perception of immigration's impact on the number of job opportunities (all models). While 
the subjective assessment of sufficiency of household income is implied as being positively 
related to labor (models iii to v), neither real net income per capita (models vi to viii) nor 
intracountry relative net income per capita (models ix to xi) is. Immigrants from richer 
countries seem to be perceived to have a more positive labour-market impact than those 
from poorer countries (all models). A perception of either little or many ethnic minorities 
in residential areas appears related to a perception of a more negative labour-market impact 
of immigration than a perception of some ethnic minorities in residential areas (all models). 
Once the presence of immigrants by occupation and country is controlled, having a foreign-
born parent does not seem to result in a more positive perception of immigrants' labour-
market effect than the others (models viii and xi). 
3.5.2. Explaining fiscal 
We present OLS estimates of 17 models to explain fiscal in Table 3.5. The results from 
ordered probit are similar, and hence we do not report them. Each model includes a 
constant and 14 country dummies whose coefficients are not reported. 28 Model i has the 
same set of explanatory variables as does model i in the previous section (Table 3.4). 
We begin with model ii which adds three explanatory dummy variables of interest to 
model i, ie, benefit, pension and parentl. We find none of these statistically significant. 
28 Available upon request 
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The estimated coefficients on the other explanatory variables are very similar to the cor-
responding ones in model i. Respondents who thought that most immigrants originated 
from poorer European countries (originp) were likely to perceive a more negative net fiscal 
impact of immigration than those who thought that most European immigrants came from 
richer countries (originr) or both poorer and richer countries equally (the reference group). 
The more immigrant friends a respondent had (friend dummies), the more positive 
the person's perception of immigration's public-finance impact would be. Respondents 
who perceived many ethnic minorities in their residential areas (ethlive2) were likely to 
perceive a more negative public-finance impact of immigrants than those who perceived 
either some or little ethnic minorities in their residential areas (the reference group and 
ethliveO respectively). Those who had at least one parent who was born abroad (fparent) 
were more likely to regard immigrants as net contributors to government coffers than the 
others. 
A respondent's satisfaction with the state of the national economy (econ), self-assessed 
political orientation (polit), exposure to the media on current affairs (media) and general 
wellbeing (happy) are all statistically significant. For instance, other things being equal, 
one point increase in fiscal seems to require more than 15 extra hours of exposure to the 
media on current affairs per weekday. 
Note that only those who attained high formal education appear noticeably different 
from the rest, regarding the perception of immigrants' net fiscal contribution. The positive 
effect of the attainment of first-stage tertiary education (edu5) is as strong as that of having 
a foreign-born parent (fparent) or a few immigrant friends (friendl). The estimated figures 
suggest that this magnitude would be roughly doubled if second-stage tertiary education 
were attained (edu6). The rest (from eduO to edu4) are not distinguishable from each 
other. The effect of education on fiscal thus seems discrete rather than continuous. The 
threshold level of education is first-stage tertiary. 
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Table 3.5 OLS models for explaining fiscal 
ii iii iv v 
inc .026 
.034 
reline .020 
.040 
sufincO -.255 •• 
.108 
sufinc1 -.033 
.045 
sufinc3 .201 ••• 
. 041 
benefit -.166 -.075 -.092 -.098 
.119 .110 .125 .128 
pension .003 .016 .054 .052 
.060 .063 .032 .034 
parentl .335 .373 •• .266 •• .264 • • 
. 166 .167 .110 .1OS 
originp -.221 ... -.222 • •• -.219 ... -.306 ••• -.306 • •• 
.059 .059 .062 .046 .047 
originr .039 .032 .029 .038 .040 
.103 .106 .lD2 .126 .126 
friendl .423 ••• .420 ••• .416 ••• .390 ••• .391 • •• 
.064 .065 .063 .072 .072 
friend2 .627 .619 ••• .614 ••• .611 ••• .612 ... 
.106 .110 .112 .125 .124 
ethliveO -.126 -.124 -.129 -.151 .. -.151 .. 
.077 . 077 .078 .069 .069 
ethlive2 -.154 •• -.160 •• -.142 .. -.156 ... -.156 • •• 
.062 .061 .061 .050 .050 
econ . 118 ... .117 ... .112 ••• .123 ••• .123 ••• 
.0lD .Oll .0lD .013 .013 
polit . 121 ••• .121 ... .121 ... .121 ... .121 .. . 
.037 .036 .036 .035 .035 
media .062 .064 •• .063 .072 .072 ... 
.023 .024 .022 .017 .017 
happy .054 ••• .055 ••• .045 ... .060 • •• .060 ... 
.015 .014 .014 .009 .009 
eduO .020 .008 .061 .027 .030 
.133 .135 .125 .127 .132 
edul -.027 -.023 .017 -.009 -.008 
.083 .083 .086 .107 .111 
edu2 -.113 • -.114 • -.102 -.106 -.108 
.055 .055 .059 .093 .093 
edu4 .058 .054 .045 .090 .090 
.135 .135 .129 .158 .158 
edu5 . 388 ••• .386 ••• .364 ... .360 • •• .364 .. . 
.081 .082 .085 .116 .114 
edu6 . 795 ••• .796 ••• .763 ... .677 • •• .676 • •• 
.073 .073 .064 .074 .069 
/parent . 391 •• .388 ••• .382 •• .308 •• .308 • • 
.133 .128 .130 .109 .109 
female .042 .026 .027 -.032 -.033 
.057 .054 .055 .062 .062 
age -.001 •• -.001 -.002 -.002 -.002 
.000 .001 .001 .001 .001 
068. 21,867 21,867 21,700 17,788 17,788 
R,2 
.120 .121 .123 .120 .120 
NB: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors appear in a small font, adjusting for intra-
country correlation. To avoid perfect multicollinearity, we do not interact sufinc dummies 
with country-level variables. The significance levels are indicated by • (10%), •• (5%) and 
... (1%). Dummies for edu, ethlive, friend, origin and sufinc are respectively jointly 
significant at the 1 % level in each model except i where ethlive dummies at the 6% level, 
ii where ethlille dummies at the 5% level and iii where ethlille dummies at the 8% level and 
origin dummies at the 2% level. Refer to Table 3.3 for the descriptions of the variables. 
In models iii to v, we add our measures of income to model ii. Model iii contains sujinc 
dummies. It suggests that each respondent's expressed sufficiency of household income 
for living is positively related to fiscal. The more sufficient a respondent felt about the 
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household income, the more positive perception of immigrants' net contribution to public 
finance the person had. Note that the estimated coefficient on parentl is now significantly 
positive, suggesting that lone parents with at least one child living together tend to perceive 
a more positive net fiscal impact of immigration than the others. The rest of the coefficients 
in model iii are very similar to those of model ii with the same signs. 
In model iv, we use ine instead of sufine dummies. This measure of real net income per 
capita is found insignificant. The addition of ine to model ii results in a slight decrease in 
the size of the coefficients on edu6, parentl and fparent. However, this comparison between 
models ii and iv is not valid, for the sample size is smaller in model iv than in model ii. 
We also fi~d ethliveO now significantly negative. That is, those who perceived little 
ethnic minorities in their residential areas were likely to have a more negative perception of 
immigration's public-finance effect than those who perceived some ethnic minorities in their 
residential areas (the reference group). The magnitude of originp also slightly increases. 
In model v with our measure of intracountry relative net income per capita, the coeffi-
cient on reline is found insignificant. The other coefficients are almost the same as in model 
iv. 
In models vi to xiii, we attempt to see whether the coefficients on income and the other 
indicators of net fiscal contributions of respondents turn out as economic theory predicts. 
We found ine and reline insignificant in models iv and v respectively. We found our 
subjective measure of income significant in model iii, but sufine dummies would measure not 
only the sufficiency of household income but also spending habit as well as lifestyle aspiration 
implicitly. We therefore use ine in models vi to xiii to see whether the relationship between 
personal income and the perception of immigrants' net fiscal contribution depends on the 
system of public finance. These are extensions of model iv in the table. The results from 
the use of reline instead of ine in models vi to xiii are very similar and are hence reported 
in Table A3.4 in the appendix.29 We do not discuss the estimated coefficients on the set 
291n any case, we cannot usc sufinc dummies in the same way as we do in models vi to xiii because our 
measures of public finance are country-specific, ie, the inclusion of the set of sufinc dummies interacted with 
country-level variables causes perfect multicollinearity because we also have country dummies in each model. 
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of the explanatory variables appearing in model i , for they remain roughly the same as in 
model iv. 
In model vi, we interact inc, benefit, pension and parentl with tp in order to see whether 
the importance of these variables for fiscal depends on country-level tax progressivity. We 
find that real net income per capita continues unimportant. Nor do beneficiaries of non-
pension social welfare benefits differ from the rest. The coefficient on pension is now 
significantly positive although the interaction with tp is insignificant. That is, other things 
being equal, a respondent having pension as the main source of household income was likely 
to perceive a more positive net fiscal impact of immigrants than the rest. We find parentl 
and parentl *tp insignificant. 
In model vii, we further add interaction terms with fshare in order to see whether 
the importance of inc, benefit, pension and parentl for fiscal depends on not only tax 
progressivity but also the extent of immigrants' presence at the country level. Ideally we 
would like to use a measure of social welfare use by immigrants, which we do not have. We 
tentatively use the share of non-citizens in the total population as a proxy at the price of 
being unable to draw firm conclusions because, in interpreting the results, we need to assume 
that citizens and non-citizens are equally likely to benefit from welfare programmes.30 We 
find all the terms involving inc, benefit, pension and parentl insignificant even though they 
are respectively jointly significant. 
In model viii, we repeat model vi but use tp2 instead of tp. By using this alternative 
measure of tax progressivity that takes into account employees' social security contribution, 
we find the positive coefficient on pension no longer significant: it was in the tp version. 
Model ix is the tp2 version of model vii. We find none of the explanatory variables of 
interest significant, as we did in the tp version. 
30Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter (2005) could use immigrants' share of cash-benefit recipients in the United 
States, as we noted in Subsection 3.2.2 above. 
Table 3.5 (Continued) 
vi vii viii ix x xi xii xiii 
inc -.018 .583 -.077 -.115 -.084 -.099 .944 ••• -.152 
.037 .378 .067 .469 .055 .103 .186 .829 
inc"'tp .547 -5.330 • -13.533 • •• 
.640 2.573 2.217 
inc "'tp "'fshare 102.185 • 286.204 ... 
55.300 48.420 
inc "'tp2 1.189 .065 .752 
.949 4.259 10.190 
inc "'tp2"'fshare -6.510 -20.777 
79.103 223.474 
inc"'nrr .171 .025 1.110 -.049 
.106 .139 .237 .636 
inc "'nrr'" fshare -.048 -29.570 ... 1.906 
3.609 6.438 17.691 
inc "'fshare -11.686 3.192 2.084 -16.524 ... 3.418 
8.249 9.427 2.645 3.818 15.745 
(.318) (.000) (.391) (.028) (.300) (.059) (.000) (.002) 
benefit .204 -.911 .373 -.054 -.459 -2.719 -.902 .038 
.274 2.420 .308 2.962 .554 .483 .850 1.786 
benefit*tp -2.601 6.211 -24.951 • 
1.891 16.757 12.208 
benefit"'tp "'fshare -172.882 523.938 • 
356.773 272.088 
benefit "'tp2 -4.560 • - .455 -27.325 
2.378 23.262 17.756 
benefit *tp2 *fshare -74.421 541.248 
493.745 385.210 
benefit"'nrr . 543 4.026 6.392 ••• 4.897 ... 
.768 .857 1.304 1.119 
benefit "'nrr*fshare -96.902 ... -154.439 • •• -109.472 • •• 
23.817 36.101 33.960 
benefit*fshare 23.050 8.234 66.853 ... 33.618 • 7.519 
53.132 64.291 16.660 16.408 42.664 
(.123) (.000) (.020) (.000) (.659) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
(continued ... ) 
NB: p-value for joint significance in brackets, eg, p = .318 for the joint significance of inc and inc*tp in model vi ...... <=> 
""" 
Table 3.5 (Continued) 
(vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (xii) (xiii) 
pension .167 •• .734 .128 .787 .045 .410 ••• . 717 ••• .791 
.065 .445 .130 .615 .071 .060 .225 .542 
pension*tp -.982 -4.418 -3.047 
.609 3.297 2.986 
pension *tp * fshare 80.406 37.392 
64.061 58.614 
pension *tp~ -.671 -5.021 -4.377 
1.285 5.302 6.475 
pension *tp~*fshare 105.175 84.296 
93.940 121.057 
pension *nrr .012 -.210 • -.149 -.003 
.111 .100 .241 .344 
pension *nrr* fshare 12.703 ••• 12.805 .. 7.765 
2.223 5.893 8.467 
pension *fshare -12.830 -15.149 -12.448 ... -17.083 ••• -19.328 • 
9.346 11.844 1.649 4.540 9.571 
(.054) (.042) (.209) (.078) (.308) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
parentI .277 1.945 .154 1.835 .697 1.481 ... .474 -.721 
.297 1.640 .278 2.085 .281 .233 .701 1.099 
parentl *tp -.125 -13.549 15.836 
2.046 11.047 9.916 
parentl *tp *fshare 253.796 -384.254 
217.120 229.710 
parentl *tp~ 1.079 -13.234 27.245 • 
1.992 15.864 14.443 
parentl *tp~*fshare 268.937 -617.313 • 
317.255 330.738 
parentl *nrr -.695 • -2.310 • •• -4.273 • n -4.221 ••• 
.375 .397 1.283 1.227 
parentl *nrr*fshare 40.781 ... 92.163 •• 87.599 ** 
5.828 31.532 31.541 
parentl *fshare -33.404 -32.836 -23.698 * .. -4.419 21.947 
32.862 42.192 4.061 13.198 22.183 
(.054) (.000) (.022) (.000) (.031) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
(continued ... ) 
..... 
0 
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Table 3.5 (Continued) 
(vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (xii) (xiii) 
originp -.303 ••• -.302 ••• -.304 ••• -.304 ••• -.306 ... -.304 ••• -.303 ••• -.305 ••• 
.048 .047 .048 . 047 .046 .047 .047 .047 
originr .044 .042 .044 .042 .040 .044 .042 .042 
.128 .127 .129 .128 .126 .128 .128 .129 friendl .388 ... .387 ... .388 ... .388 ••• .389 ... .386 ••• .385 ••• .386 ••• 
.072 .072 .072 . 072 .073 .073 .073 .073 friend2 .611 ••• .607 ••• .610 ••• .607 ••• .609 ••• .608 ••• .606 ... .607 • •• 
.125 .124 .124 . 124 .124 .124 .124 .125 
ethliveO -.152 •• -.152 •• -.151 •• -.153 •• -.154 •• -.155 •• -.157 •• -.155 •• 
.069 .068 .069 . 068 .068 .068 .069 .068 
ethlive2 -.156 ... -.156 ••• -.156 ... -.156 .. . -.155 •• -.155 • •• -.159 ... -.157 ... 
.049 .050 .049 . 050 .050 .050 .050 .050 
econ .123 ••• .124 ... .123 ••• .124 ••• .123 ••• .123 ••• .123 ••• .123 ••• 
.013 .013 .013 .013 .013 .013 .013 .013 
polit .121 ••• .121 ... .121 ••• .121 ... .122 ••• .121 ... .121 ... .121 ••• 
.035 .035 .035 . 035 .035 .035 .035 .035 
media .071 .071 ••• .071 ••• .071 ... .071 ••• .070 . .. .070 ••• .070 ••• 
.017 .017 .017 .017 .017 .017 .017 .017 
happy .059 ... .058 ••• .059 ... .059 ••• .060 ••• .058 ... .057 ••• . 057 .. . 
.010 .010 .009 .009 .009 .009 .010 .009 
eduO .025 -.003 .029 .006 .021 .018 .013 .024 
.124 .120 .125 .120 .123 .116 .118 .118 
edul -.009 -.024 -.008 -.022 -.012 -.014 -.021 -.014 
.105 .103 .105 .105 .107 .104 .100 .102 
edu2 -.112 -.118 -.113 -.117 -.107 -.114 -.119 -.115 
.091 .090 .090 .091 .091 .089 .091 .091 
edu4 .083 .081 .083 .078 .089 .084 .085 .082 
.155 .157 .155 .157 .156 .156 .157 .157 
edu5 .355 ••• .355 ... .356 ••• .353 • •• .357 .358 ••• .358 ... .358 
.115 .115 .115 .115 .115 .114 .114 .113 
edu6 .671 ••• .675 .668 ... .664 .678 .676 .697 ... .672 ... 
.073 .079 .073 . 078 .075 .077 .079 .077 fparent .310 •• .313 •• .310 •• .314 •• .312 •• .317 .. .317 .. .315 
.109 . 110 .109 .109 .108 .108 .110 .109 female -.032 -.035 -.033 -.035 -.034 -.036 -.033 -.034 
.061 .061 .061 .061 .063 .062 .061 .061 
age -.002 -.002 • -.002 • -.002 • -.002 * -.002 * -.002 • -.002 • 
.001 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 
ohs. 17,788 17,788 17,788 17,788 17,788 17,788 17,788 17,788 
R2 
.120 .120 .120 .120 .120 .121 .121 .121 
...... 
0 
Q) 
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In model x, we add to model iv interactions of inc, benefit, pension and parentl with 
n1T respectively in order to see whether the importance of these variables for fiscal depends 
on country-level welfare generosity. We find only parentl significant, and the positive 
coefficient is much larger than the one in model iv. 
In model xi, we further add interaction terms with fshare in order to see whether the 
importance of inc, benefit, pension and parentl for fiscal depends on not only welfare gen-
erosity but also the extent of immigrants' presence at the country level. We find all the 
terms involving inc insignificant. We find all the terms involving benefit and parentl statis-
tically significant. The estimated partial effect of benefit on fiscal is the following: -2.719 
+4.026n1T -96.902n1T*fshare +66.853fshare. The resulting sign of this expression is am-
biguous. The second and third terms imply that Ishare has to be sufficiently small if 
more generous welfare provision should make those who rely on non-pension social welfare 
benefits perceive a more positive net fiscal effect of immigration than the rest, ie, Ishare 
< 4.026/96.902 ~ .041. The third and fourth terms imply that n1T has to be sufficiently 
small if more presence of immigrants should make them perceive a more positive net fiscal 
effect of immigration than the rest, ie, n1T < 66.853/96.902 ~ .689. For the mean values of 
n1T and fshare (given in Table 3.3), the estimated partial effect is approximately .196. 
The estimated partial effect of pension on fiscal is the following: .410 +(12.703n1T 
-12.448)fshare. It suggests that more generous social welfare provision would make pen-
sioners perceive a more positive net fiscal impact of immigration. A higher presence of 
immigrants would make them perceive a more negative net fiscal impact of it: the sum 
inside the brackets would be negative even when the sample's maximum n1T (given in Table 
3.3) is substituted. For the mean values of n1T and Ishare, the estimated partial effect is 
approximately.107. 
We obtain the estimated partial effect of parentl on fiscal as follows: 1.481 -2.31On1T 
+40.781n1T*fshare -23.698fshare. The second and third terms imply that fshare has to 
be sufficiently large if more generous welfare provision should make lone parents living with 
at least one child perceive a more positive net fiscal effect of immigration than the rest, 
ie, fshare > 2.310/40.781 ~ .056. The third and fourth terms imply that n1T has to be 
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sufficiently large if more presence of immigrants should make them perceive a more positive 
net fiscal effect of immigration than the rest, ie, nrr > 23.698/40.781 ~ .581. Compared to 
ofiscal/obenefit, each term in this partial effect has an opposing sign. For the mean values 
of nrr and fshare, the estimated partial effect is approximately .170. 
In model xii, we combine models vii and xi. That is, we examine the influence of tax 
progressivity, welfare generosity and the presence of non-citizens together on the importance 
of inc, benefit, pension and parentl for fiscal. We then find all the terms involving inc 
statistically significant. The estimated partial effect of inc on fiscal is complex: 
{}fiscal 
-(}-.- ~ .944-16.524fshare+(286.204fshare - 13.533) tp+(1.110 - 29.570fshare) nrr 
tnc 
The third term suggests that more progressive tax would contribute positively to the effect 
if the share of non-citizens in the country's total population is sufficiently high, ie, fshare 
> 13.533/286.204 ~ .047. The fourth term suggests that, if fshare > 1.110/29.570 ~ .037, 
more generous welfare provision would contribute negatively to the effect. The contribution 
of the presence of non-citizens to the effect also depends on tax progressivity positively and 
welfare generosity negatively. For the mean values of nrr, tp and fshare (given in Table 
3.3), the estimated partial effect is approximately -.111. In this case, other things being 
equal, having higher income implies the perception of a more negative net fiscal contribution 
of immigration to government coffers. 
The estimated partial effect of benefit on fiscal is (6.392 -154.439fshare)nrr. This 
suggests that, if fshare > 6.392/154.439 ~ .041, those who rely on non-pension social welfare 
benefits are likely to perceive a more negative net fiscal contribution of immigration under 
more generous social welfare provision. For the mean values of nrr and fshare, the estimated 
partial effect is approximately -2.827. 
The estimated partial effect of pension on fiscal is .717 +(12.805nrr -17.083)fshare. 
This suggests that those whose household income depended mainly on pension are likely to 
perceive a more positive net fiscal impact of immigration under a more generous social welfare 
system. They are also likely to perceive a more negative net fiscal impact of immigration 
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with a higher share of non-citizens in the total population because the net replacement ratio 
is unlikely to exceed one. For the mean values of nrr and fshare, the estimated partial effect 
is approximately .094. 
The estimated partial effect of parentl on fiscal is (92.163fshare -4.273)nrr. This 
suggests that, lone parents with at least one child living together are likely to perceive a 
more positive net fiscal impact of immigration with a higher share of non-citizens in the total 
population. If the share is sufficiently high, ie, fshare > 4.273/92.163 ~ .046, they are likely 
to perceive a more positive net fiscal impact of immigration under a more generous welfare 
system. For the mean values of nrr and fshare, the estimated partial effect is approximately 
1.394. 
In model xiii, we repeat model xii but use tp2 instead of tp. Tax progressivity then 
takes into consideration employee's social security contributions. We then find all the terms 
involving inc and pension insignificant, although they are jointly significant. The estimated 
partial effect of benefit on fiscal is (4.897 -109.472fshare)nrr. This suggests that those who 
rely on non-pension social welfare benefits are likely to perceive a more negative net fiscal 
contribution of immigrants with a higher share of non-citizens in the total population. If this 
share is sufficiently high, ie, fshare > 4.897 /109.472 ~ .044, they are also likely to perceive a 
more negative net fiscal impact of immigration under a more generous welfare system. This 
is what we also found in the tp version (model xii), and the threshold fshare is also similar. 
For the mean values of nrr and fshare, the estimated partial effect is approximately -1. 770. 
The estimated partial effect of parentl on fiscal is (87.599fshare -4.221)nrr. This sug-
gests that lone parents living with at least one child are likely to perceive a more positive 
net fiscal contribution of immigrants with a higher share of non-citizens in the total popula-
tion. If the share is sufficiently high, ie, fshare > 4.221/87.599 ~ .048, they are also likely 
to perceive a more positive net fiscal contribution of immigration under a more generous 
welfare system. This is what we also found in the tp version (model xii), and the threshold 
fshare is also similar. For the mean values of nrr and fshare, the estimated partial effect is 
approximately 1.222. 
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Although suggestive, some results from models xii and xiii are very difficult to interpret. 
Hence we also estimated simpler models with measures of both tax progressivity and welfare 
generosity. In models xiv to xvii, we do not interact these measures with the share of 
foreigners in the total population. Models xiv and xv use tp, while models xvi and xvii use 
tp2 instead. In models xiv and xvi, fshare is not included. It is interacted with inc, benefit, 
pension and parentI in models xv and xvii. 
Model xiv shows a significantly positive coefficient on inc*nrr, which suggests that the 
positive relationship between inc and fiscal depends positively on nrr. The more generous 
welfare provision is, the stronger the positive relationship between inc and fiscal is. However, 
this is not confirmed in models xv to xvii. 
Model xiv shows the following partial effect of benefit on fiscal: 1.194nrr-4.405tp. This 
indicates that non-pension welfare beneficiaries would perceive a more positive fiscal impact 
of immigration than the rest if welfare provision were generous. They would also perceive 
a more negative fiscal impact of immigration than the rest if tax were progressive. Model 
xvi shows that the generosity of welfare provision becomes unimportant if the measure 
of tax progressivity takes into consideration the social security contribution by employees. 
Furthermore, in models xv and xvii where we include fshare, the partial effect of benefit on 
fiscal is not dependent on tax progressivity. It is related positively to nrr and negatively 
to fshare. The results are thus mixed. 
The partial effect of pension on fiscal is also unclear. Model xiv suggests that it is 
negatively related to tax progressivity, while model xvii suggests that it is negatively related 
to the share of foreigners in the total population. 
Finally, we find that the partial effect of parentI on fiscal is significantly negatively 
related to the generosity of welfare provision. This finding is consistent across models xiv 
to xvii, whether we use tp or tp2, and whether fshare is included or not. The more generous 
welfare provision is, the more negative fiscal impact of immigration lone parents with at 
least one child living together perceive. 
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Table 3.5 (Continued) 
xiv xv xvi xvii 
inc -.093 -.090 •• -.146 • -.091 
.058 .038 .075 .054 
inc*tp .401 -.241 
.564 .431 
inc*tp£ 1.027 -.140 
.813 .977 
inc*nrr .136 •• .022 .129 • .018 
.059 .053 .066 .066 
inc*fshare 2.357 • 2.215 
1.116 1.334 
(.011) (.000) (.163) (.039) 
benefit -.408 -.416 • -.122 -.254 
.247 .209 .364 .360 
benefit*tp -4.405 •• -3.045 • 
1.800 1.509 
benefit*tp£ -6.070 .. -3.544 
2.578 2.685 
benefit *nrr 1.194 .. 1.514 ••• .949 • 1.253 .. 
.414 .438 . 468 .485 
benefit *fshare -6.211 ••• -5.677 •• 
1.926 2.058 
(.011) (.000) (.026) (.000) 
pension .134 .134 • .113 .046 
.086 .069 .137 .117 
pension*tp -1.206 oooo -.342 
.528 .828 
pension *tp£ -.758 .951 
1.310 1.499 
pension *nrr .090 .213 .036 .210 
.135 .149 .118 .136 
pension *fshare -2.989 • -3.793 .oo 
1.655 l.I;70 
(.038) (.000) (.366) (.004) 
parentl . 554 • .568 oo • .439 .575 • 
.277 .260 .295 .321 
parentl*tp 1.783 .004 
1.687 1.846 
parentl *tp£ 2.922 -.057 
2.082 3.285 
parentl *nrr -.790 ... -1.078 .. oo -.767 oooo -1.084 .oo 
.353 .449 .351 .468 
parentl *fshare 6.400 6.502 
4.875 5.569 
(.043) (.002) (.035) (.000) 
(continued ... ) 
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Table 3.5 (Continued) 
(xiv) (xv) (xvi) (xvii) 
originp -.304 ••• -.304 ••• -.304 ••• -.304 ... 
.047 . 047 .047 .047 
originr .045 .044 .045 .043 
.128 .128 .129 .128 
friendl . 386 ... .385 ••• .386 ••• .386 ... 
.073 . 073 .073 .072 
friend2 .610 ••• .608 ... .609 ... .607 ••• 
.125 . 124 .124 .124 
ethliveO -.155 •• -.155 .. -.154 •• -.155 .. 
.068 . 068 .068 .068 
ethlive2 -.155 ••• -.154 ••• -.154 ••• -.154 ••• 
.050 . 050 .050 .050 
econ . 123 ••• .123 ••• .123 ••• .123 ••• 
.013 .013 .013 .013 
polit . 121 ••• .121 ••• .121 ••• .121 ... 
.035 . 035 .035 .035 
media .071 ••• .071 ••• .071 ••• .070 ••• 
.017 . 017 .017 .017 
happy .059 ••• .058 ••• .059 ••• .058 ••• 
.010 . 010 .009 .009 
eduO .023 -.007 .024 .005 
.121 .121 .122 .123 
edul -.006 -.018 -.007 -.020 
.104 .105 .106 .107 
edu2 -.110 -.114 -.112 -.114 
.091 .090 .090 .090 
edu4 .086 .084 .084 .083 
.155 .156 .155 .156 
edu5 . 355 ••• .358 ••• .355 ••• .357 • •• 
.115 . 115 .115 .114 
edu6 . 675 ••• .673 ••• .671 ••• .671 ... 
.075 .076 .074 .076 
/parent . 314 •• .315 •• .313 •• .315 •• 
.109 . 109 .108 .109 
female -.034 -.034 -.035 -.035 
.062 .062 .062 .062 
age -.002 . -.002 • -.002 -.002 
·001 .QQ1 .QQ1 .001 
obs. 17,788 17,788 17,788 17,788 
R,2 
.120 .121 .120 .121 
To summarise, in specifications where either tax progressivity or welfare generosity is 
included on its own, neither of them seems to matter to fiscal (models vi, viii and x). When 
we have them together in a specification, we find that lone parents living with at least one 
child perceive a more negative fiscal impact of immigration under a more generous welfare 
system (models xiv to xvii). We also found that those citizens who relied on non-pension 
social welfare benefits perceived a more negative fiscal impact of immigration under a more 
progressive tax system (models xiv and xvi). But the influence of tax progressivity became 
insignificant when benefit*fshare was included, and we found that those welfare beneficiaries 
perceived a more negative fiscal impact of immigration when the presence of immigrants in 
the country is high (models xv and xvii). 
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When we interact fshare not only with inc, benefit, pension and parentl but also nrr and 
tp (tp2), the use of tp makes all terms involving inc significant, while the use of tp2 makes 
all of them insignificant (models xii and xiii). Hence the result depends on the definition 
of tax progressivity. Similarly, the result regarding the terms involving pension changes 
depending on whether we use tp or tp2 in specification (models xii and xiii). As for those 
citizens who replied on non-pension social welfare benefits, their perception of the fiscal 
impact of immigration was more positive under more generous welfare provision, provided 
that the share of foreigners in the total population is not very high (models xii and xiii). 
On the other hand, we found that lone parents living with at least one child would perceive 
a more negative fiscal impact of immigration if welfare provision were generous, given a low 
share of foreigners in the total population (models xii and xiii). 
Regarding the other explanatory variables, we find that attaining tertiary education 
distinguishes the respondent from the others by perceiving more positive net fiscal contribu-
tions of immigration (all models). Those who thought most European migrants came from 
poorer countries were likely to perceive a more negative net fiscal impact of immigration 
than the others (all models). Perceiving either many or little ethnic minorities in residential 
areas implies the perception of a more negative fiscal effect of immigration than perceiving 
some ethnic minorities (models iv to xiii). 
3.6. Explaining the desirable level of immigration 
We now turn to our main dependent variable, the desirable level of immigration. We first 
try to explain host" by labour-market concern. We then try to explain it by public-finance 
concern. We finally introduce both concerns. If the result changes significantly by having 
both concerns rather than just one of them, it is misleading to concentrate on one of these 
concerns in explaining the desirable level of immigration from poorer European countries.31 
As we explained in Section 3.4, we will assume that all the explanatory variables, including 
labor and fisca~ are econometrically exogenous.32 
31In this section, we no longer use 8ufinc dummies as explanatory variables because they cause perfect 
multicollinearity. See Subsection 3.5.2. 
32This is the reason why we control such factors as general wellbeing (happy) and self-assessed political 
orientation (polit) that might bias respondents' opinions and perceptions towards a certain direction overall. 
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3.6.1. Importance of labor 
We first present the results from 6 models for explaining host· by labor. We use our measure 
of real net income per capita (inc) in Table 3.6.33 The use of our measure of intracountry 
relative net income per capita (relinc) instead of inc yields very similar results which are 
therefore presented in Table A3.5 in the appendix. 
Model i contains explanatory variables that are included in all the subsequent models 
explaining host·. Note that we now include each respondent's perception of immigrants' 
security impact (crime) and cultural impact (culture): these did not appear when we ex-
ami ned the determinants of labor and fiscal in the previous section. We thus account for 
these non-economic motives behind individual opinions on the desirable level of immigra-
tion. The positive coefficient on culture suggests that the more positive cultural influence of 
immigrants a respondent perceived, the more immigration the person was likely to permit. 
Similarly, the less positive security effect of immigrants a respondent perceived (crime), the 
less immigration the person was likely to permit. 
The number of immigrant friends is important for host·: the more immigrant friends 
a respondent had, the more immigration the person was likely to desire. The significantly 
negative coefficient on originp implies that those who perceived most European immigrants 
to have come from poorer countries were likely to prefer less immigration of the same type 
than the rest. The estimated coefficients on edu dummies indicate that the attainment of 
formal education is positively related to host·. We find neither econ nor /parent statistically 
significant, while the estimated coefficient on inc is significantly positive. 
Model ii adds labor to model i. Its estimated coefficient is significantly positive: those 
who perceived a more negative impact of immigrants on the number of job opportunities 
were likely to desire less immigration. One point move to the positive direction on the 
labor scale would increase the preferred level of immigration by .073/1.229 ~ .06 standard 
deviations. We find that ethlive dummies become insignificant as a consequence of including 
labor. 
33With weighted observations, Stata maximises the log pseudolikelihood. The pseudo-R2 is defined as 
1- Ll/ Lo where Ll is the log pseudolikelihood of the model and La is that of the constant-only model. See 
[R] muimise. 
Table 3.6 Ordered probit models for explaining host' by labor 
ii iii iv v vi 
isub*labor .006 
.004 
isub -.006 -.034 
.020 .039 
(.149) 
osub*labor -.002 
.005 
osub -.084 -.071 
.054 .052 
(.312) 
unemploy*labor -.004 -.006 
.033 .037 
unemploy -.041 -.020 -.058 -.035 
.093 .125 .109 .121 
(.921) (.849) 
employer*labor -.095 -.097 ••• 
.019 .020 
employer -.122 . 331 • -.040 .415 • • 
.lD4 .lS0 .OS9 .162 
(.000) (.000) 
labor . 073 .073 ... .073 . .. .075 ... .085 .. . 
.0lD .007 .004 .009 .oos 
crime . 093 ... .079 ... . 085 . .. .084 • •• .090 .. . .089 • •• 
.015 .013 .011 .011 .014 .014 
culture .163 ... .145 ••• .141 • •• .141 . .. .143 ... .143 .** 
.OOS .009 .007 .007 .010 .010 
(continued ... ) 
NB: To avoid perfect multicollinearity, the be dummy is dropped in models inculding isub, while dummies 
for be, fr and se are dropped in models including osub. Dummies for edu and friend are respectively jointly 
significant at the lo/c level in all models. Dummies for origin are jointly significant at the 1% level in models i 
to iv, the 10% level in v but insignificant in vi. Dummies for ethlive are jointly insignificant at the 10% level 
in all the models except model i. .... 
.... 
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Table 3.6 (Continued) 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
originp -.103 ... -.101 ... -.088 ••• -.087 . .. -.078 • -.076 • 
.033 .031 .028 .028 .041 .041 
originr -.007 -.035 -.013 -.016 .004 -.002 
.081 .079 .089 .091 .113 .116 friend1 . 204 ••• .190 ••• .202 • •• .204 • •• .208 • •• .210 • •• 
.041 .044 .041 .042 .051 .052 friend2 .306 . 279 ... .295 . .. .293 ••• .292 • •• . 289 • •• 
.029 .034 .039 .038 .056 .052 
ethliveO -.056 •• -.045 • -.051 -.051 -.071 -.071 • 
.028 .026 .039 .039 .042 .042 
ethlive2 -.015 -.002 -.027 -.026 -.021 -.020 
.057 .059 .046 .046 .065 .066 
econ . 025 • .020 .021 .020 .012 .012 
.013 .013 .013 .013 .015 .016 
polit . 045 ••• .044 • •• .044 ••• .044 ••• .061 .. . . 060 ••• 
.014 .013 .015 .015 .013 .013 
media .036 ••• .032 ... .025 .025 .022 .021 
.012 .011 .016 .016 .019 .019 
happy .028 •• .024 •• .027 ••• .027 • •• .032 • •• . 032 • •• 
.012 .011 .0lD .0lD .0lD .009 
inc . 040 •• .039 • •• .041 • •• .041 ... .037 ... .037 • •• 
.017 .014 .012 .013 .0lD .011 
eduO -.164 ... -.150 •• -.197 • •• -.197 • •• -.116 • -.112 • 
.058 .070 .063 .067 .065 .065 
edut -.100 ••• -.088 • •• -.110 ••• -.111 • •• -.036 -.042 
.029 .024 .031 .030 .038 .036 
edu2 -.086 •• -.082 •• -.107 •• -.106 •• -.130 .. . -.127 • •• 
.036 .036 .043 .042 .036 .037 
edu4 .014 .003 -.010 -.016 -.008 -.015 
.063 .059 .058 .056 .063 .061 
edu5 .228 ... .209 ••• .196 • •• . 194 • •• .176 • •• . 173 ••• 
.044 .039 .047 .049 .050 .053 
edu6 .011 -.003 -.046 -.049 .002 .000 
.073 .071 .064 .067 .086 .089 fparent .083 .067 .076 .072 -.004 -.005 
.077 .076 .075 .074 .037 .038 female -.011 -.006 -.000 -.001 -.018 -.017 
.035 .038 .043 .043 .042 .043 
age -.003 -.004 -.003 -.003 ... -.003 -.003 
.001 .001 .001 .001 .000 .000 
s.d. of host· 1.218 1.229 1.233 1.234 1.226 1.228 
obs. 17,420 17,167 14,692 14,692 12,412 12,412 
log pseudo-likelihood -17,523 -17,148 -14,610 -14,597 -12,528 -12,516 
.... 
pseudo-R2 . 141 .147 .150 .151 .145 .146 .... Ol 
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Model iii further adds isub, unemploy and employer to model ii. We find these added 
variables insignificant. Note that the inclusion of isub means that the sample for this speci-
fication is of 14 countries without Belgium.34 We now find media statistically insignificant. 
In model iv, we further add these 3 variables inter&eted with labor in order to check 
whether the importance of labour-market concern for determining host· depends on a 
respondent's position in the labour market. We find the estimated coefficient on la-
bor*employer significantly negative. Its size suggests that their perceptions of immi-
grants' impact on the number of job opportunities do not really matter to their opinions on 
the permissible number of immigrants from poorer countries of Europe, ie, 8host· /8labor 
= .073 - .095 = -.022 for employers. 
Model v repeats model iii by replacing isub with osub. As a result of the use of 
this occupation-based measure of labour substitutability between citizens and non-citizens, 
origin dummies now become jointly insignificant. We find osub, unemploy and employer 
insignificant as in model iii. Note that the inclusion of osub means that the sample for this 
model is of 12 countries without Belgium, France and Sweden.35 We find the estimated 
coefficients on eduO and edul insignificant. 
Model vi is the osub version of model iv. The estimated coefficient on employer is 
now significantly positive, ie, employers are likely to prefer more immigration than the 
rest, other things being equal. As in model iv where isub is used, employers' perceptions 
of immigrants' impact on the number of job opportunities do not really matter to their 
opinions on the permissible number of immigrants from poorer countries of Europe, ie, 
8host* /8Iabor= .085 - .097 = -.012 for them.36 
3.6.2. Importance of fiscal 
We now examine the importance of public-finance concern for the determination of host·. 
We present the results from 7 models estimated by ordered probit in Table 3.7 where we 
34See Table 3.1. 
35See Table 3.2. 
36 As the results in models v and vi suggest, osub appears unimportant to host· while its estimated coefficient 
was found significantly negative in explaining labor (subsection 3.5.1). Hence we tried to use osub as an 
instrument for labor, but failed to obtain a result. See section 3.4. 
118 
use our measure of real net income per capita (inc). The use of intracountry relative net 
income per capita (relinc) instead of inc yields similar results which are therefore presented 
in Table A3.6 in the appendix. 
In model i, we add fiscal to Table 3.6's model i. We find its estimated coefficient 
significantly positive, which suggests that those who perceived a more positive net fiscal 
contribution of immigrants were likely to permit more immigration from poorer European 
countries. The other estimated coefficients are similar to those of Table 3.6's model i. 
In model ii, we add benefit, pension and parent1 to model i. We find none of these 
dummies that indicate beneficiaries of social welfare provision statistically significant. The 
other coefficients remain roughly the same as in model i. 
In model iii, we add to model ii the interaction terms of fiscal with these 3 variables and 
inc respectively in order to check whether the importance of fiscal for determining host· 
depends on a respondent's level of income or/and net fiscal contribution. We find none of 
them significant. We also find inc on its own becomes insignificant. 
In model iv, we add to model iii the interaction terms with our measure of tax progres-
sivity (tp) and social welfare generosity (nrr). We like to check whether these two country 
characteristics affect the influence of public-finance concern on the desirable number of im-
migrants. We find all the terms involving benefit statistically significant except benefit on 
its own. The estimated partial effect of fiscal on host" among those who rely on non-pension 
social welfare benefits differs from that among the rest by -.202 -.896tp +.473nrr. This 
indicates that more generous welfare provision increases the partial effect of fiscal on host· 
among them. That is, public-finance concern becomes more important for the formation of 
host" . On the other hand, more progressive taxation negatively contributes to the partial 
effect among them. The more progressive the tax system is, the less affected they are 
likely to be because they are net beneficiaries. Hence public-finance concern becomes less 
important for their opinion formation. For the mean values of tp and nrr (given in Table 
3.3), the estimated partial effect of fiscal on host" is approximately .059 among non-pension 
welfare beneficiaries. 
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The estimated partial effect of fiscal on host- among pensioners differs from that among 
the rest by -.050nrr. This indicates that higher welfare generosity negatively contributes 
to the partial effect of fiscal on host· among them. In other words, public-finance concern 
becomes less important in a more generous welfare state. Furthermore, pensioners seem 
to have some other reasons that make them prefer more immigration than the others: the 
coefficient on pension on its own is significantly positive. 
We find none of the terms involving parentI statistically significant, although they are 
jointly significant at the confidence level of 1 percent. We find that the partial effect of 
fiscal on host- depends on real net income per capita: f)2 host-/ afisca18inc :::= .039 - .053nrr. 
If nrr were sufficiently high, its sign would be negative, ie, higher income then implies lower 
ahost-/afiscal, other things being equal. In other words, under a generous welfare system, 
public-finance concern matters to the desirable level of immigration more among low-income 
earners than among high-income earners. 
In model v, we still add to model iv interaction terms involving fshare. By including 
these interactions, we hope to check whether the importance of fiscal for host- that may 
depend on tax progressivity and/or welfare generosity also depends on the presence of non-
citizens in the country. First, we can summarise the difference in the estimated partial effect 
of fiscal on host- between non-pension social welfare beneficiaries and the rest as follows: 
-.417 -2.897tp +(1.197 -22.341/share}nrr. On the one hand, this suggests that more 
generous welfare provision would contribute positively to the partial effect among them if the 
share of non-citizens in the total population is sufficiently low, ie, fshare < 1.197/22.341 :::= 
.053. It implies that the net fiscal impact of immigration becomes a more important issue 
for them if welfare provision is generous and there are not many immigrants in the country, 
other things being equal. Note that, in models xii and xiii in Table 3.5, we found that non-
pension welfare beneficiaries perceived a more positive fiscal impact of immigration under 
generous welfare provision and a low presence of foreigners in the country. This then implies 
that fiscal is important because they think that immigrants contribute to the welfare system 
positively. On the other hand, more progressive taxation would negatively contribute to 
the partial effect of fiscal on host· among them: potential tax increase is unlikely to affect 
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these beneficiaries when the tax system is progressive, so immigrants' fiscal impact becomes 
unimportant in thinking of the desirable level of immigration. 
The positive coefficient on pension on its own remains significant, indicating that pen-
sioners were likely to prefer more immigration ceteris paribus by reasons unexplained in the 
model. The estimated partial effect of the perception of immigration's net fiscal contri-
bution on the permissible number of immigrants differs between those who rely on pension 
benefits and the rest by (21.367tp -2.026nrr)fshare. This suggests that the partial effect 
unambiguously increases under a more progressive tax system or/and a less generous social 
welfare system among pensioners. An increase in the share of non-citizens in the total 
population may increase or decrease the partial effect depending on the sign of the sum in 
the brackets. For the mean values of tp, nrr and fshare (given in Table 3.3), the estimated 
partial effect is approximately .133 among them. 
We find all the terms involving parentl statistically significant except parentl on its 
own. The estimated partial effect of fiscal on host· differs between lone parents with at 
least one child living together and the rest by -.318 +4.281fshare +(4.129 -85.107fshare)tp 
+(1O.867fshare -.345)nrr. The interpretation of this is rather difficult. It suggests that 
more generous welfare provision would contribute positively to the partial effect of fiscal 
among them if the share of non-citizens in the total population is sufficiently high, ie, fshare 
> .345/10.867 ~ .031. However, if fshare > 4.129/85.107 ~ .048, more progressive taxation 
would negatively contribute to it. For the mean values of tp, nrr and fshare, the estimated 
partial effect is approximately .106 among them. 
The estimated partial effect of fiscal on host· depends on real net income per capita: 
82host· fis 18' ~ .170 - 3.067fshare + (18.039fshare - .854) tp - .067nrr 8 ca mc 
which suggests that welfare generosity contributes unambiguously negatively to the second 
partial derivative. Tax progressivity contributes positively to it if fshare > .854/18.039 ~ 
.047. However, a higher fshare reduces the second partial derivative via the second term. 
If its sign is positive, higher income results in a larger contribution of fiscal to determining 
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Table 3.7 (Continued) 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) 
parentl *fiscal*nrr*fshare 10.867 ••• 9.490 • •• 
2.291 3.544 
parent1 *fiscal*nrr .076 -.345 ••• .079 • -.316 •• 
.04S .096 .042 .131 
parent1 *fiscal*tp *fshare -85.107 ... 
19.019 
parent1 *fiscal*tp . 121 4.129 ... 
.41S 1.072 
parent1 *fiscal*tp2*fshare -128.894 ••• 
37.063 
parent1 *fiscal*tp2 .021 6.286 ••• 
. 540 1.S06 
parent1 *fiscal*fshare 4.281 ••• 9.566 ••• 
1.626 2.684 
parent1 *fiscal .012 -.040 -.318 ... -.031 -.556 ••• 
.054 .062 .101 .073 .159 
parent1 -.002 -.055 -.095 -.057 -.091 -.047 
.047 .216 .224 .21S .222 .21S (.954) (.005) (.000) (.006) (.000) 
inc *fiscal *nrr*fshare .800 • 1.641 • 
.458 .839 
inc *fiscal *nrr -.053 ••• -.067 • •• -.051 . .. -.097 • •• 
.012 .015 .012 .029 
inc *fiscal *tp *fshare 18.039 ••• 
4.701 
inc*fiscal*tp . 083 . -.854 ••• 
. 042 .227 
inc *fiscal *tp2*fshare 15.063 
11.920 
inc *fiscal *tp2 . 170 ... -.694 
.061 .573 
inc *fiscal*fshare -3.067 ••• -3.046 ... 
.417 .9S0 
inc*fiscal .012 • .039 ••• .170 . .. .031 . .. . 162 ... 
.006 .011 .019 .010 .050 
inc .044 •• . 041 • • -.006 -.010 -.007 -.010 -.006 
.017 .016 .019 .020 .021 .020 .021 (.026) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
fiscal .071 ••• . 071 • •• .061 . .. .058 ••• .060 • •• . 058 • •• .060 • •• 
.009 .009 .016 .017 .017 .017 .017 
(continued ... ) 
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Table 3.7 (Continued) 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) 
crime .073 ••• .073 ... .073 • •• .074 ... .074 ... .074 . 074 . .. 
.012 .012 .012 .012 .012 .012 .012 
culture .146 ••• .146 . .. . 146 ... .147 ••• .146 ... .147 .. . . 147 ••• 
.008 .008 .008 .008 .008 .008 .008 
originp -.090 .... -.091 .... -.091 .. .. -.088 ... -.088 ... -.089 .. . -.089 ... 
.031 .031 .031 .032 .032 .032 .032 
originr -.022 -.025 -.030 -.030 -.030 -.032 -.030 
.072 .074 .073 .075 .075 .075 .075 friend1 .198 .... .198 .. .... . 197 .. .. . 195 ••• .194 ... .194 .. . . 194 ... 
.044 .044 .044 .041 .042 .041 .042 friend2 . 297 .... .297 .... .295 .. .. .296 ... .295 ••• .294 . .. . 297 ... 
.036 .037 .038 .038 .038 .037 .038 
ethliveO -.052 • -.053 • -.054 • -.050 • -.049 • -.051 • -.050 • 
.029 .029 . 028 .027 .027 .027 .027 
ethlive2 -.014 -.012 -.011 -.014 -.017 -.014 -.016 
.060 .060 .059 .059 .060 .059 .060 
econ .020 .020 .020 .021 .021 .021 .021 
.014 .014 .014 .013 .013 .013 .013 
polit .041 ••• .041 ... . 041 • •• .041 .. . .042 ••• .041 • •• . 042 .. . 
.015 .015 .015 .015 .015 .015 .015 
media .032 ••• . 032 ... .032 ... .033 ... .034 . .. .034 . .. .034 • •• 
.011 .011 .011 .Oll .Oll .Oll .Oll 
happy . 027 •• .026 .. .026 .. .024 .. .024 .. .025 .. .024 •• 
.013 .012 .013 .012 .012 .012 .012 
eduO -.174 ... -.178 • •• -.171 ••• -.171 • •• -.177 ••• -.173 . .. -.169 •• 
.064 .063 . 064 .064 .066 .064 .069 
edu1 -.118 ••• -.118 ... -.116 . .. -.110 ... -.116 . .. -.112 ... -.111 • •• 
.025 .026 .027 .030 .029 .028 .029 
edu2 -.088 •• -.088 ... -.087 • •• -.084 • •• -.089 • •• -.086 ••• -.089 • •• 
.034 .033 .033 .032 .030 .031 .030 
edv.4 .010 .010 .012 .010 .009 .009 .011 
.060 .060 .060 .060 .061 .060 .061 
edu5 . 220 ... .219 . .. .215 ... .216 .216 .217 ... . 218 ... 
.043 .044 .044 .042 .041 .042 .041 
edu6 .004 .004 .002 -.000 .003 -.003 .001 
.068 .068 .069 .070 .070 .069 .070 fparent .075 .077 .076 .073 .074 .074 .074 
.080 .080 .079 .078 .079 .078 .078 female -.008 -.009 -.009 -.009 -.007 -.008 -.006 
.036 .035 .035 .034 .034 .034 .034 
age -.004 ••• -.004 ... -.004 • •• -.004 • •• -.004 -.004 . .. -.004 • •• 
.001 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 
s.d. of host· 1.229 1.230 1.230 1.234 1.236 1.233 1.235 
obs. 17,066 17,066 17,066 17,066 17,066 17,066 17,066 .... t-:> 
log pseudo-likelihood -17,044 -17,039 -17,032 -16,995 -16,977 -17,001 -16,979 (J,) 
pseudo-R2 .147 .148 .148 .150 .151 .150 .151 
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In model vi, we repeat model iv by replacing tp with tp2. That is, we regard employees' 
social security contributions as part of tax in approximating tax progressivity. The esti-
mated partial effect of fiscal on host" among those who rely on non-pension social welfare 
benefits depends positively on welfare generosity. Compared to model iv, tax progressivity 
does not now matter. We find all the terms involving parent1 insignificant, although they 
are jointly significant. This was also the case in model iv. For pensioners, we find a 
significantly negative coefficient on pension*fiscal*nrr. Its size relative to the coefficient on 
fiscal suggests that public-finance concern is not very important for their opinions on the 
permissible level of immigration under a generous social welfare system. Note that those 
who rely on pension benefits were likely to prefer more immigration for reasons unexplained 
by the model. This was also the case in model iv. 
The influence of inc on ohost" /ofiscal is positively related to the alternative measure 
of tax progressivity and negatively to welfare generosity. Note that we obtain a posi-
tive number by substituting the sample's minimum of tp2 and the maximum of nrr in 
o2host"/ofiscaLOinc ~ .031 + .170tp2 -.051nrr. That is, inc is unambiguously positively 
related to ohost" /ofiscal, and higher income results in a larger contribution of fiscal to de-
termining host" under a more progressive tax system or/and a less generous welfare system. 
Note that, in model iv, the coefficient on tp was found insignificant. 
In model vii, we repeat model v by replacing tp with tp2. The difference in the esti-
mated partial effect of fiscal on host" between those who rely on non-pension social welfare 
benefits and the others is (93.341fshare -4.536)tp2 +(1.244 -24.776fshare)nrr which sug-
gests that, if the share of non-citizens in the total population is sufficiently low, ie, fshare 
< 4.536/93.341 ~ .048, the first term is negative. Tax progressivity then contributes neg-
atively to the partial effect among them. However, if fshare < 1.244/24.776 ~ .050, the 
second term is positive. In this case, welfare generosity contributes positively to it. Com-
pared with model v, the use of tp2 rather than tp makes the interaction of tax progressivity 
with fshare significant. As a result, the influence of tax progressivity on ohost" /ofiscal 
among those beneficiaries becomes dependent on the presence of foreigners in the country. 
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We continue to find the coefficient on pension on its own significantly positive, as in 
models iv to vi. But none of the interaction terms involving pension is significant. 
The difference in the estimated partial effect of fiscal on host- between lone parents liv-
ing with at least one child and the others is -.556 +9.566fshare +(6.286 -128.894fshare)tp2 
+(9.490/share -.316)n1T. This suggests that tax progressivity would negatively contribute 
to the partial effect among such lone parents if the share of non-citizens in the total 
population is sufficiently high, ie, fshare > 6.286/128.894 ~ .048. However, if fshare 
> .316/9.490 ~ .033, welfare generosity would positively contribute to it among them. For 
the mean values of tp2, n1T and fshare, the estimated partial effect is approximately .095 
among them. 
The estimated partial effect of fiscal on host- depends on the level of real net income 
per capita as follows: cPhost* /{)fiscallJine ~ .162 - 3.046fshare -.097n1T. This suggests 
that welfare generosity as well as the presence of non-citizens in the country unambiguously 
negatively contribute to the second partial derivative. If the resulting sign is still positive, 
higher income implies a larger effect of fiscal on host·. Compared to model v, we do not 
find tax progressivity important here. However, the reline version of model vii in Table 
A3.6 yields a slightly different result: {)2host* /afiscallJreline ~ .162 - .059nrr -1.09ltp2 
-2. 955fshare. Thus, tax progressivity negatively contributes to the influence of income on 
the partial effect of fiscal on host- when using intracountry relative net income per capita. 
3.6.3. Importance of labor and fiscal 
We have so far examined the importance of labour-market and public-finance concerns sepa-
rately for individual opinions on the permissible number of immigrants from poorer European 
countries. In this subsection, we now examine the importance of these two concerns for 
host* together. We use ine in Table 3.8, and the results from the corresponding reline 
version are reported in Table A3.7 in the appendix. Only where the results are remarkably 
different between the ine and reline versions, do we refer to Table A3.7. 
In model i of Table 3.8 below, we add to Table 3.6's model i only labor and fiscal on 
their own. The estimated coefficients on both of these are found significantly positive, and 
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the magnitude is similar to each other. The coefficients on the other explanatory variables 
are similar to Table 3.6's model i. We then add all the variables we have used in Tables 3.6 
and 3.7. We use isub in models ii and iv and osub instead in models iii and v. We use tp 
in models ii and iii and tp2 instead in models iv and v. 
In all the 4 models, we confirm what we found in Table 3.6's models iv and vi. First, 
when using osub, we find that, other things being equal, employers are likely to permit more 
immigration than the others. Second, the perception of immigrants' impact on the number 
of job opportunities seems to have a slightly negative effect on host" among employers, eg, 
-.043 = .059-.102 in model ii and -.037 = .068-.105 in model v. However, the magnitude 
is small: in model ii, for example, even one point decrease in the labor score increases only 
.034 standard deviations in host" among employers. 
Unexpectedly, we conclude that, other things being equal, those whose labour can be 
more easily substituted by non-citizens do not differ from the others regarding the influence 
of labour-market concern for the desirable level of immigration. Neither labor*isub nor 
labor*osub are found significant in models ii to v. We also confirm that labour-market 
concern matters no more to the unemployed than to the employed. 
Before describing the results related to public-finance concern, we note a few things 
about the other explanatory variables. First, origin dummies lose significance when we 
use osub rather than isub. Second, ethlive dummies are consistently insignificant in not 
only Table 3.8 but also Tables 3.6 and 3.7: the perceived presence of ethnic minorities in 
residential areas does not matter to opinions on the permissible level of immigration. Third, 
with isub, those with low educational attainment distinguish themselves from the others by 
preferring less immigration. But by replacing isub by osub, this difference disappears. 
Let us now turn to the importance of fiscal for host". First, we focus on those who 
rely on non-pension social welfare beneficiaries. In models ii and iv where isub is used, 
the sign, size and significance of each pair of the corresponding coefficients are similar to 
each other. The difference is that the negative coefficient on fiscal*benefit is significant in 
model ii but not in model iii. In model ii, for example, the difference in the estimated 
partial effect of fiscal on host" between non-pension welfare beneficiaries and the rest is 
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-.194 +(85.228fshare -4.289)tp +(1.170 -20.851/share)nrr. The relationship among tp, 
nrr and fshare in the equation is what we found in model vii in Table 3.7. It suggests 
that tax progressivity contributes negatively to the partial effect if the share of non-citizens 
in the total population is sufficiently low, ie, fshare < 4.289/85.228 ~ .050. On the other 
hand, welfare generosity contributes positively if fshare < 1.170/20.851 ~ .056. In the case 
of model iv, the threshold fshare is slightly lower than in model ii, but we observe the same 
relationship among tp2, nrr and fshare. 
Th\s relationship among tax progressivity, welfare generosity and the presence of non-
citizens loses statistical significance when we replace isub by osub in models iii and v. Only 
the positive coefficient on fiscal*benefit*nrr is significant, which suggests that welfare gen-
erosity positively contributes to the partial effect of fiscal on host· among those who rely 
on non-pension social welfare benefits. The magnitude is similar in each case. It then 
appears that, for non-pension social welfare beneficiaries, it does not really matter whether 
tp or tp2 is used in estimation, but the significance of the result is sensitive to the measure 
of labour substitutability between citizens and non-citizens. If we use the industry-based 
measure of non-citizens' penetration into the national labour market, we find most of the 
interaction effects significant. If we use the occupation-based measure, we have a simple 
interpretation: these welfare beneficiaries are more concerned with immigrants' net fiscal 
contribution if benefits are not trivial. 
Second, the coefficients on the terms involving pension are consistent in their signs 
across the models except iii, but the significance of each coefficient is not. The use of 
osub results in none of the terms being significant in models iii and v. The use of isub 
gives the difference in the estimated partial effect of fiscal on host· between those whose 
household income depended mainly on pension and the others as follows in model ii where 
we use tp: (26.437tp -3.087nrr)fshare. This implies that tax progressivity contributes 
positively, and welfare generosity contributes negatively, to the partial effect. Compared 
to Table 3.7's model v, the relationship between tp, nrr and fshare is preserved. By using 
tp2 instead of tp, we get .279 -5.589fshare +(67.652fshare -3.021)tp2. We now see that 
welfare generosity no longer matters. In addition, the contribution of tax progressivity can 
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be either positive or negative depending on the sum inside the brackets of the third term. 
It is hard to conclude about this group of respondents from these results. Note that, in 
Table 3.7's model vii where labor-related terms were absent, all the terms interacted with 
pension were insignificant. 
Third, we find the signs of the coefficients on the terms involving parent1 are consistent 
across models ii to v. We observe that the positive coefficient on parent1 is not significant 
in models ii and iv where we use isub, but it is in models iii and v where osub is used 
instead. On the other hand, the positive coefficient on parentl *fiscal*fshare is significant 
when isub is used but not when osub is used. Regarding the significant signs which are of 
our interest, the 4 models consistently indicate that the share of non-citizens in the country's 
total population should be sufficiently high if tax progressivity should contribute negatively 
to the partial effect of fiscal on host· among lone parents with at least one child living 
together. A sufficiently high share of non-citizens in the total population also implies that 
welfare generosity would positively contribute to the partial effect of fiscal on host· among 
them. The finding is consistent with what we saw in Table 3.7's models v and vii. Note that 
the sign on each coefficient on the terms related to tax progressivity or welfare generosity is 
opposing between the lone parents and those who rely on non-pension welfare benefits. 
Finally, let us look at the terms involving inc. The signs of the coefficients on these 
terms are consistent across the models except v: in model v where we use osub and tp2, 
none of these terms are significant. In models ii and iii where tp is used instead of tp2, 
both tax progressivity and welfare generosity seem to matter, while they do not when tp2 
is used. In models ii to iv, inc*fiscal*fshare and inc*fiscal are significant. The influence of 
inc on the estimated partial effect of fiscal on host· in model iii for example is 
{Phost* {}fisca18inc ~ .143-2.673fshare+{7.713fshare - .400) tp+{2.061/share - .106) nrr 
This suggests that both tax progressivity and welfare generosity would contribute positively 
to the second partial derivative if the share of non-citizens in the country's total population 
is sufficiently high. The relationship among tp, nrr and fshare is the same as in model ii, 
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although ine*fiscal*nrr*fshare is not significant at the 5 % level in model ii. In model iv 
where we use tp2 and isub, we find neither tax progressivity nor welfare generosity matters. 
Note that the reline version in Table A3.7 implies that welfare generosity does not matter 
when isub is used, but the use of Dsub indicates tax progressivity does not matter. Nev-
ertheless, we again find that either tax progressivity or welfare generosity would contribute 
positively to the second partial derivative if the share of non-citizens in the country's total 
population is sufficiently high. 
Table 3.8 Ordered probit models for explaining host by both labor and fiscal 
ii iii iv v vi vii viii ix 
benefit *fiSrol*nrr*/share-- -20.851 .*. -12.759 • -27.624 * •• -19.441 • 
4.138 7.152 6.327 10.520 
benefit*fisrol*nrr 1.170 ... .851 ••• 1.333 • •• 1.004 ••• .444 • •• .447 ••• .378 • •• .375 ••• 
.151 .247 .191 .361 .075 .058 .099 .089 
benefit *fisrol *tp * fshare 85.228 ... 32.382 
22.040 53.821 
benefit *fisrol *tp -4.289 ... -1.911 -.683 ••• -.715 ••• 
1.024 2.368 .235 .059 
benefit *fisrol*tp2 *fshare 147.913 ... 57.795 
28.491 127.731 
benefit *fiscal *tp2 -6.785 ... -2.685 -.787 -.765 •• 
1.444 5.693 .536 .372 
benefit *fisrol *fshare 2.780 4.575 1.450 6.888 
2.302 3.191 4.841 10.787 
benefit *fiscal -.194 •• -.308 * -.066 -.347 -.203 ... -.195 ... -.156 ** -.150 •• 
.096 .176 .184 .506 .050 .046 .073 .060 
benefit -.199 • -.174 -.196 -.170 -.206 -.181 -.203 • -.179 
.119 .112 .121 .113 .121 .113 .123 .114 
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
pension *fisrol*nrr*fshare -3.087 ... -1.644 -3.511 * -3.457 
1.113 2.358 1.911 3.196 
pension *fisrol*nrr .035 -.012 .076 . 072 -.079 ... -.060 ... -.060 . .. -.040 •• 
.050 .079 .082 .105 .017 .013 .017 .016 
pension *fisrol *tp *fshare 26.437 •• 13.296 
12.380 24.989 
pension *fisrol *tp -.760 -.221 .517 *** .437 ... 
.738 1.298 .169 .105 
pension *fisrol *tp2 *fshare 67.652 •• 64.489 • 
26.983 38.408 
pension *fisrol *tp2 -3.021 .* -2.902 .386 .280 
1.433 1.759 .284 .275 
pension *fisrol *fshare -1.414 -.489 -5.589 .. -5.122 • 
1.052 1.703 2.503 2.735 
pension*fisrol .060 .013 . 279 •• .259 • -.028 -.029 • -.022 -.020 
.068 .106 .129 .143 .019 .015 .029 .030 
pension . 098 • .101 .099 • .105 .098 .101 .104 • .108 
.056 .079 .056 .079 .057 .080 .056 .079 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.095) 
(continued ... ) 
NB: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors appear in a small font, adjusting for intracountry correlation. p-values for joint significance are in brackets. To avoid 
perfect multicollinearity, the be dummy is dropped in models inculding isub, while dummies for be, fr and se are dropped in models including osub. Dummies for edu .... c.o 
and friend are respectively jointly significant at the 1% level in all the estimated equations. Dummies for origin are jointly significant at the 1 % level except models iii, 0 
v. vii and ix where they are jointly insignificant at the 10% level. Dummies for ethlive are jointly insignificant at the 10% level in all the models. 
Table 3.8 (Continued) 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) 
parentI *fiscal*nrr*fshare 12.909 .... 2.949 ...... 16.753 ...... 7.849 .. ... 
2.254 .636 2.560 2.711 
parentI *fiscal*nrr -.454 .... -.151 ..... -.594 . .... -.312 • •• .055 -.056 . ... .061 -.044 .. .. 
.099 .026 .113 .097 .055 .013 .050 .016 
parentI *fiscal*tp*fshare -107.804 ..... -14.684 . ..
18.740 5.976 
parentI *fiscal*tp 5.307 ..... 1.131 ••• .199 .545 • •• 
.964 .264 .459 .070 
parentI *fiscal*tp2*fshare -199.216 .... -77.508 .... 
31.361 33.497 
parentI *fiscal*tp2 9.291 ••• 3.901 • •• .070 . 638 ••• 
1.556 1.431 .662 .166 
parent1 *fiscal*fshare 5.976 ••• .006 12.987 . ... 4.131 • 
1.446 .487 2.260. 2.395 
parent1 *fiscal -.430 ••• -.145 • •• -.766 • •• -.360 .... -.059 -.127 . ... -.048 -.138 ••• 
.091 .024 .149 .106 .060 .016 .078 .024 
parent1 .064 . 340 ••• .073 .335 • •• .008 .339 . ... .012 . 339 ••• 
.207 .054 .207 .054 .216 .055 .214 .055 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.001) (.000) 
inc *fiscal *nrr*fshare 1.113 • 2.061 • •• .332 5.165 
.645 .432 1.739 3.331 
inc *fiscal *nrr -.080 .... -.106 .... -.054 -.219 • -.060 ... -.055 . .. -.058 . .. -.055 • •• 
.021 .013 .063 .118 .015 .013 .014 .012 
inc*fiscal*tp *fshare 18.608 ... 7.713 ••• 
6.268 2.248 
inc *fiscal *tp -.900 ... -.400 ••• .068 • .033 
.303 .108 .041 .031 
inc *fiscal *tp2 *fshare 33.657 -31.402 
22.408 39.262 
inc*fiscal*tp2 -1.543 1.382 .145 •• .084 
1.007 1.701 .061 .057 
inc *fiscal *fshare -3.413 ••• -2.673 ••• -4.446 ••• .060 
.530 .273 1.588 2.568 
inc*fiscal .187 .... .143 • •• . 237 . .. .000 . 046 ••• .045 • •• .038 • •• . 040 ••• 
.026 .008 .079 .128 .011 .011 .010 .009 
inc . 043 ••• -.009 -.007 -.004 -.004 -.012 -.008 -.010 -.007 
.015 .01(; .024 .016 .024 .015 .024 .015 .024 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
fiscal . 057 ••• .047 ••• . 051 • •• .048 • •• .051 . ... .045 • •• .050 • •• .045 . .. . 050 ••• 
.007 .014 .019 .014 .019 .014 .019 .014 .019 
(continued ... ) 
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Table 3.8 (Continued) 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) 
isub*labor .005 .006 .006 .006 
.004 .004 .005 .004 
isub -.030 -.031 -.031 -.031 
.037 .037 .037 .037 
(.423) (.411) (.393) (.361) 
osub*labor -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001 
.005 .005 .005 .005 
osub -.077 -.078 -.076 -.076 
.061 .060 .061 .061 
(.343) (.328) (.354) (.353) 
unemploy *labor -.010 -.007 -.009 -.006 -.008 -.007 -.007 -.005 
.031 .033 .031 .033 .032 .033 .032 .033 
unemploy .042 .014 .037 .009 .034 .006 .031 .003 
.097 .092 .096 .091 .099 .091 .100 .091 
(.909) (.976) (.927) (.984) (.943) (.976) (.950) (.983) 
employer*labor -.102 .. - -.107 
---
-.101 
---
-.105 
---
-.102 .. - -.106 -.- -.101 
---
-.105 .. -
.026 .025 .026 .026 .026 .026 .026 .026 
employer .372 
-
.472 
--
. 365 
-
.465 
--
.370 • .468 
--
.365 
-
.464 
--
.214 .196 .216 .198 .214 .198 .215 .199 
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
labor .059 -.. .059 -_. .069 ..- . 059 --. .068 
---
.059 ••• .069 ._. .058 . .. .068 ... 
.008 .005 .008 .005 .008 .006 .008 .005 .008 
crime .066 .072 .075 
---
. 072 
---
.075 ••• . 072 • •• .075 ... .072 ••• .075 • •• 
.Oll .010 .013 .010 .013 .010 .013 .010 .013 
culture .135 .-. .131 
---
.133 .. - .130 
_ .. 
.133 
---
.131 . .. .133 
---
.130 
---
.133 
---
.009 .007 .010 .007 .010 .007 .010 .007 .010 
originp -.091 -.. -.075 •• -.059 -.076 ... -.060 -.074 •• -.060 -.075 . .. -.062 
.030 .029 .042 .029 .042 .028 .042 .028 .042 
ongmr -.042 -.038 -.026 -.040 -.026 -.037 -.028 -.040 -.031 
.077 .091 .119 .091 .119 .090 .119 .090 .120 
(continued ... ) 
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Table 3.8 (Continued) 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) 
Jriendl . 189 ••• .199 ••• . 208 • •• .199 ••• .208 ••• .200 ••• .209 .. . .199 • •• .208 ... 
.046 . 042 .052 .042 .052 .042 .052 .042 .051 
Jriend2 .280 ••• . 294 ... .290 ••• .293 ... .290 .. . . 295 • •• .289 • •• .294 • •• .287 • •• 
.040 .047 .067 .047 .067 .047 .067 .047 .066 
ethliveO -.043 -.045 -.067 • -.046 -.068 • -.046 -.068 • -.047 -.069 • 
.027 .037 .038 .037 .038 .037 .039 .037 .039 
ethlive2 -.001 -.025 -.004 -.026 -.005 -.022 -.005 -.023 -.006 
.060 .047 .067 .047 .067 .045 .066 .045 .066 
econ .017 .019 .010 .019 .010 .019 .0lD .019 .010 
.014 .013 .015 .013 .015 .013 .015 .013 .015 
polit . 041 ••• . 042 ••• .060 • •• .042 ... .061 • •• .041 •• .059 • •• .041 •• .060 • •• 
.014 .016 .013 .016 .013 .016 .013 .016 .013 
media .029 ••• .024 .022 .024 .022 .023 .022 .023 .022 
.010 .015 .018 .015 .018 .015 .018 .015 .018 
happy .024 • .026 •• .033 ••• . 025 .. .033 ••• .026 • • .033 ••• .026 •• .033 • •• 
.012 .010 .008 .010 .008 .010 .008 .010 .008 
eduO -.161 •• -.207 ••• -.107 -.199 ••• -.103 -.198 • •• -.098 -.203 ••• -.102 • 
.076 .067 .065 .070 .070 .068 .059 .068 .062 
edul -.107 ••• -.126 ••• -.042 -.119 ... -.035 -.118 • •• -.037 -.121 • •• -.038 
.023 .036 .041 .039 .039 .036 .045 .036 .045 
edu2 -.085 .. -.106 ... -.116 ••• -.107 ... -.118 • •• -.100 • •• -.115 • •• -.103 • •• -.119 • •• 
.034 .035 .035 .035 .035 .037 .036 .037 .034 
edu4 .001 -.019 -.013 -.018 -.013 -.016 -.016 -.017 -.016 
.058 .057 .062 .057 .061 .056 .062 .056 .062 
edu5 . 206 ••• .190 ••• .174 ••• . 191 • •• .174 ••• .190 • •• .172 • •• .191 ••• .173 • •• 
.040 .046 .050 .045 .050 .048 .050 .047 .050 
edu6 -.006 -.054 -.029 -.052 -.031 -.053 -.026 -.055 -.032 
.068 .064 .107 .065 .107 .065 .106 .065 .106 
/parent .065 .069 -.009 .071 -.007 .068 -.009 .068 -.008 
.078 .076 .033 .075 .033 .074 .033 .075 .033 female -.005 .002 .020 .003 .021 -.000 .021 .000 .021 
.038 .041 .044 .041 .044 .042 .044 .042 .044 
age -.004 ••• -.003 • •• -.004 ••• -.004 • •• -.004 ••• -.004 ... -.004 -.004 -.004 . .. 
.001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
s.d. of host' 1.236 1.249 1.244 1.248 1.243 1.247 1.243 1.246 1.242 
obs. 16,854 14,438 12,184 14,438 12,184 14,438 12,184 14,438 12,184 
log pseudo-
likelihood -16,760 -14,219 -12,170 -14,221 -12,174 -14,236 -12,177 -14,242 -12,183 
pseudo-R2 .151 .158 .154 .158 .154 .157 .154 .157 .153 
..... 
c:.o 
c:.o 
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To make interpretation easier regarding the public-finance concern about immigration, 
we also estimated models without interactions with fshare. The results are presented in 
models vi to ix. We use tp in models vi and vii, and tp2 in viii and ix instead. We include 
isub in models vi and viii, and osub in vii and ix instead. 
We find the estimated coefficient on benefit*fiscal significantly negative, which implies 
that, other things being equal, the perceived fiscal impact of immigration mattered less 
to the desirable level of immigration from poorer European countries among those EU15 
citizens who relied on non-pension welfare benefits. However, the estimated coefficient on 
benefit*fiscal*nrr is significantly positive, which implies that fiscal matters more to host· 
among them under a more generous welfare system. We also find benefit*fiscal*tp (or 
benefit*fiscal*tp2) significantly negative except in model viii, which might suggest that fiscal 
matters less to host· among them under a more progressive tax system. 
As for pensioners, we find that the estimated coefficient on pension*fiscal*nrr is sig-
nificantly negative, which implies that the perceived fiscal impact of immigration is less 
important for the desirable level of immigration among them under a more generous welfare 
system. 
The estimated coefficients on the terms involving parent1 in models vi to ix do not give 
consistent results. The use of osub indicates that they are all statistically significant, while 
the use of isub makes them insignificant. 
Finally, we find inc*fiscal significantly positive. That is, other things being equal, 
the higher the net per capita income is, the stronger the positive relationship between the 
perceived fiscal impact of immigration and the desirable level of immigration is.37 We also 
find that the estimated coefficient on inc*fiscal*nrr is significantly negative. This suggests 
that the influence of inc on the partial effect of fiscal on host· is reduced under a more 
generous welfare system. 
37Note however that, in the reline version in Table A3.7, reline·fiscal is insignificant when isub is used 
rather than oaub. 
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3.1. Discussion 
One of the main findings of this chapter is that, other things being equal, the perceived 
impact of immigration on the number of job opportunities matters equally to the desirable 
level of immigration from poorer European countries, whether the person can or cannot be 
easily substituted by immigrants. Belonging to an occupation or an industry where immi-
grants are more present does not seem to make the influence of labour-market concern on the 
person's opinion any stronger. However, we found some evidence that more substitutable 
citizens (as defined in terms of occupation) are likely to perceive a more negative impact of 
immigration on the national job market. Therefore, if they tend to prefer less immigration, 
it is not because the marginal effect of job-market concern on the opinion is larger among 
them, but because they are likely to be located towards the lower end of the labor scale. A 
policy implication for gaining more support for the Free-Movement-of-Workers principle is 
that it is necessary to eliminate a situation where existing citizen workers are replaced by 
immigrants, or if such a situation does not exist we need to ensure everyone understood it 
in order to avoid misperception. 
This study confirms what others have found in the literature: being unemployed does 
not relate to a desire for less immigration. In addition, we found that the status of being 
unemployed does not affect the influence of labour-market concern on the opinion about 
the desirable level of immigration, although we might ex ante expect it to strengthen it. 
We even did not find evidence that the unemployed are likely to perceive a more negative 
labour-market impact of immigration. 
In this chapter, we also examined whether employers are different from the others. It 
has often been argued that employers tend to benefit from immigration via the availability 
of workers who are not too selective about the kind of job and are willing to accept a lower 
wage offer than what native workers would take. Employers would also benefit if they 
own production factors that are complementary to immigrants. However, in the literature, 
employers' opinions have not been analysed as far as I am aware of. We found some 
evidence that, other things being equal, being an employer itself implies that the person is 
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likely to permit more immigration from poorer European countries than the others. We also 
found that the perception of immigrants' impact on the number of job opportunities does 
not seem to matter to the opinion on the desirable level of immigration among employers. 
Note that, even though labour-market concern does not matter to their opinions, we found 
that they are likely to perceive a more positive impact of immigration on the number of job 
opportunities in the national labour market. Since employers seem to gain from immigration 
from poorer European countries, a potential policy for indirectly increasing support for the 
Free-Movement-of-Workers principle might be programmes that encourage entrepreneurship 
among citizens. By helping many to change their labour-market positions from employees 
to employers, demand for immigrants might increase overall. 
Another economic motive that we studied is public-finance concern related to immigra-
tion. The interpretation of the results on this is not straightforward, as we found many 
interaction effects statistically significant. Modelling effort for examining this concern is 
made as a follow-up of Facchini and Mayda (2006) and Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter (2005). 
We paid attention to the relationship between per capita income and the desirable level of 
immigration because the level of income would approximate the person's net fiscal contri-
bution in the economy. We also used three dummy variables to distinguish approximately 
between net beneficiaries and net contributors in those European welfare states. 
We used a dummy explanatory variable that indicated whether the respondent was de-
pendent on social welfare benefits which were unrelated to pension. We found the estimated 
coefficient on benefit*fiscal significantly negative, which suggests that the perceived fiscal im-
pact of immigration is less important for host· among those welfare beneficiaries than the 
rest ceteris paribus. This might be because they do not expect benefit cuts: net beneficiaries 
of the welfare system are unlikely to be affected by tax changes that might take place to 
adjust to immigration. However, we also found that, for those welfare beneficiaries, the gen-
erosity of welfare provision contributes positively to the relationship between the perceived 
fiscal impact of immigration and the desirable level of immigration from poorer European 
countries. Clearly, when the welfare system is more generous, public-finance concern be-
comes a more important issue because, for example, benefit cuts in very generous welfare 
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programmes can easily be argued when adjustment is necessary. These results appear fairly 
robust, for they remain statistically significant whether we use tp or tp2j isub or osubj and 
terms interacted with fshare or not. 
As for pensioners, we consistently found pension*fiscal*nrr significantly negative if we 
do not include terms interacted with fshare. This might indicate that, among pensioners, 
the generosity of welfare provision contributes negatively to the relationship between the 
perceived fiscal impact of immigration and the desirable level of immigration from poorer 
European countries. The reason might be that pensioners are not worried about cuts in 
pension benefits. Pension benefit cuts are likely to be introduced to younger generations 
who are not yet recipients of the benefits. 
The estimated coefficients on the terms involving lone parents who lived with at least one 
child are not consistent in terms of significance when we do not include terms interacted with 
fshare. When we include them (models ii to v in Table 3.8), we find it difficult to interpret 
the consistently significant coefficients. First, the estimated coefficient on parentI *fiscal 
is significantly negative, but this negative relationship between fiscal and host· is not all. 
We find both measures of tax progressivity and welfare generosity statistically significant. 
In particular, tax progressivity would contribute positively to the partial effect of fiscal on 
host· if the share of foreigners in the total population were small. In other words, if the 
presence of immigrants is still low , the perceived fiscal impact of immigration is an important 
factor in considering the desirable level of immigration in a country with progressive tax. 
This might be a sign of concern about the unknown fiscal impact of immigration. On the 
other hand, if the presence of immigrants is already high, the perceived fiscal impact of 
immigration is less important in considering the desirable level of immigration in a country 
with progressive tax. The coexistence of high fshare and high tp (or tp2) may suggest that 
the fiscal adjustment to immigration had not affected those welfare beneficiaries in the past, 
which might make the fiscal impact of immigration unimportant among them. 
Moreover, we found that welfare generosity would contribute negatively to the partial 
effect of fiscal on host· if the share of foreigners in the total population were small. This 
suggests that, if the presence of immigrants is already high, the perceived fiscal impact 
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of immigration is more important in considering the desirable level of immigration in a 
country with generous welfare provision, ie, the generosity of welfare provision might be 
seen as changeable according to immigration. But, if the presence of immigrants is still low, 
generous welfare provision makes the perceived fiscal impact of immigration less important. 
Thus, it is very difficult to give interpretations to the statistically significant relationships 
between tax progressivity, welfare generosity and the presence of foreigners among those 
single parents. 
As for the net income per capita, we consistently found inc*fiscal significantly positive 
and inc*fiscal*nrr significantly negative when we do not include the terms interacted with 
fshare. This suggests that, as far as social welfare provision is not very generous, the 
relationship between the perceived fiscal effect of immigration and the desirable level of 
immigration from poorer European countries is positive. This positive relationship is then 
strengthened, as income increases. On the other hand, when the welfare system is generous, 
{Phost- /8fiscal8inc may be negative, which reduces the positive coefficient on fiscal on its 
own as income rises. That is, fiscal become more important for host- among low-income 
citizens. 
Future research should improve on the variable that approximates tax progressivity, use 
an alternative measure of welfare generosity for robustness check and find a measure that 
reliably approximates immigrants' use of welfare programmes. These may result in unam-
biguous findings with respect to what we could not conclude in this study. Furthermore, as 
we explained in section 3.4, the estimation of the structural model is necessary to take into 
account the potential endogeneity of perceptions (labor and fiscal) in the main equation for 
explaining the desirable level of immigration. 
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3.S. Appendix 
A. Weights 
The ESS data set is provided with two types of weights. One is the sampling weight (named 
dweight in the original data set) in each country, and the other is the weight (named pweight) 
that is used to rescale dweight to reflect the relative size of each country's population in cross-
country data analysis.38 Since our analysis is cross-country, we need to apply both dweight 
and pweight together, ie, pweight; *dweight;. The sum of the products across observations 
in a country gives its total population aged 15 years and over divided by 10,000. 
In order to focus on the attitudes of citizens in each country, we dropped cases who 
answered other than yes to Question C18: Are you a citizen of [the name of the country 
where the person is questioned]? We then need to rescale pweight; *dweight; because the 
sum of the products across observations in a country should give its citizen population, not 
the total population, aged 15 years and over divided by 10,000. We simply discount each 
weight by multiplying 1 - !J. where fk is the share of non-citizens in the total population of 
country k. We use figures from OECD (2005) for this discounting. See Table A3.3 below. 
B. Creating ine and reline 
Question F30 asked each respondent the question "If you add up the income from all sources, 
which category describes your household's total net income? If you don't know the exact 
figure, please give an estimate." A respondent was then given a table where each category 
shows a range of income in Euros or relevant national currencies or both.39 The responses 
to this question suffer from a large percentage of missing values: over 20 percent of the 
responses were recorded missing. Among these, almost 16 percent were those who refused 
to answer. 
I assign the mid-value of each category's interval in terms of monthly income in Euros 
to the responses except the highest category which has no upper bound: 75 (= category J), 
38See HILder and Gabler (2004) for the detail. 
39However, respondents in Ireland were given a table with categories that are not consistent with those of the 
other countries. Compare Card 56 and Ireland's Card F6 available at ESS's website (http://ess.nsd.uib.no). 
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225 (= R), 400 (= e), 750 (= M), 1,250 (= F), 1,750 (= S), 2,250 (= K), 2,750 (= P), 4,000 
(= D), 6,250 (= H) and 8,750 (= U). We remove the responses in category N (= 10,000 
and over) rather than assign an arbitrarily chosen value to them, for they represent only 
0.78 percent of the whole sample. I then divide these figures by the number of household 
members collected by Question F1. There are 6 missing responses to Fl having non-missing 
responses to F30. Since we cannot obtain per capita figures for these cases, I assign missing 
values to them. Finally, we convert these nominal figures into the real counterparts by 
dividing them by the corresponding country-level PPPs provided by Eurostat.40 We use 
PPPs for 2002, for most of the survey was conducted from the last quarter of 2002 to the first 
quarter of 2003. In any case, the PPPs for 2002 and 2003 are not very different from each 
other. We use the PPPs based on the household final consumption expenditure (category 
eOll), for the data we have are of net income. This variable is called inc. 
Purchasing power parity for 2002 
at be de dk es Ii Ir gb gr ie it lu nl pt se 
1.014 .985 1.036 9.710 .818 1.198 1.022 .670 .792 1.179 .943 .987 1.015 .734 10.687 
Source: Eurostat NB: The average for the 15 countries - 1 
We also construct a measure of intra-country relative income. This may be useful if 
the relative income within the economy matters to our explained variables rather than the 
level of income, for the mean of inc varies across the countries. We divide the pre-PPP-
adjusted inc by the corresponding country's mean of it to obtain reline. For example, a 
respondent with reline = 1.5 has monthly net income per capita 50 percent higher than 
his/her country's average. 
Mean of inc by country 
at be de dk es Ii Ir gb gr ie it 
852.66 921.09 1,168.53 1,389.21 490.96 1,026.96 553.94 1,314.94 479.24 579.30 718.15 
lu nl pt se 
1,514.32 1,108.28 437.37 1,107.52 
Source: ESS, Round 1, Questions F30 and F1; Eurostat; Author's computation 
C. Creating media 
We create this variable by using the responses to the 3 separate questions "On an average 
weekday, how much of your time is spent watching television / listening to the radio / 
40http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/ Go to Data -+ Economy and finance -+ Prices -+ Purchasing power parities 
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reading newspapers about politics and current affairs? (A2 / A4 / A6 respectively)" Since 
people use different types of the media, the exposure to the media is best indicated by the 
total amount of time spent on the media regardless of types. Unfortunately, the question 
on the use of the internet (A7) did not focus specifically on politics and current affairs. 
The responses to these questions were given on the same scale that has an equal interval 
in hours between categories: 0 (= No time at all), 1 (= Less than 0.5 hour), 2 (= 0.5 to 1 
hour),3 (= More than 1 and up to 1.5 hours), 4 (= More than 1.5 and up to 2 hours), 5 (= 
More than 2 and up to 2.5 hours), 6 (= More than 2.5 and up to 3 hours) and 7 (More than 
3 hours). This enables us to combine the responses at the individual level. We assign an 
amount of hours for each category as follows: 0 (= 0), .25 (= 1), .75 (= 2), 1.25 (= 3), 1.75 
(= 4), 2.25 (= 5), 2.75 (= 6) and 3.25 (= 7). We then aggregate the hours spent on TV, 
radio and newspapers giving information on current affairs and politics at the individual 
level. 
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Table A3.1 Per capita GDP and GNP in current international dollars, 2001 
Rank 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Country GDP per capita Countryf GNI per capita 
Luxembourg 53, 780 48,560 
Ireland 32,410 Denmark 28,490 
Denmark 29,000 Netherlands 27,390 
Netherlands 27,190 Ireland 27,170 
Austria 26,730 26,380 
Belgium 25,520 26,150 
Germany 25,350 25,240 
Italy 24,670 24,530 
Finland 24,430 UK 24,340 
Sweden 24,180 France 24,080 
UK 24,160 Finland 24,030 
France 23,990 Sweden 23,800 
Cyprus· 21,190 21,110 
Spain 20,150 19,860 
Portugal 18,150 17,710 
Greece 17,440 17,520 
Slovenia· 17,130 17,060 
Czech Republic· 14,720 14,320 
Malta· 13,160 13,140 
Hungary· 12,340 11,990 
Slovak Republic· 11,960 11,780 
Estonia· 10,170 9,650 
Poland· 9,450 9,370 
Lithuania· 8,470 8,350 
Latvia· 7,730 7,760 
Source: World Bank's World Development Indicators 2003 
NB: Figures of 2001, based on PPP GNI ::::: GNP 
• New EUI0 t Shown only if different from the second column 
Table A3.3 Share of non-citizens in each country's total population, 2002 
at be de ilk es fi fr gb gr ie it lu nl pt se 
Ik .088 .082 .089 .049 .031 .020 .056t .045 .070* .048 .026 .381 .043 .040 .053 
Source: OEeD, 2005, Table A.1.5: 334 
t The figure for France is of 1999 t The figure for Greece is of 2001 
TableAJ.2 
Empirical studies of determinants of individual opinions on the level of immigration 
(a) United States 
S~ ___ Main data source (~ple) Method Regressors ofinterest ~ult, relevant table in the study] 
Espenshade & CBS NewslNew York Times poll Ordered Immigrants mostly take jobs Americans don't want [significant, ASJ 
Hempstead 1993 (1,363; aged 18 and over; probit Most new immigrants do not end up on welfare [insignificant, ASJ 
(1996) regardless of citizenship) Educational attainment [significant only among the uneducated, AS] 
Household income [significant only among the low-income group, A8J 
Citrin, Green, 
Muste& 
Wong (1997) 
Scheve & 
Slaughter 
(2001)' 
Hanson, 
Scheve & 
Slaughter 
(2005) 
ANES 1992 (1,066) 
ANES 1992 (2,485) 1994 (1,795) 
1996 (1,714) 
ANES 1992 (2,978) 2000 (3,117) 
Ordered 
probit 
Ordered 
probit 
Probit 
Hispanics and Asians take jobs away from people already here [significant, I] 
They cause higher taxes due to more demands for public services [significant, IJ 
Years of education [insignificant, I J 
Labour-supply status [insignificant, I] 
Income (made dichotomous; personal or household?) [insignificant, l) 
Average wages by occupation as a proxy for labour skill [significant only among labour-force 
participants, 2 and 4] 
Years of education (and also educational attainment) as a proxy for labour skill [significant only among 
labour-force participants, 2 and 4] 
High share of immigrants in the residential-area population as a proxy for labour market competition 
[insignificant, 5] 
Educational attainment as a proxy for income level [significant among the educated, 5] 
Income quartiles as an alternative [significant only interactions between high income and fiscal 
exposure, 8] 
(Generous welfare state with high share of immigrants in the state population)*(Educational attainment) 
[significant only among the educated; particularly in states under progressive tax system, 5] 
(State with high share of immigrant households receiving cash benefits)*(Educational attainment) 
[significant particularly among the educated, 5] 
(High share of immigrants in the state population)*(Educational attainment) [significant only among the 
uneducated, 5] 
NB: ANES = American National Election Studies t Kessler's (2001) study is almost identical except the use ofadditional samples from 1998 (1,281) and 2000 (1,807) 
Table AJ.l (Continued, 2 of 5) 
(b) Other single-country studies: 
study Main data source (sample) 
L~_ [explained variable] 
Fertig & ALLBUS 1996 (3,499; 
Schmidt (2002) regardless of citizenship) 
[Germany) [Degree ofagreernent with the 
statement "Foreigners are a 
burden for the social security 
system in Germany") 
deMelo, 
Miguet& 
MUlier (2004) 
[Switzerland] 
Dustmann& 
Preston (2004) 
[UK] 
VOX 2000 (1,024; aged over 18; 
citizens only) 
[Voting on a popular initiative 
proposing a change in the 
constitution to reduce the share 
of foreigners from 19.3 to 18 
percent] 
BSAS (various sample size 
summarised in Table AI; white 
English only) 1983 1984 1985 
1986198719891990 
[Desirable level of immigration 
by country of origin, categorised 
based on ethnicity] 
Method 
Ordered 
probit 
Censored 
bivariate 
probit 
Probit 
Factor 
model 
Regressors of interest [result, relevant table in the study] 
Currently unemployed status [insignificant, 11) 
Worry about being unemployed [insignificant, 11] 
Educational attainment [significant (less educated, more likely to agree), 11) 
Low share of foreigners in the regional population [significant (more likely to agree), 11) 
Years of schooling [significant (less educated, more likely to accept), 6.5 and 6.6) 
Mincer's potential earnings using schooling years and experience [significant (lower, more likely), 6.6] 
Canton-level unemployment rate [significant (lower, more likely), 6.5 and 6.6) 
Share offoreigners in the regional population [significant small magnitude (lower, more likely), 6.6) 
Average percentile point of household income as relative income [significant regarding ethnic 
minorities (higher ranking, less tolerant), 4] 
Educational attainment [significantly moderate among the educated (more educated, more tolerant), 4) 
County-level unemployment rate [insignificant, 4] 
Experience of unemployment [insignificant, 4] 
Share of ethnic minorities in the county population [insignificant, 4) 
Manual worker status [insignificant, 4] 
Labour-market concern score [significant moderate magnitude regarding ethnic minorities only among 
non-manual workers, 7 and 8] 
Fiscal concern score [significant moderate magnitude regarding ethnic minorities only among non-
manual workers and the medium-to-high e!lllcated, 7 and 8] 
NB: ALLBUS = Allgemeine BevOlkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften BSAS = British Social Attitude Survey : See also Fetzer (2000: Part II) for studies of France, Germany and the US 
Table Al.2 (Continued, 3 of 5) 
(c) Cross-country studies 
Study Main data SOW'Ce (sample) 
[countries ] [explained variable] 
Dustmann & ESS 2002-2003 (31,822; aged 15 
Preston (2006) or over) 
[EUI5, Czech [Is immigration good or bad for 
Republic, the country's economy?] 
Hungary, 
Norway, 
Poland, 
Slovenia, 
SwitzerlandJ 
Hainmueller & 
Hiscox (2006) 
[EVl5, Czech 
Republic, 
Hungary, Israel, 
Norway, 
Poland, 
Slovenia, 
SwitzerlandJ 
Brenner & 
Fertig (2006) 
[EUI5, 
Hungary, 
Norway, 
Poland, 
Slovenia, 
SwitzerlandJ 
ESS 2002-2003 (various 
estimation-specific sample size 
between 25,000 and 29,000; 
aged 15 or over; regardless of 
citizenship) 
[Desirable level of immigration 
by wealth and location 
(in/outside Europe) of origin 
countryJ 
ESS 2002-2003 (24,874; aged 15 
or over; citizens only) 
[Latent general attitude to 
immigration] 
NB: ESS = European Social Survey 
Method 
Ordered 
probit 
Factor 
model 
Probit 
Ordered 
probit 
factor 
model/ 
weighted 
least 
square 
Regressors of interest [result, relevant table in the study] 
Educational attainment [significant (less educated, more negative), 3J 
Unemployed status [significant negative, 3J 
Labour-market concern score [insignificant, 5J 
Fiscal concern score [significant, 5J 
Education [significant modest (more educated, more tolerant), 7J 
Skill-based occupational categories [significant relatively large except low-skill category, 7] 
Reported nominal household income [significant small magnitude, 7J 
Educational attainment [significant only among high education across countries (country-by-country 
estimation: this doesn't hold in Spain), 5.2 and 5.4] 
Status of being unemployed [significant across countries (country-by-country estimation: significant 
only for Germany and Italy), 5.2 and 5.4J 
Parents' educational attainment [significant only among high education across countries (country-by-
country estimation: this doesn't hold in Hungary and Italy), 5.2 and 5.4J 
Table AJ.2 (Continued. 4 of 5) 
(c) Cross-country studies (Continued) 
Study Main data source (sample) 
{countries} (exl!lained variable] 
Gang. Rivera- Eurobarometer 19881997 
Batiz& Yun (21,643; aged 16 to 70; EU 
(2002) citizens only) 
(Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Gennany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain. UK} 
[Are there too many non-ECIEU 
nationals living in the country?) 
Kessler & Eurobarometer 1988 (6,311) 
Freeman (2005) 1993 (6,108) 1997 (7,742) 2000 
(7,255) 
{EUl2 (1988, 1993) and EU15 
(I997,2ooo)} 
[Are there too many non-ECIEU 
nationals living in the count!)'?J 
Bauer, Lofstrom ISSP 1995 (over 11,7(0) 
& Zimmermann (US, Canada. New Zealand; 
(2000) UK. Germany, Austria. 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden; 
Ireland, Italy Spain} 
[The number of immigrants 
should be reduced] 
NB: ISSP = International Social SUlVey Programme 
Method 
Probit 
Ordered 
probit 
Probit 
Regressors of interest [result. relevant table in the study) 
Years in education [significant (less educated, more likely to agree), 5 and 6] 
Number of children aged 15 or less [significant (more children, less likely to agree), 5 and 6) 
Status of being unemployed [not significantly different from status of being employed, 5) 
Being in education [significant (less likely to agree), 5) 
Currently or in the past being in the labour force [significant (more likely to agree), 6] 
Perception that many foreigners are present [significant (more likely to agree), 5 and 6) 
Status of being unemployed [significant except 1993 (opposing signs), 5) 
Skill-based occupational categories [low-skill category significant negative only in 2000 (more likely 
to agree), high-skill category significant in 1988 and 1997 (less likely to agree), 5) 
Perceived performance of national economy [significant in 1997 and 2000 (opposing signs), 5] 
Educational level [significant (more educated, less likely to agree), 5] 
Income quartile dummies [insignificant, 5] 
Educational attainment [significant (more educated, more tolerant), 2,3 and 4) 
Status of being unemployed [insignificant (significant if the explained variable is "immigrants take 
jobs away"), 2, 3 and 4J 
Immigrants take jobs away [country-by-country estimation: significant in all countries, 6] 
Table AJ.2 (Continued, 5 of 5) 
(c) Cross-country studies (Continued) 
Study Main data source (sample) Method 
{countries} (ex~lained variable) 
O'Rourke & ISSP 1995 (about 21,(00) (UK, Ordered 
Sinnott (2006) US, HUngary, Germany, Spain, probitl 
Netherlands, Austria, Ireland, bivariate 
Bulgaria, Canada, Latvia, Czech SUR 
Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, probit 
Poland, Norway, Philippines, 
Australia, New Zealand, Russia) 
[The number of immigrants 
should be increased or reduced?J 
Mayda (2006) ISSP 1995 (about 23,000) WVS Probit 
1995-97 (about 36,(00) 
(66 countries) 
[The number of immigrants 
should be increased or reduced? 
I Allow or limit people from 
other countries coming here to 
work?J 
Facchini & ISSP 1995 (over 13,605; citizens Probit 
Mayda (2006) only) (Germany, UK, US, 
Austria, Ireland, Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, New Zealand, 
Japan, Canada, Spain, Slovenia, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Slovak Republic) 
[The number of immigrants 
should be increased or reduced?J 
NB: ISSP = International Social Survey Programme WVS = World Value Survey 
Regressors of interest [result, relevant table in the study J 
High-skill occupation group [significant particularly among the labour-force participants (more 
tolerant), 3, 4 and 5J 
(High-skill occupation group)*(country-Ievel per capita GOP) [significant particularly among the 
labour-force participants (more tolerant), 3, 4 and 5J 
(High-skill occupation group)*(country-Ievel Gini coefficient) [significant particularly among the 
labour-force participants (less tolerant), 3, 4 and 5J 
Status of being unemployed [insignificant, 3, 4 and 5) 
Education [significant negative among the labour-force participants (more educated, less tolerant), 2] 
Education·GOP [significant positive among the labour-force participants, 2J 
Relative income [significant (wealthier, more tolerant), I] 
High-skill occupational category [significant negative, 2] 
(High-skill occupational category)*GOP [significant positive, 2J 
(Country-level native-immigrant skill ratio)*education [significant (more educated, more tolerant if 
immigrants are less skilled relative to natives), 3] 
Occupation-level immigrant-native ratio [significant (higher, less tolerant), 3J 
Years of education [significant negative (more educated, less tolerant), 4J 
(Years of education)·(Skilllevel of natives relative to immigrants ) [significant positive (less skilled 
migrants, more educated, more tolerant), 4J 
Education*(average labour tax rate) [significant positive (higher tax, more educated, more tolerant), 4J 
Education·(immigrant skilllevel)*(average labour tax rate) [significant negative (less skilled migrants, 
higher tax, more educated, less tolerant), 4J 
Education*(immigrant skillievel)*(tax progressivity) [significant negative (less skilled migrants, more 
progressive tax system, more educated, less tolerant), 4J 
Education*(average public transfer) [significant positive (more generous benefit, more educated, more 
tolerant), 4] 
Education*(immigrant skilllevel)*(average public transfer) [insignificant, 4J 
In(real personal income) [insignificant, 4] 
Table A3.4 reline version of models vi to xvii in Table 3.5 
vi vii viii ix x xi xii xiii 
relinc -.047 .497 • -.086 .195 -.041 -.047 .936 ... .308 
.082 .269 .103 .322 .034 .079 .093 .616 
relincfttp . 634 -4.858 •• -13.061 ... 
.952 1.879 1.011 
relinc fttp ft fshare 89.517 .. 272.909 ••• 
39.857 22.151 
relincfttp£ 1.050 -2.577 -4.266 
1.247 2.892 7.729 
relinc fttp£ ft fshare 48.242 86.457 
·56.554 169.394 
relincftnrr .103 -.080 1.053 ... .145 
.090 . 140 .123 .515 
relincftnrrftfshare 1.806 -27.240 ••• -4.091 
2.996 3.032 13.771 
relinc ftfshare -9.489 -3.551 .957 -16.366 ••• -5.481 
5.776 6.570 1.613 1.833 11.616 
(.783) (.001) (.707) (.257) (.468) (.277) (.000) (.364) 
benefit .176 -.953 .353 -.022 -.464 -2.712 ... -.865 .128 
.288 2.402 .317 2.937 .551 .475 .829 1.776 
benefitfttp -2.442 6.466 -25.904 •• 
1.967 16.667 11.980 
benefit fttp "'fshare -178.181 546.366 • 
354.293 266.913 
benefitfttp£ -4.466 • - .800 -28.445 
2.422 23.057 17.683 
benefit *tp2 "'fshare -66.925 565.595 
489.272 383.460 
benefit*nrr . 542 4.001 ... 6.538 . .. 4.948 ••• 
.761 .857 1.287 1.111 
benefit "'nrr"'fshare -96.261 ... -158.888 • •• -111.198 ••• 
23.639 35.439 33.563 
benefit "'fshare 23.882 7.364 66.446 ... 33.550 • 5.805 
52.720 63.722 16.437 15.915 42.382 
(.120) (.000) (.016) (.000) (.649) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
(continued ... ) 
NB: p-values for joint significance in brackets, eg, p = .783 for joint significance of reline and relinc*tp in model vi .... ~ 
00 
Table A3.4 (Continued) 
(vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (xii) (xiii) 
pension .150 .. .729 .112 .784 . 044 .410 ... . 719 ••• .770 
.065 .446 .125 .616 .071 .059 .221 .541 
pension*tp -.869 -4.409 -3.112 
.617 3.317 2.916 
pension *tp * fshare 80.341 38.457 
63.924 57.013 
pension *tp2 -.562 -5.006 -4.159 
1.244 5.305 6.468 
pension *tp2*fshare 106.005 80.784 
93.983 121.571 
pension *nrr . 012 -.220 .. -.142 -.016 
.110 .097 .232 .343 
pension *nrr* fshare 12.868 ... 12.579 .. 7.986 
2.152 5.695 8.525 
pension */share -12.802 -15.258 -12.499 ••• -17.077 • •• -19.033 • 
9.304 11.844 1.595 4.470 9.542 
(.081) (.050) (.262) (.085) (.338) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
parentI . 266 1.930 . 148 1.861 .701 •• 1.483 ... .508 -.655 
.291 1.644 .273 2.087 .278 .231 .715 1.095 
parentl*tp -.058 -13.461 15.244 
2.017 11.066 10.104 
parentI *tp*/share 252.009 -370.891 
218.266 233.785 
parentI *tp2 1.099 -13.459 26.410 • 
1.969 15.862 14.387 
parentI *tp2*/share 274.227 -598.754 • 
317.864 329.380 
parent1 *nrr -.702 • -2.318 ... -4.208 . .. -4.177 • •• 
.372 .389 1.291 1.220 
parent1 *nrr*fshare 40.861 ••• 90.266 •• 86.175 •• 
5.711 31.863 31.423 
parentI */share -33.121 -33.492 -23.726 ••• -4.943 20.699 
33.033 42.284 4.013 13.440 22.098 
(.054) (.000) (.024) (.000) (.029) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
(continued ... ) 
...... 
"'" ~ 
Table A3.4 (Continued) 
(vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (xii) (xiii) 
originp -.304 ... -.302 ••• -.304 ••• -.304 ... -.307 ••• -.304 • •• -.302 ••• -.304 • •• 
.047 .047 .047 .047 .046 .047 .047 .047 
originr .045 .042 .044 .044 .041 .045 .041 .043 
.128 .127 .128 .128 .126 .128 .129 .129 friendl .390 ... .388 .390 ... .389 ... .390 ••• .388 . .. .384 ••• .387 ••• 
.072 .072 .072 .072 .073 .072 .073 .073 friend2 . 613 ... .608 ... .613 ... .609 ••• .611 ••• .610 • •• .607 ••• .609 ••• 
.125 .124 .124 .124 .123 .123 .124 .124 
ethliveO -.152 •• -.152 •• -.151 •• -.153 .. -.154 •• -.155 .. -.157 •• -.155 •• 
.069 .068 .069 .068 .068 .068 .069 .068 
ethlive2 -.157 ••• -.156 ••• -.156 ••• -.156 ••• -.154 ••• -.155 ••• -.160 ••• -.157 ... 
.049 .050 .049 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050 
econ .123 ••• .124 ••• .123 ••• . 124 • •• .123 ••• .123 ... .123 ... .123 . .. 
.013 .013 .013 .013 .013 .013 .013 .013 
polit .121 ••• .121 ••• .121 ••• . 120 ••• .122 ... .121 ••• .121 ••• .121 ••• 
.035 .035 .035 . 035 .035 .035 .035 .035 
media .072 ••• .072 ••• .072 ... .071 .. , .072 ... .071 • n .070 ... .070 ••• 
.017 . 017 .017 .017 .017 .017 .017 .017 
happy .059 ••• .058 ... .059 ••• .059 ••• .060 ••• .058 • •• .057 .,. .057 ., . 
.009 .010 .009 .009 .009 .009 .010 . 009 
eduO .024 -.005 .028 .001 .027 .018 .011 .019 
.126 .121 .128 .121 .128 .119 .121 .119 
edul -.009 -.026 -.009 -.024 -.008 -.015 -.022 -.017 
.106 .104 .107 .105 .110 .105 .101 .102 
edu2 -.115 -.119 -.115 -.119 -.107 -.115 -.119 -.117 
.091 .091 .091 .091 .092 .090 .091 .091 
edu4 .085 .081 .085 .079 .089 .085 .086 .084 
.155 .157 .156 .157 .155 .156 .157 .157 
edu5 .362 .,. .357 **' .363 ... .357 ... .361 .,* .363 .. * .357 .*. .362 .., 
.115 .115 .114 .114 .113 .113 .115 .113 
edu6 .674 '" .676 '** .673 .,. .667 '** .674 .,* .675 ,.* .707 **. .678 .. . 
.071 .078 .071 .075 . 067 .072 .080 .073 
fparent .309 .313 . 309 .. .314 • • .311 •• .316 " .317 " .315 " 
.109 .110 .109 .109 . lOS .108 .110 .109 
female -.033 -.035 -.034 -.035 -.034 -.037 -.033 -.034 
.061 .061 .062 .062 .063 .062 .060 .061 
age -.002 -.002 -.002 , -.002 -.002 , -.002 , -.002 -.002 • 
.001 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 
Ob8. 17,788 17,788 17,788 17,788 17,788 17,788 17,788 17,788 
R,2 
.120 .120 .120 .120 .120 .121 .121 .121 
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in a small font, adjusting for intracountry correlation 
The significance levels indicated by * (10%), ** (5%) and *'* (1%) 
.... 
Dummies for origin, friend, ethlive and edu respectively jointly significant at the 1 % level in all the estimated equations 
'" 0 
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Table AS.4 (Continued) 
xiv xv xvi xvii 
reline -.072 -.083 -.113 -.101 
.080 .057 .106 .066 
relinc"tp .433 -.111 
.842 .534 
reline "tp2 .856 .135 
1.080 .725 
reline"nrr .080 -.015 .079 -.019 
.060 .050 .065 .049 
reline "fshare 2.317 • 2.194 
1.185 1.152 
(.612) (.317) (.649) (.366) 
benefit -.417 -.430 • -.125 -.279 
.253 .215 .370 .364 
benefit"tp -4.260 •• -2.874 
1.895 1.641 
benefit "tp2 -6.007 .. -3.296 
2.615 2.164 
benefit "nrr 1.172 •• 1.504 ••• .932 1.255 • • 
.423 .441 . 472 .476 
benefit "fshare -6.321 ••• -5.840 •• 
1.929 1.986 
(.012) (.000) (.022) (.000) 
pension .123 .125 .101 .035 
.086 .073 .134 .118 
pension"tp -1.087 • -.261 
.570 .865 
pension "tp2 -.662 1.043 
1.279 1.503 
pension "nrr .083 .204 .034 .205 
.134 .141 .117 .134 
pension "fshare -2.947 • -3.769 •• 
1.632 1.552 
(.072) (.001) (.421) (.007) 
parentI . 552 .564 •• .441 .568 • 
.275 .257 .293 .319 
parentI"tp 1.831 .073 
1.675 1.831 
parentI "tp2 2.914 .025 2.072 3.280 
parentI"nrr -.798 •• -1.082 •• -.773 •• -1.087 •• 
.352 .447 .351 .466 
parentI "fshare 6.355 6.471 
4.808 5.508 
(.042) (.002) (.036) (.000) 
(continued ... ) 
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Table A3.4 (Continued) 
(xiv) (xv) (xvi) (xvii) 
originp -.304 ... -.304 ••• -.305 ••• -.305 ••• 
. 047 .047 .047 .047 
originr .046 .045 .045 .044 
.128 .127 .128 .128 
friend1 .388 ... .387 ••• .388 ••• .387 ••• 
. 073 .073 .073 .072 
friend2 .612 ... .610 ... .611 ••• .609 ... 
. 124 .124 .124 .124 
ethliveO -.155 •• -.155 .. -.154 .. -.154 •• 
. 068 .068 .068 .068 
ethlive2 -.155 ••• -.155 ••• -.154 ••• -.155 ... 
. 050 .050 .050 .049 
econ .123 ... .123 ••• .123 ... .123 ••• 
.013 .013 .013 .013 
polit .121 ••• .121 ••• .121 ... .121 ... 
. 03S .035 .035 .035 
media .071 ... .071 . .. .071 • •• .071 ••• 
. 017 .017 .017 .017 
happy .059 ... .058 ••• .059 ... .058 ••• 
. 010 .010 .009 .009 
eduO .025 -.009 .026 .006 
.124 .123 .126 .124 
edu1 -.004 -.017 -.007 -.020 
.106 .106 .107 .107 
edu2 -.112 -.116 -.112 -.116 
.091 .090 .091 .090 
edu.l .088 .085 .087 .084 
.155 .155 .155 .156 
edu5 .361 ... .362 ... .362 • •• .362 ••• 
. 114 .114 .113 .113 
edu6 .675 ••• .672 ••• .673 ••• .671 ••• 
. 070 .073 .069 .073 
/parent .313 .314 .. .312 •• .314 .. 
. 109 .109 .109 .108 
female -.035 -.035 -.036 -.036 
.062 .062 .062 .062 
age -.002 . -.002 • -.002 • -.002 • 
·QQl .QQ1 .QQ1 .Q01 
obs. 17,788 17,788 17,788 17,788 
R2 
.120 .120 .120 .120 
Table A3.5 reline version of models i to vi in Table 3.6 
ii iii iv v vi 
i8ub*labor .006 
.004 
i8ub -.004 -.034 
.021 .039 
(.095) 
08'4b *labor -.002 
.0011 
08ub -.079 -.068 
.0l1li .0113 
(.370) 
unemploll*labor -.003 -.005 
.033 .037 
unemploll -.038 -.020 -.057 -.036 
.093 .127 .108 .122 
(.932) (.856) 
employer*labor -.096 ••• -.098 • •• 
. 020 .020 
employer -.126 . 332 .. -.043 .419 • • 
.105 .181 .090 .161 
(.000) (.000) 
labor .072 ••• .072 • •• . 072 . .. .075 • •• .085 ••• 
. 010 .007 .003 .009 .008 
crime .093 ••• . 079 • •• .085 • •• . 084 ••• .090 ••• .089 • •• 
. 014 .013 .011 .011 .014 .014 
culture .163 ••• .145 .... . 141 . ... . 141 • •• .143 • •• .143 ...... 
.008 .009 .007 .007 .010 .010 
(continued ... ) 
NB: To avoid multicollinearity, the be dummy is dropped in models including isub, 
while dummies for be, fr and se are dropped in models including osub. 
Dummies for edu and friend are respectively jointly significant at the 1% level. 
Dummies for origin are jointly significant at the 1% level in models i to iv, the 10% in v 
but insignificant at the 10% in vi. Dummies for ethlive are jointly insignificant at the 10% level except in model i. ~ 
01 
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Table A3.5 (Continued) 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
originp -.103 ••• -.101 ... -.088 ••• -.088 • •• -.077 • -.075 • 
.033 .031 .028 .028 .041 .041 
originr -.006 -.033 -.011 -.014 .005 .003 
.081 .080 .089 .091 .113 .116 friend 1 .204 ... .190 ... .202 • •• .203 • •• .207 • •• . 209 . .. 
.041 .043 .040 .041 .050 .051 
friend! .306 ... .279 • •• .295 • •• .294 . .. .294 • •• . 290 . .. 
.029 .034 .039 .038 .056 .052 
ethliveO -.056 •• -.044 . -.051 -.051 -.071 • -.071 • 
.028 .026 .039 .039 .042 .041 
ethlive2 -.015 -.002 -.027 -.026 -.022 -.021 
.057 .059 .046 .046 .065 .066 
econ .025 . .020 .021 .020 .012 .012 
.013 .013 .013 .013 .01li .016 
polit . 045 ••• .044 ••• .044 • •• .044 • •• . 061 • •• .060 ... 
.014 .013 .015 .015 .013 .013 
media .035 ••• . 032 ••• .025 .025 .022 .022 
.012 .011 .016 .016 .019 .019 
happy .028 •• .024 •• .027 • •• .027 • •• .032 • •• . 032 • •• 
.012 .011 .010 .010 .010 . .009 
reline .052 ••• .049 ... .051 • •• .052 ... .049 • •• .050 ••• 
. 014 .013 .013 .014 .014 .015 
eduO -.151 .. -.138 • -.185 ••• -.184 ••• -.106 -.101 
.058 .070 .063 .067 .065 .065 
edul -.091 ••• -.081 ••• -.102 ••• -.104 ••• -.030 -.035 
.027 .023 .031 .029 .038 .036 
edu2 -.085 •• -.081 •• -.107 •• -.106 •• -.132 • •• -.129 • •• 
.035 .035 .043 .042 .036 .037 
edu4 .012 .001 -.012 -.018 -.009 -.017 
.063 .059 .058 .057 .064 .062 
edu5 . 228 ••• .209 ••• .196 • •• . 194 . .. .176 • •• .173 ... 
. 044 .040 .048 .050 .050 .053 
edu6 -.000 -.014 -.057 -.061 -.008 -.011 
.076 .073 .068 .071 .101 .106 fparent .083 .067 .075 .071 -.004 -.006 
.077 .076 .075 .074 .037 .038 female -.011 -.006 -.000 -.002 -.018 -.016 
.035 .037 .043 .043 .042 .043 
age -.004 ••• -.004 ... -.003 • •• -.004 ••• -.003 ••• -.003 • •• 
.001 .001 .001 .001 .000 .000 
s.d. of host· 1.218 1.229 1.233 1.235 1.227 1.228 
obs. 17,420 17,167 14,692 14,692 12,412 12,412 
log pseudo-likelihood -17,521 -17,147 -14,609 -14,596 -12,527 -12,515 
.-
pseudo-R2 .141 .147 .150 .151 .145 .146 C11 
""" 
Table A3.6 reline version of models i to vii in Table 3.7 
ii iii iv v vi vii 
bene/it*fi6caJ.*nfT*fshare -=-2T.14i---"· -24.514 ... 
7.491 4.731 
benefit*fiscal*nfT .465 ••• 1.183 ••• .374 ••• 1.230 ••• 
. 085 .218 .124 .133 
benefit*fiscal*tp*fshare 52.295 • 
27.903 
benefit*fiscal*tp -.865 ••• -2.838·· 
.225 1.274 
benefit *fiscal*tpe *fshare 
benefit *fiscal*tp2 
benefit *fiscal *fshare 8.441 
4.972 
benefit * fiscal .023 -.207 ••• -.421 
. 018 .059 .159 
benefit -.097 -.186 -.181 -.171 
.083 .140 .139 .137 (.413) (.000) (.000) 
pension *fiscal*nrr*fshare -2.100 
. 883 
pension *fiscal*nrr -.049 ••• .029 
.013 . 039 
pension *fiscal*tp *fshare 22.222 
9.658 
pension *fiscal *tp .295 • -.824 
. 157 .629 
pension *fiscal*tp2*fshare .. 
pension *fiscal*tp2 
pension *fiscal*fshare -1.504 
.811 
pension *fiscal -.016 -.020 .068 
.010 .017 .059 
pension . 041 .106 .. .103 ** .108 
.029 .051 .049 .050 (.115) (.005) (.000) 
(continued ... ) 
NB: Dummies for origin, friend and edu are respectively jointly significant at the 1% level. 
Dummies for ethlive are jointly insignificant at the 10% level. 
• 
... 
•• 
** 
• 
.. 
92.950 ••• 
31.474 
-.825 -4.534 ••• 
.597 1.696 
5.794 
5.981 
-.158 . -.275 
.091 .229 
-.181 -.173 
.140 .137 (.016) (.000) 
-.267 
1.943 
-.037 ••• .026 
.013 .073 
28.118 
23.152 
.143 -1.506 
.222 1.119 
-2.973 
1.858 
-.009 .158 
.025 .097 
.108 •• .108 * • 
.049 .050 
(.001) (.000) 
.... 
C11 
C11 
Table A3.6 (Continued) 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) 
parentI-fiscal-nrr-/share 10.843 ••• 9.491 • •• 
2.277 3.1148 
parentI-fiscal-nrr .074 -.345 ••• .078 • -.316 •• 
.047 .096 .042 .130 
parentI-fiscal-tp-/share -84.932 ••• 
18.761 
parentI-fiscal-tp .134 4.122 ••• 
.406 1.060 
parentI-fiscal-tp2-/share -128.386 ••• 
36.983 
parentI-fiscal*tp2 .034 6.259 ••• 
.530 1.793 
parentI *fiscal*/share 4.279 ••• 9.508 • •• 
1.585 2.668 
parentI *fiscal .009 -.045 -.320 ••• -.036 -.555 ... 
.052 .061 .099 .072 .158 
parentI .001 -.040 -.076 -.042 -.072 -.034 
.047 .209 .218 .214 .215 .213 (.977) (.004) (.000) (.005) (.OOO) 
reline *fiscal-nrr*/share .376 .902 
.602 .760 
reline *fiscal*nrr -.035 ••• -.036 -.034 • •• -.059 •• 
. 012 .022 .011 .027 
reline*fiscal*tp*/share 17.888 ••• 
5.775 
reline *fiscal *tp .036 -.944 ... 
.108 .281 
reline *fiscal *tp2 */share 19.817 • 
10.844 
reline *fiscal *tp2 .071 -1.091 •• 
. 142 .542 
reline*fiscal*fshare -2.627 ... -2.955 • •• 
.429 .842 
reline*fiscal .002 .018 .142 **. . 014 .162 • •• 
.010 .014 .022 .018 .045 
reline .059 n. .057 ... .046 .052 .047 .052 .048 
.018 .018 .034 .032 .031 .032 .031 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
fiscal .071 **. . 071 **. .070 • •• .073 ... .072 ... .073 .** .072 • •• 
.009 .009 .019 .018 .018 .018 .018 
erime .073 ••• . 073 ••• .073 ••• .073 ••• .073 ••• .073 . .. .073 ... 
.012 .012 .012 .012 .012 .012 .012 
culture .146 ••• . 146 ••• .146 • •• .147 .n .147 ••• .147 .** .147 • •• 
.... 
.008 . 008 .008 .008 .008 .008 .008 CTI 
0> 
(continued ... ) 
Table A3.6 (Continued) 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) 
originp 
-.090 ••• -.092 ... -.091 ••• -.089 • •• -.088 . .. -.090 • •• -.089 • •• 
. 031 .031 .031 .032 032 .032 .032 
originr 
-.020 -.023 -.025 -.026 -.028 -.028 -.028 
.073 .074 .075 .on. .075 .076 .076 friend! . 197 ... .198 ... .197 ... . 196 . .. .193 . .. .195 . .. .194 • •• 
.044 .043 .043 .042 .042 .042 .042 friend2 .296 ••• .296 . 295 • •• .296 • •• .295 . .. .295 • •• .297 ••• 
. 036 .036 .038 .038 .038 .037 .036 
ethliveO -.051 • -.052 • -.052 • -.049 • -.049 • -.050 • -.050 • 
.028 . 028 .028 .027 .027 .027 .027 
ethlive2 -.013 -.012 -.011 -.014 -.017 -.014 -.016 
.060 .060 .059 .059 .061 .059 .060 
econ .020 .020 .020 .021 .021 .021 .021 
.014 .014 .014 .013 .013 .013 .013 
polit . 041 ... .041 ... .041 • •• .041 • •• .042 ••• .041 ... .042 ••• 
.015 . 01li .015 .015 .015 .01li .01li 
media .032 ... .032 ••• .032 ... .034 • •• .034 • •• .034 • •• .034 ••• 
.Oll . 011 .Oll .011 .011 .011 .011 
happy .027 •• .026 •• .025 •• .024 o. .024 •• .024 •• .023 • 
.013 . 012 .013 .012 .012 .012 .012 
eeluO -.159 •• -.164 •• -.158 •• -.163 .. -.172 . .. -.165 . .. -.164 •• 
.064 . 063 .064 .063 .064 .063 .068 
eelu! -.109 ••• -.108 ••• -.106 • •• -.106 • •• -.1l3 ••• -.108 . .. -.109 • •• 
.023 .024 .025 .029 .028 .028 .028 
eelu2 -.086 •• -.087 ... -.086 ... -.084 u. -.088 .** -.085 . .. -.087 ... 
.033 . 032 .033 .031 .030 .031 .030 
eelu4 .007 .007 .008 .008 .006 .008 .009 
.060 .060 .060 .060 .061 .060 .061 
eelu5 . 219 ••• . 218 . .. .218 ••• .221 • •• .217 o.. .222 .o. . 219 ••• 
.044 .045 .044 .042 .040 .042 .040 
edu6 -.008 -.007 -.009 -.003 .001 -.004 -.000 
.071 .071 .072 .070 .071 .070 .070 
/parent .076 .077 .076 .072 .074 .073 .073 
.080 .079 .078 .077 .078 .077 .078 female -.008 -.009 -.008 -.008 -.006 -.007 -.005 
.035 .035 .035 .034 .033 .034 .033 
age -.004 ... -.004 • •• -.004 **. -.004 eo. -.004 ... -.004 u. -.004 ••• 
.001 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 
s.d. of host· 1.229 1.230 1.230 1.233 1.235 1.233 1.235 
obs. 17,066 17,066 17,066 17,066 17,066 17,066 17,066 
log pseudo-likelihood -17,040 -17,036 -17,033 -16,999 -16,977 -17,005 -16,979 
pseudo-R2 .148 .148 .148 .150 .151 .149 .151 
..... 
C11 
-'I 
Table A3. T relif&(: version of models i to ix in Table 3.8 
ii iii iv v vi vii viii ix 
kfle}it 'filjC4l in1T 'J&hare -20.605 ••• -12.803 -20.902 • •• -18.969 • 
4.138 7.176 6.181 10.472 
benefit *ji&C4l*n1T 1.154 ... .850 ... 1.304 ••• . 988 ... .436 ••• . 442 ... .372 ... .372 . .. 
.1111 .249 .189 .360 .076 .060 .097 .088 
benefit *ji&C4l*tp * J&hare 84.113 ... 33.158 
22.1112 53.969 
benefit *ji&eal*tp -4.229 ••• -1.940 -.652 ••• -.697 ••• 
1.036 2.375 .2111 .069 
benefit*ji&C4l*tp~·J&hare 143.940 ... 55.797 
28.617 126.640 
benefit ·ji&C4l·tp2 -6.629 ... -2.603 -.747 -.739 • 
1.468 5.645 .546 .378 
benefit ·ji&C4l*Jshare 2.770 4.496 1.448 6.793 
2.305 3.196 4.666 10.1i1iG 
benefit·ji&eal -.198 -.306 . -.072 -.348 -.208 -.197 ... -.163 -.154 ... 
.096 .177 .180 .499 .049 .047 .070 .01i8 
benefit -.174 -.165 -.172 -.164 -.180 . -.172 -.178 -.171 
.124 .113 .124 .113 .124 .114 .125 .114 
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
pension *fiseal·n1T*fshare -3.135 ••• -1.620 -3.588 • -3.282 
1.153 2.354 1.909 3.147 
pension *fiscal*n1T .037 -.012 .078 .066 -.080 ••• -.060 • •• -.059 ••• -.040 .. 
.052 .080 .082 .104 .018 .013 .017 .016 
pension ·fiscal·tp ·Jshare 27.076 •• 13.280 
12.759 25.023 
pension *fiscal·tp -.786 -.217 . 529 ... .441 • •• 
.762 1.301 .172 .106 
pension *fiscal*tp2*fshare 69.067 ... 62.638 • 
. 26.596 37.992 
pension *fiscal *tp2 -3.090 •• -2.826 .406 .290 
1.413 1.743 .287 .278 
pension * fiscal *Jshare -1.473 -.514 -5.700 •• -5.010 • 
1.075 1.704 2.457 2.701 
pension *fiscal .062 .013 .284 •• .253 • -.030 -.029 • -.024 -.021 
.070 .106 .128 .142 . 018 .015 .029 .030 
pension . 101 • .103 .102 • .107 .099 • .102 .103 • .108 
.054 .078 .053 .078 .053 .078 .053 .078 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.077) 
(continued ... ) 
NB: Dummies for friend and edu are respectively jointly significant at the 1% level. Dummies for ethlive are jointly insignificant at the 10% level. 
Dummies for origin are jointly significant at the 1% level in models i, iv, vi and viii, the 2% level in model ii, but insignificant at the 10% level in models iii, v, vii and ix. ...... 
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Table A3.1 (Continued) 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) ( viii) (ix) 
parentJ*/Ucal*nrr*'share 12.960 2.804 ... 16.831 7.986 
2.242 .600 2.524 2.720 
parentl*/Ucal*nrr -.456 ... -.147 ••• -.598 -.316 .054 -.057 . .. .060 -.044 . .. 
.099 .0'24 .111 .097 .054 .013 .050 .016 
parentJ*/Ucal*tp*'share -107.965 ... -13.352 .. 
lS.514 11.713 
parentJ*/Ucal*tp 5.314 1.071 ... .215 .554 
.944 .24S .446 .OSO 
parentJ*/Ucal*tp2*,share -199.747 ••• -78.670 .. 
3O.S1S 33.1162 
parentJ*/Ucal*tp2 9.318 3.956 ... .092 .650 
1.1123 1.426 .651 .166 
parentJ*fiscal*,share 5.975 ... -.074 13.005 ... 4.176 . 
1.420 .465 2.218 2.40S 
parentl ·/Ucal -.433 ... -.142 ... -.770 ... -.364 -.064 -.130 -.054 -.141 ... 
.089 .024 .146 .106 .059 .016 .077 .024 
parentJ .079 . 346 ... .085 .338 . 026 .347 ••• .028 .345 ... 
.203 .052 .203 .054 .210 .053 .20S .053 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.001) (.000) 
relinc *fiscal*nrr*,share .545 1.853 ••• .472 4.342 •• 
.768 .642 1.152 2.111 
relinc *fiscal*nrr -.043 -.082 ... -.045 -.173 .. -.039 ••• -.030 ••• -.039 . .. -.031 .. . 
.029 . 0'24 .042 .074 .014 .011 .012 .010 
relinc *fiscal*tp ·fshare 18.170 •• 3.820 
7.197 5.147 
relinc*fiscal*tp -.978 ••• -.331 .012 -.052 
.352 .244 .112 .043 
relinc*fiscal*tp2*fshare 26.864 • -28.505 
15.452 25.367 
relinc *fiscal*tp2 -1.433 • 1.108 .031 -.044 
.733 1.124 .152 .071 
relinc *fiscal*fshare -2.823 ••• -1.869 ... -3.546 . .. .380 
.536 .346 1.121 1.683 
relinc*fiscal . 153 ... . 105 ••• .195 .. . -.007 .022 .031 • •• .020 .031 •• 
.028 .016 .058 . 083 .014 .012 .018 .013 
relinc .056 ... .047 .014 .049 · .012 .053 • .017 .053 • .017 
.018 .029 .029 .029 .031 .030 .028 .029 .027 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
fiscal . 057 ... .060 . 057 ... .060 ... .055 . .. . 061 ... .058 ••• .061 ... .057 . .. 
.007 .014 .019 .014 .020 .014 .019 .014 .019 
(continued ... ) 
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Table AS.7 (Continued) 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) 
iaub-Iabor .005 .005 .005 .005 
.004 .004 .0011 .0011 
isub -.027 -.029 -.028 -.028 
.037 .037 .038 .037 (.460) (.448) (.448) (.416) 
oaub-Iabor 
-.001 -.001 -.001 -.001 
.006 .006 .005 .005 
oaub -.075 -.076 -.072 -.073 
.060 .060 .061 .060 (.360) (.356) (.377) (.381) 
unemploy -labor -.012 -.008 -.011 -.006 -.010 -.008 -.009 -.006 
.031 .033 .031 .033 .032 .033 .032 .034 
unemploy .048 .017 .042 .011 .040 .on .036 .006 
.096 .091 .095 .090 .098 .090 .097 .090 (.880) (.969) (.906) (.980) (.918) (.969) (.932) (.977) 
employer-labor -.102 ••• -.107 . .. -.100 ••• -.105 ••• -.102 ••• -.106 • •• -.101 ••• -.105 ••• 
.026 .025 .027 .026 . 026 .026 .027 .026 
employer .369 • .474 . . . 364 • .467 .. . 368 • .469 •• .364 • .466 •• 
.218 .196 .219 .198 .217 .198 .217 .199 (.Ooo) (.OOO) (.OOO) (.000) (.OOO) (.OOO) (.OOO) (.OOO) 
labor . 059 ••• .059 ... .069 ... .059 ••• .068 ••• .059 ... .070 ... .059 ... .069 ... 
.009 .006 .008 .005 .009 .006 .008 .005 .008 
cnme . 066 ••• .072 ••• .075 ••• . 072 ••• .075 ... .071 ••• .075 ••• .072 ••• .075 ••• 
.011 .010 .013 .010 .013 .010 .013 .010 .013 
culture .135 ••• . 131 ••• .133 ... . 131 ... .133 ... .131 ••• . 133 ••• .131 ••• .133 ••• 
.009 .007 .010 .007 .010 . 007 .010 .007 .010 
originp -.091 ••• -.075 .. -.059 -.076 ••• -.060 -.075 •• -.060 -.076 ••• -.062 
.030 .029 .042 .029 .042 .029 .041 .029 .041 
originr -.041 -.036 -.025 -.037 -.024 -.032 -.026 -.035 -.028 
.078 .091 .119 .091 .118 .090 .119 .091 .120 
(continued ... ) 
.... 
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Table A3.7 (Continued) 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) 
friend1 .189 ... .199 . .. . 208 ••• .200 • •• .208 .. . .201 • •• .209 ... .201 . .. . 209 ••• 
.045 .043 .052 .043 .051 .042 .052 .042 .051 friend2 .280 ••• . 293 • •• .289 ••• .293 ••• .290 • •• .296 .. . .289 • •• .295 ... . 288 • •• 
.039 .046 .067 .046 .067 .046 .067 .046 .066 
ethliveO -.043 -.044 -.066 • -.045 -.068 • -.044 -.068 • -.045 -.069 • 
.027 .037 .038 .037 .038 .037 .038 .037 .038 
ethlive2 -.001 -.024 -.004 -.026 -.006 -.022 -.005 -.022 -.007 
.060 .047 .067 .047 .067 .046 .067 .045 .067 
econ .017 .019 .010 .019 .010 .019 .010 .019 .010 
.014 .013 .015 .013 .015 .013 .015 .013 .015 
polit .041 ... .042 .060 . .. . 042 ... . 060 • •• .041 .. .059 . .. .041 .. .059 ••• 
.014 .016 .013 .016 .013 .016 .013 .016 .013 
media . 029 ••• .024 .022 .024 .023 .023 .022 .024 .023 
.010 .015 .018 .015 .018 .015 .018 .015 .018 
happy .024 • . 025 .. .033 • •• .025 .033 ... .026 .. .033 ... .026 .. .033 ... 
.012 .010 .008 .010 .008 .010 .008 .010 .008 
eduO -.147 • -.202 ••• -.104 -.194 ... -.100 -.190 ... -.092 -.194 ... -.097 
.076 .066 .066 .068 .070 .067 .059 .067 .061 
edul -.098 ••• -.124 • •• -.041 -.116 ••• -.033 -.115 ... -.035 -.116 ... -.035 
.022 .035 .041 .037 .040 .035 .046 .036 .046 
edu2 -.084 •• -.105 ••• -.116 ... -.105 ... -.119 • •• -.099 . .. -.118 ... -.101 . .. -.121 • •• 
.033 .035 .034 .035 .033 .036 .034 .037 .033 
edu4 -.000 -.021 -.015 -.020 -.015 -.018 -.018 -.018 -.018 
.058 .057 .061 .056 .061 .056 .061 .056 .061 
edu5 .205 ••• .191 ••• .176 • •• .192 ••• .175 . .. .195 • •• .174 • •• .196 ••• .175 • •• 
.041 .045 .049 .045 .050 .048 .049 .048 .049 
edu6 -.018 -.055 -.026 -.055 -.025 -.055 -.016 -.056 -.020 
.070 .066 .107 .065 .107 .065 .104 .065 .104 
/parent .065 .069 -.009 .070 -.006 .067 -.009 .067 -.009 
.078 .075 .033 .075 .033 .074 .033 .074 .033 female -.005 .003 .021 .004 .021 .000 .021 .001 .022 
.037 .041 .044 .041 .044 .041 .044 .041 .044 
age -.004 ... -.003 • •• -.004 ... -.004 ••• -.004 • •• -.004 ... -.003 • •• -.004 • •• -.004 • •• 
.001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
s.d. of host· 1.236 1.248 1.244 1.248 1.243 1.246 1.242 1.245 1.241 
obs. 16,854 14,438 12,184 14,438 12,184 14,438 12,184 14,438 12,184 
log pseudo-
likelihood -16,757 -14,220 -12,172 -14,222 -12,175 -14,240 -12,180 -14,247 -12,187 
pseudo-R2 .152 .158 .154 .158 .154 .157 .154 .156 .153 
.... 
0:> 
.... 
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Part 2 
Migrant Smuggling 
CHAPTER 4 
Exploitation of Migrants 
This chapter examines the labour exploitation of migrants in the migrant 
smuggling market. We use an asymmetric information framework where 
potential migrants are unable to distinguish between exploitative and non-
exploitative smugglers. We find that when the equilibrium is characterised 
by adverse selection, policies that diminish the availability of smuggling ser-
vices to potential migrants inevitably raise the mean exploitation of smug-
gled labour. When the equilibrium is not of adverse selection, the effects of 
anti-illegal migrant policy and anti-trafficking policy may offset each other. 
We also suggests that the market may converge to a stable state where only 
exploitative smugglers are active. 
4.1. Introduction 
The migrant smuggling market has features that are worth microeconomic analysis. 
First of all, there exists no legally enforceable contract between the providers and the 
consumers of illicit border crossing services. In addition, the consumption of such ser-
vices requires a loss of the consumers' control over the assets they carry with them while 
travelling--their own bodies and labour. Smuggling agents increasingly gain power to 
control these assets against the will of the owners once the provision of smuggling services 
is implemented. Nevertheless, this shift of asset control that increases the vulnerability of 
the consumers vis-a-vis the service providers has not caused the migrant smuggling market 
to vanish because not all smugglers exercise the power they gain in order to exploit their 
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clients to their advantage. Some smugglers have the technology to utilise migrant labour, 
while others do not. 
There has been little analysis of the migrant smuggling market in economics so far, 
even though smuggling and trafficking in migrants l have recently become one of the major 
international concerns.2 Friebel and Guriev (2006) theoretically examined the interaction 
between migrants and smuggling agents. In their model, not all potential migrants are able 
to pay for smuggling services upfront. A worker may therefore enter into a debt contract with 
a smuggler if migrating and must then pay back the debt through work in the destination. 
Their analysis shows that, while stricter border enforcement discourages both financially 
constrained and unconstrained workers to migrate illegally, better detection in the formal 
employment sector not only discourages the illegal entry of the latter type but encourages 
that of the former, leading to a bias in the composition of illegal immigrants towards the 
poorer end. In their model, while smugglers face a risk that migrants may default debt 
repayments, migrants do not face the risk of being exploited by their smugglers.3 
Dessy and Pallage (2006) theoretically argue that the risk of child trafficking serves as 
a deterrent to parents who send their children to labour markets. The effort to reduce the 
incidence of child trafficking therefore increases the parental supply of child labour. Their 
analysis concentrates on the household utility maximisation with respect to the supply of 
child labour, and traffickers are not modelled explicitly. Dessy, Mbiekop and Pallage (2005) 
present a general equilibrium model with producers who choose between the legal sector 
and child trafficking.4 They emphasise the importance of demand for trafficked children in 
influencing the incidence of child trafficking. These two studies address the issue of abuse, 
lWc distinguish latcr in this introduction between smuggling and trafficking in migrants. 
2For instance, a recent report by the Global Commission on International Migration (2005) touches on the 
related problems throughout the text. At the same time, its acknowledgment section on page 88 indicates 
that economists' contributions to the report were scarce. 
3Guzman, Haslag and Orrenius (2002) model migrant smuggling explicitly, but their analysis in a two-
country dynamic general equilibrium framework treats smugglers as suppliers of cost-saving border crossing 
services, and migrants do not face a risk of exploitation. It belongs to the theoretical macroeconomic 
literature on illegal immigration and border enforcement that began with Ethier (1986). Djajil: (1987) and 
Bond and Chen (1987) but does not attempt to provide microeconomic analysis of interactions between 
migrants and smugglers. 
4They model a small open source country in the sense that the price per child sold abroad is exogenously 
given. 
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but children are treated as commodities and do not make any decision. Hence these do not 
cover the problem we examine in this chapter. 
Our objective is to provide the first microeconomic analysis of the migrant smuggling 
market where we allow the fact that smugglers gain control over their clients by smuggling 
them. In our model, each smuggler's decision as to whether it exploits its clients after 
successful smuggling is endogenous in the workers' expectation of exploitation in the des-
tination, and a weakened position of a migrant vis-a-vis the smuggler does not necessarily 
result in exploitation. This chapter thus provides a solution to one of Vltyrynen's (2003: 3) 
criticisms about economic approaches to migrant smuggling, ie, inadequate attention paid 
to exploitative aspects. We focus on the equilibrium proportion of exploitative smugglers 
as well as the number of active smuggling agents in the market. The more exploitative the 
market, the greater the welfare loss. Our analysis, however, implies that there is a tradeoff 
between the number of active suppliers of illicit border crossing services and the extent of 
exploitation: policy makers face a dilemma as to whether to improve the welfare of smuggled 
migrants or to diminish the availability of smuggling services. 
We begin by adapting Akerlof's (1970) model of asymmetric information for the migrant 
smuggling market. We assume smugglers exogenously differ in their capacities to exploit 
their clients in the destination and make two decisions at a given smuggling fee: enter the 
market or not, and exploit or not if smuggling. The exploitation decision depends on the 
workers' expectation of exploitation in the destination which determines the smuggling fee. 
Note that the way we endogenise the quality of a smuggling service is different from Kim's 
(1985). In his model, the quality of a secondhand car depends on the level of maintenance 
by the owner, and car owners exogenously differ in their marginal utility gains from the car 
quality. A car owner chooses the level of maintenance and also decides whether she/he sells 
or keeps the car. In our analysis, the exploitation decision of a smuggler depends on the fee 
that cannot be chosen by the smuggler when exploitation capacities are private information. 
We find that, when workers cannot distinguish between heterogeneous smugglers, an 
adverse selection problem may arise: only exploitative smugglers provide border crossing 
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services even though workers are willing to pay a higher fee to hire non-exploitative smug-
glers. As in Wilson (1980), multiple equilibria can arise depending on the distribution of 
exploitation capacities. 
We subsequently examine the market equilibrium over time by incorporating two com-
mon findings from surveys of smuggled and trafficked migrants. One is that the most 
common initial source of information about smuggling agents they hire is the social net-
work: parents, relatives, friends and other acquaintances. Another is that it is very difficult 
for workers to identify exploitative smugglers. Victims of trafficking may communicate what 
happened to them via family/social networks but are often afraid of pointing out who did it 
because of the fear of retaliation. Moreover, they may not communicate the incidence at all 
if the nature of work they were forced to do overseas, eg, prostitution, is likely to stigmatise 
themselves in their home communities. 
We assume only those smugglers who did not exploit their clients are identified by the 
information transmission through social networks. The incidence of trafficking is com-
municated, but potential migrants cannot identify traffickers. Accordingly, the migrant 
smuggling market is segmented into two: one in which information is symmetric, and the 
other where it is asymmetric. As a result, with a constant flow of potential smuggling 
agents into the economy, identified non-exploitative smugglers charging the full information 
fee and unidentified exploitative and non-exploitative smugglers charging a lower fee coexist 
in a transitional equilibrium. We show that the informationally asymmetric part of the 
market becomes increasingly exploitative over time, which in turn biases the composition of 
new entries towards the more exploitative. In the long run, a new entry of non-exploitative 
smugglers ceases, and the equilibrium converges to a stable state characterised by adverse 
selection. The dynamics we employ in this chapter are similar to those of Janssen and 
Karamychev (2002) and Janssen and Roy (2004) but with exogenous information transmis-
sion common in the migrant smuggling market.s 
~ Janssen and Karamychev (2002) generalise Janssen and Roy (2004) who use the uniform distribution of 
different qualities. Both studies deal with durable goods, and each seller can supply only once. 
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In the rest of this introduction, we explain our working definitions of migrant smug-
gling and trafficking in this chapter. In Section 4.2, we gather stylised facts about these 
activities from non-economic studies. Section 4.3 presents a benchmark model where in-
formation is symmetric between smugglers and migrants. In Section 4.4, we assume that 
different exploitation capacities are private information. Section 4.5 examines the dynamics 
of the market equilibrium under the above mentioned information transmission. Section 
4.6 concludes with policy implications. 
The terms, smuggling and trafficking, have been used interchangeably by some re-
searchers and practioners but with clear distinction by others. A lack of consensus as 
to the use of the terms complicates the analysis of these activities. 6 However, recent effort 
to create legal instruments to fight against human smuggling and trafficking has given a 
clear distinction between these activities. In December 1998, the General Assembly of the 
United Nations established an ad hoc committee for the purpose of setting up its Conven-
tion against Transnational Organized Crime and supplementing protocols specific to human 
smuggling and trafficking. As a result, the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants 
(UN, 2000b) entered into force on 28 January 2004, while the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress 
and Punish Trafficking in Persons (UN, 2000a) did so earlier on the Christmas day of 2003. 
In this chapter, we closely follow these two protocols.7 Our working definitions are that 
a smuggler (or non-exploitative smuggler) is an agent who provides illegal border crossing 
services without exploiting its clients in the post-smuggling period, while a trafficker (or 
exploitative smuggler) is an agent who also provides the same border crossing services but 
with exploitation of its clients after successful smuggling.s We define exploitation as that of 
the labour of a smuggled client, and we ignore for the sake of economic analysis elements of 
intimidation and violence that often seem involved in both trafficking and smuggling. These 
working definitions of ours will become clear when we describe our analytical framework in 
Section 4.3. 
6Salt and Hogarth discuss this problem in Laczko and Thompson (2000: 18-23). 
7See Appendix A for the relevant excerpts from these UN protocols. 
8Whether exploitation of migrants is involved or not is often taken as a distinguishing criterion between 
trafficking and smuggling, eg, Kelly and Regan (2000: 3), Salt (2000: 33-4) and Interpol (www.interpol.int). 
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4.2. Stylised facts 
Several non-economic studies have made crude estimates as to the scale of smuggling 
and trafficking in migrants, based on apprehension data, court cases, survey questionnaires, 
interviews and best guesses. Salt (2003: Table 20) gathers and compares such estimated 
figures and suggests the annual total number of either smuggled or trafficked migrants is 
approximately 4 million in the world in the second half of the 1990s. According to the 
US government (USDS, 2004: 23), approximately 600,000 to 800,000 persons were trafficked 
across international borders worldwide in 2003. Although these figures are not comparable, 
the incidence of trafficking appears to be lower than that of smuggling.9 
This section does not provide a thorough collection of stylised facts about migrant 
smuggling and trafficking but only a selection of them that are relevant to our analysis. lo 
Note that, while increasingly available surveys of smuggled and trafficked migrants reveal 
the demand side of the market, its interaction with the supply side and the consequences, 
they do not inform us much about the supply side, ie, smugglers and traffickers. Studies 
of smugglers and traffickers describe their characteristics and activities by referring to mass 
media reports or quoting what was told by police officers, crime investigators, immigration 
officers, charity personnel and smuggled and trafficked migrants, but hardly by smugglers 
and traffickers themselves. This implies that our knowledge of the supply side of the market 
is rather limited. 
4.2.1. Motives for migration 
Existing surveys of smuggled migrants, victims of trafficking and the like indicate, although 
economic reasons are not the only factors that influence migration decision making, these 
seem to be the major factors.ll They can be divided into two: economic hardship, such as 
9We should remain sceptical of these estimates, for the nature of both smuggling and trafficking in migrants 
is clandestine. However, the UK government (IND, 2001: 75) also expressed the same view that trafficking 
takes place less frequently than smuggling, concerning illegal immigration in the country. See also 10M 
(2002a) for Armenia and Budapest Group (1999: 15). 
iOSalt and Hogarth provide an empirical literature review in Laczko and Thompson (2000). 
ll:-;oneconomic reasons include civil wars, ethnic conflicts, political prosecutions, family/relationship prob-
lems at horne, family reunions and desires for adventure. 
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unemployment and poverty, at home countries and better economic prospects at destination 
countries. The former is the so-called economic push, and the latter the economic pull. 
Economic hardship was found to be the most common reason for migration among 
smuggled or trafficked migrants in Armenia (10M, 2oo2a: 16), Georgia (10M, 2001: 14), 
Ukraine (Uehling, 2004: 90-1) and Southeastern Europe (CTRCP, 2003).J2 In Azerbaijan, 
Bickley (2001: 27) found the same, but 10M (2002b: 16-7,21) suggests both push and pull 
factors influence an individual's migration decision simultaneously. This is natural because, 
if economic prospects are not thought to be any better overseas than at home, there would 
not be an incentive to leave his/her country. However, there also seem to be those whose 
migration decisions are influenced purely by the economic pull. Pieke (2002: 32) and Chin 
(1999: 14, referred by Skeldon, 2000b: 17) found such individuals are more common in 
China. LilzMoiu and Alexandru (2003: 34-7) found females with higher aspiration are more 
vulnerable to trafficking in Romania, suggesting the economic pull is important. 
In this chapter, we take a traditional economic approach to migration decision making 
and assume the migration decision positively depends on the income gap between the origin 
and the destination. More specifically, we assume each worker can earn zero income at home, 
ie, she/he has no employment prospect at home, while she/he is employed with certainty at 
the destinationP 
4.2.2. Demand for smuggling services 
A number of authors have argued that restrictive immigration policies of destination coun-
tries increase the number of migrants who choose to resort to clandestine border crossing 
and smugglers who can organise it, eg, Ghosh (1998: 148), Budapest Group (1999: 15-6), 
Schloenhardt (1999: 212), Kelly and Regan (2000: 5), Skeldon (2000a), Andreas in Kyle and 
Koslowski (2001: 116), Cornelius (2001: 668), Marshall (2001), ILO (2002: 4), Gallagher 
(2002: 28), Taran and Chammartin (2003: 5-6), Vltyrynen (2003: 3) and NCIS (2003: 37), 
12See al80 10M (1996). 
13Accordingly, we will focus on migrants whose decisions are affected by both push and pull factors. Our 
analysis can be generalised by introducing a range of income levels at home among potential migrants. 
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although there is no firm statistical evidence to prove this. 14 Futo and Jundl (2004: 78, 
151-2, 158) report that recently apprehended illegal immigrants in Hungary, TUrkey and 
Ukraine have increasingly relied on smugglers. The UK government (IND, 2001: 76) esti-
mates that smugglers and traffickers are involved in approximately 75 percent of detected 
cases of illegal border crossing. Koser's (2000: 102-3) survey found some asylum seekers in 
the sample turning to smugglers because of restrictive policies against them. 15,16 
However, a host country's government is unlikely to adopt a tolerant immigration policy 
because, while it may reduce the dependence of irregular migrants on smuggling agents and 
their vulnerability to traffickers, the number of illegal immigrants is likely to increase. For 
instance, according to the European Commission (2004: 9), the Belgian regularisation pro-
gramme of 1999 that allowed illegal residents in the country to submit asylum applications 
seems to have encouraged illegal immigration subsequently. 
In this chapter, we simply assume individuals need to hire smugglers if they wish to 
migrate. We thus assume the host country has restrictive immigration policies so that 
migrating individuals cannot enter the destination legitimately. Our analysis is limited 
in the sense that migrants do not choose between illegal entries by themselves and entries 
arranged by smugglers. 
4.2.3. Information transmission 
We have mentioned economic push and pull are the major reasons for migration. Note, 
while economic hardship is something that is actually experienced by potential migrants in 
home countries before migration, better economic prospects are not. Pull factors are based 
14Donato, Durand and Massey (1992: 153) found weak evidence with a small sample, while Singer and 
Massey (1997: Table 4) found a significant positive relation between the number of US linewatch hours and 
the use of smugglers in Mexico. On the other hand, Gathmann (2004: Table 6b) found the direct effect of 
strengthened border enforcement on the demand for a smuggler is little. 
15See Morrison and Crosland (2001: 27-39) who explain the restrictive nature of European immigration 
policies against asylum seekers. 
16 Another reason to hire a smuggler might be that of cost minimisation. Skeldon (2000&: 9-10) speculates 
that the use of smuggling services is often less costly than that of official channels because the latter involves 
a significant amount of time and bribes. However, bribery is rife in the process of both smuggling and 
trafficking, and hence its costs are likely to be included in smuggling fees. 
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on migrants' expectations. That is, even if better economic prospects at destinations are 
real, there is no guarantee that migrants will have access to them after migration. 17 
Many of those who are planning to migrate, and first-time migrants in particular, gain 
information about destinations, jobs and also smugglers from family members, relatives, 
friends and acquaintances, eg, Frejka, Ok61ski and Sword (1999: 51) in Ukraine, 10M 
(2002a: 18) in Armenia, I~duygu (2003: 35, 46) in 'lUrkey and UNICRI (2003: 48-9) in 
the Philippines. Social networks are useful for obtaining reliable information and lowering 
the risks involved in migration, such as apprehension by the border police and deception 
by the smuggler. Positive correlations between the availability of family/social networks 
and the decision to migrate might be interpreted by this reduction in implicit costs related 
to migration, eg, Espinosa and M88SeY (1997) and Orrenius (1999). In general, potential 
migrants in a community become better and better informed, over time, of the costs and 
benefits involved in migration when the community regularly sends its members abroad, 
expanding its social networks, eg, Giza in Frejka, Ok6lski and Sword (1998: Chapter 7) 
in Poland. Singer and Massey's (1997: Table 4) empirical analysis shows a strong corre-
lation between a migrant's chance of hiring a smuggler and the prevalence of experienced 
migrants in his community, which may suggest migrants with previous positive experiences 
with smugglers do share information with their community members. IS 
However, information transmission through social networks is likely to be lopsided: 
non-exploitative smugglers are more easily identified by potential migrants than traffickers. 
Victims of trafficking may communicate what happened to them via family/social networks 
but usually are afraid of pointing out who did it because of the fear of traffickers' reprisals 
against themselves and their loved ones. 19 Moreover, exploited migrants often have bitter 
experiences that they would prefer not to share with others in their communities. For 
example, regardless of having been forced or voluntarily accepted, the fact that a migrant 
17This feature is modelled by Todaro (1969; 1970) and Harris and Todaro (1970) in the context of rural-
urban migration under unemployment risk. Todaro and Maruszko (1987) adopt the same approach to illegal 
migration. 
It1This in turn implies that those who are not socially well connected are vulnerable to traffickers. 10M's 
(2001: 16-7) survey of victims of trafficking in Georgia found the majority of the sample could not rely on 
help and advice through social networks and had to look for smuggling agencies by themselves. 
19Violence is frequently used to control victims, eg, Aronowitz (2001: 177). 
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was a prostitute overseas would stigmatise the person in many cultural settings. As a 
result, trafficked victims of this type are likely to remain silent, eg, 10M (2001: 36).20 In 
addition, even if the incidence of trafficking is well known, traffickers may hardly be identified 
by potential migrants because they would disappear from the community after successful 
trickery and abuses, eg., Frejka, Ok6lski and Sword (1999: 52) and 10M (2001: 16). 
In Section 5 where we examine the market equilibrium over time, we take into account 
this feature of information transmission. For simplicity, we assume that both exploited and 
unexploited migrants in one period communicate what happened to them in their community 
in the next period, but only smugglers who did not exploit their clients can be identified. 
4.2.4. Charges for smuggling services 
Charges for smuggling services as well as payment methods vary widely, and known figures 
and methods are based on individual cases. Therefore, we do not list these here. 21 How-
ever, there appears to be a common observation in this market. Namely, non-exploitative 
smugglers charge their clients for border crossing services, while traffickers mayor may not 
explicitly charge their prey for smuggling. 22 For instance, an 10M study of trafficked women 
in Belgium found that, while most of them did not have to pay a fee to the traffickers, they 
found themselves indebted on arrival.23 
Provided the exploitation of smuggled persons at the destination is sufficiently profitable, 
it is understandable that some traffickers need not charge them for border crossing. In ad-
dition, traffickers are better off pretending they are non-exploitative if migrants are capable 
of paying for smuggling services. In our model, traffickers can mimic the fee chargeable 
20An 10M study in Poland (referred by Ghosh, 1998: 67) suggests migrants tend to pretend to be better off 
than they actually are, and failure abroad is not readily admitted. 
21lOM (2003: Table 17.21) lists ranges of smuggling fees by origin and destination. See also Ghosh (1998: 
31-2). 
22Traffickers make an excuse when exploiting smuggled migrants that th~y became heavily indebted while 
being smuggled, 80 they charge for smuggling implicitly through exploitation. In this paper, we concentrate 
on commercial smugglers and do not deal with non-exploitative smugglers who do not charge migrants at 
all. An example is someone who assist an asylum seeker to cross a border on a humanitarian basis. 
23Referred by Ghosh (1998: 22) 
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by non-exploitative smugglers because the shut-down fee is lower for the former than the 
latter.24 Hence signalling is not available for the latter under asymmetric information. 
We assume migrants pay the smuggling fee only after successful border crossing. Since 
there are cases where migrants must pay the smuggling fee upfront, or where they pay it by 
instalments, our analysis is not comprehensive. In our model, migrants are rational: paying 
the fee upfront could give a smuggler an incentive to default on the provision of border 
crossing services, and the migrants should therefore condition the fee payment on successful 
smuggling. According to Donato, Durand and Massey (1992: 151) for Mexico, IC;duygu and 
Toktas (2002: 38-9) for the Middle East and Futo and Jandl (2004: 18) for Central and 
Eastern Europe, it is not uncommon that the fee payment is made only after the client is 
smuggled as promised. 
We also assume migrants are able to pay for the fee without being indebted to smugglers. 
Hence we do not examine the case where a migrant enters a debt contract with a smuggler.25 
This is analysed by Friebel and Guriev (2006) without allowing smugglers to exploit their 
clients. 
4.2.5. Exploitation 
Migrants become vulnerable once they depart their countries of origin. They are often 
deprived of their true identities in the form of a passport in order to enter the destination 
clandestinely. Subject to legal prosecution under the immigration laws of destination coun-
tries and devoid of financial means, smuggled migrants often find their freedom of movement 
severely curtailed, eg, 10M (2001: 32). Victims of trafficking often become aware that they 
are duped during their journeys or on arrival at the destination planned by traffickers. There 
are two ways of exploiting smuggled migrants. One is by using them directly, and the other 
by selling them. 
24 A smuggler's shut-down fee is the fee at or below which it does not supply a smuggling service and becomes 
inactive in t he market. 
25 A financially constrained person does not necessarily enter a debt contract with a smuggler to finance 
clandestine migration if there is an alternative source of credit such as family members' credit. See Genicot 
and Senesky (2004: Tables 4 and 5) for some empirical evidence. 
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The sex industry can illustrate the financial gain from the coercive use of smuggled mi-
grants. Leskinen (2003) reports detailed figures from the seized bookkeeping of an exposed 
case in which 5 to 8 Estonian females were working as prostitutes in 5 apartments under a 
criminal leader of the same nationality with Finnish pimps in Helsinki in 2001. A 20-minute 
visit to one of these apartments cost 300 markaa, which are divided into 200 for the pimps 
and 100 for the female worker.26 The bookkeeping showed the number of clients was about 
1,000 per month, which implies the monthly revenue of 200,000 markaa to the pimps. The 
estimated profit to the criminal group after deducting the costs of running the business was 
at least 100,000 markaa per month, ie, almost 17,000 euros.27 
Smugglers who are not employers of their clients can still exploit the migrants simply 
by selling them. Home Office (2004: 77) for example reports that the price of a Thai female 
sold to brothel organisers operating in the United Kingdom was 6,000 pounds sterling in the 
case uncovered by Operation Horsley.28 The money paid to the smugglers seem to become 
debts that the females are forced to repay. In such a case, they receive little money from 
their work, eg, Hughes (2000: 633-4). 
Females managed by exploitative smugglers can be repeatedly traded during the smug-
gling process. 10M and ICMC's (2002: 7-10) report suggests, in Yugoslavia, the existence 
of trading houses was identified where females for exploitation were exhibited and purchased 
before border crossing, and higher prices seem to be paid to those who bring younger fe-
males to the market. Pobortscha (2002) suggests similar quasi-slave trading in Moldova, 
and Erder and Kaska (2003: 63) in Turkey. 
In our model, exploitation is defined as the use of labour without remuneration, thus 
ignoring the case where trafficked migrants are sold in the destination. Smugglers are 
exogenously endowed with different exploitation capacities. As a result, not all smugglers 
exploit their clients, and traffickers exploit migrants at various levels, which appears realistic, 
eg, 10M (2001: 33-4). 
26 100 markaa ~ 16.82 euros, according to the report. 
27The extent of economic and sexual exploitation by coercive pimps might be similar among native and 
migrant prostitutes. See May, Harocopos and Hough (2000) for the British case. 
l8See Metropolitan Police (2003: 32) for the details of this police operation. 
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4.3. Benchmark 
We now set up a two-country model with a fixed number of identical workers and a 
fixed number of heterogeneous smugglers. All the workers legally reside in one of the two 
countries, and we call it the home. The other country is called the destination to which they 
may attempt to migrate. Economic prospects for the workers are better in the destination 
than in the home in the sense that the exogenously given earnings per unit of labour are 
higher in the former than in the latter. 
We assume that a worker has no means to migrate from the home to the destination 
except by hiring a smuggler. A smuggler is capable of delivering such a worker from the 
home to the destination. Migrants would pay for smuggling services only if border crossing 
were successfu1.29 
Let us normalise the total measure' of the smugglers to I, and each of them has the 
capacity of supplying 1 unit of border crossing services without the loss of generality. That 
is, it can be hired by at most one worker. The total measure of the workers is m »1. All 
the agents are risk-neutral. 
Let Pj E (0,1) denote the given probability of apprehension at the border for j E {M, S} 
where M denotes migrant and S smuggler. Let Aj E (0,1) denote that of apprehension 
inland. We distinguish between P and A, for they usually differ from each other and 
Aj < Pj in many countries.3o It also becomes useful to distinguish between the probabilities 
for migrants and smugglers when we conduct comparative statics. We commonly observe 
PM> P S and AM > AS in the real world. Smugglers are often able to abandon their 
clients in order to evade capture. Also, for example, the driver might be apprehended at 
the border, but it is often difficult to uncover the whole operation and organisation.31 
29With this payment method, a smuggler cannot have an incentive to default on the provision of smuggling 
services after receiving a fee, though it does not solve the incentive problem of exploitative smugglers. 
30See for instance Miller in Kyle and Koslowski (2001: Chapter 12). 
31 Aronowitz (2001: 169) notes forced prostitutes are likely to have more contacts with those other than 
traffickers than non-sexual forced labourers. In order to minimise the risk of apprehension, victims are 
often rotated geographically. Raviv and Andreani (2004) found human trafficking operations have become 
increasingly invisible in the Balkan region. 
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4.3.1. Smugglers 
We assume a smuggler's decision to exploit its client depends on its capacity to do so 
which determines the profitability of exploitation. Exploitation of smuggled migrants in 
the destination requires relevant facilities to conduct illicit business, evade capture and 
restrict the freedom of the exploited. Criminal syndicates are likely to be well endowed 
with such facilities. 
Smugglers exogenously differ in their capacities to exploit their smuggled clients in the 
destination. We define exploitation as the use of labour without remuneration. Let 
k E [0,11 denote the given capacity of a smuggler to exploit its migrated client's labour net 
of exploitation costs. 
We suppose each worker is endowed with one unit of labour that can generate y > 0 in 
the destination. Therefore, if exploitation takes place, the smuggler's gain per migrant is 
ky while the client's earnings are reduced from y to (1- k)y. 
Let ~ (k) be a distribution function, and ¢ (k) > 0 'if k E [0,11 is the corresponding 
density function. Hence ~ (.) is nondegenerate. 
Suppose a smuggling operation resulted in successful border crossing. The migrant 
then paid a smuggling fee, f. The smuggler's expected profit from the post-smuggling 
exploitation is 
(4.1) ir=(I-As)kY-As(f+p+kq) 
where p > 0 represents the fixed penalty for smuggling and q > 0 the marginal penalty for 
exploitation in pecuniary terms. The expression assumes the fee payment by a client is 
seized and forfeited in the case of apprehension.32 Note that, the first term indicates, when 
exploitation takes place, the smuggled migrant and the smuggler are always caught together 
with the apprehension probability of As. We thus assume k takes into account the capacity 
to reduce AM to zero. 
32This is equivalent to assuming the total penalty is increasing in the fee received. This innocent looking 
lUIIIumption is crucial when we endogenise the ratio between smugglers and traffickers. 
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Let e (k) E {0,1} be a binary variable that is 1 if a type-k smuggler decides to exploit 
its client and ° if it does not. We assume a smuggler exploits its client iff iT (k) > 0, ie, 
(4.2) if iT(k) :5 ° 
otherwise. 
Since the success of border crossing is uncertain at the pre-smuggling stage, a smuggler's 
total expected profit from smuggling is 
where c > ° denotes the sum of smuggling costs such as expenditures on transportation, 
hiding places, fraudulent documents and bribes. The first term implies a smuggler does not 
face a risk of apprehension inland if it decides not to exploit its client.33 It also assumes a 
smuggler must deliver its client to the destination in order to receive the fee, f. 
Let 1f > 0 denote the alternative profit available for each smuggler, and we assume 7r > 1f 
is both necessary and sufficient for it to supply a border crossing service. 
4.3.2. ~orkers 
Each worker is endowed with one unit of labour which is supplied inelastically in either 
the home or the destination.34 Let y > 0 denote the earnings per unit of labour in the 
destination.35 Let us normalise a worker's alternative income, ie, the earnings in the home, 
33Commonly, apprehended illegal workers are not questioned for the purpose of tracing the smugglers and 
traffickers who brought them in. 
34We thus ignore the case where a worker supplies a fraction of the labour endowment in the home and the 
rest in the destination. 
35We ignore the possibility of smuggled migrants being unemployed in the destination because there appears 
to be high demand for illegal migrants who are usually willing to accept lower wages than natives. See OECD 
(2000: Chapter 3) for an overview. Profitability of hiring unauthorised migrants is exemplified by Ghosh 
(1998: 77): the convicted employers of irregular migrants in the Netherlands in 1991 made a significant 
financial gain even after paying for penalties and out-of-court settlements. Furthermore, Anderson and 
O'Connell Davidson (2003: 21,25) found some features specific to migrants are preferred by consumers. 
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to zero. If apprehended, a worker is sent back to the home without paying a penalty.36 If 
the apprehension takes place at the border, the worker need not pay a smuggling fee, either. 
Suppose each smuggler's k is known to the workers. Suppose (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3) 
are also known to them. The expected utility of a successfully smuggled worker at the 
post-smuggling stage is 
(4.4) U = (1 - >w) (1 - e>.s) (1 - ek) y. 
Note that, when a migrant is exploited, >'s has to be taken into account because there is 
no chance to expect (1 - >'M) (1 - k) y if the smuggler and the migrant are caught together 
during the exploitation process. We thus assume if exploitation takes place it does before 
a migrant can make use of any labour being unused by the smuggler. 
At the pre-migration stage, a worker's expected total utility from hiring a smuggler is 
(4.5) U = (1- {3s)(l- {3M)(u - f) 
which assumes the smuggling fee, f, is paid only if border crossing is successful. We suppose 
workers are not wealth-constrained in financing assisted clandestine migration. 
We assume u ~ 0 is both necessary and sufficient for a worker to hire a smuggler. (4.5) 
implies the following participation constraint under symmetric complete information: 
(4.6) f:5 (1 - >'M) (1 - e>.s) (1 - ek) y 
which needs to be met if a worker decides to hire a type-k smuggler. 
4.3.3. Equilibrium 
Under symmetric complete information, the workers know the exploitation capacity of each 
smuggler as well as its exploitation decision rule. Accordingly, (4.6) and m » 1 imply there 
36This assumption may not be reasonable in some cases. Pacurar (2003) points out that, although migrants 
are not subject to criminal prosecution for being the object of smuggling, they can be prosecuted for holding 
fraudulent documents or/and directing the third party to smuggle themselves. We assume throghout the 
paper that migrants are not prosecuted but sent back to the home country without compensation for what 
the smuggler took from them. This seems to apply to most of the cases. 
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is a competitive equilibrium fee for each exploitation capacity, ie, 
(4.7) f (k) = (1 - eAs)(l - ek) r 
r is the fee a worker is willing to pay for a non-exploitative smuggling service. By sub-
stituting (4.7) into (4.1) with e = 1, the exploitation condition, ir (f (k), k) > 0, can be 
rewritten as follows: 
(4.8) 
Therefore, we can rewrite the exploitation decision rule (4.2) as follows: 
{
I if k > k 
(4.2') e(k)= 
° otherwise 
If k ~ I, or equivalently y $ 1~1s (p + q), no smuggler would exploit its clients because k E 
[0,1]. All the smugglers are exploitative if k < ° or equivalently y < l~is (l+>'S(~ >'M»)' ie, 
the denominator of k is negative. Accordingly, we need y > 1~1s (p + q) to have k E (0,1). 
For those who cannot exploit smuggled migrants profitably, ie, k $ k, the participation 
constraint, fr(k $ k) > 1f, can be rewritten as 
(4.9) 
where 1 is the non-exploitative smuggler's shut-down fee at or below which it does not 
supply a smuggling service. 
Exploitative smugglers with k > k may not participate in the market because (4.7) sug-
gests, the more exploitative a smuggler, the lower the fee it can charge. Their participation 
constraint, fr(k > k) > 1f, is equivalent to the following: 
(4.10) 
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If ic ~ 1, or equivalently y :5 1~~s (p + q) + ~, no trafficker enters the market. All 
the traffickers are active if ic < ° or equivalently either (a) a combination of a negative 
numerator and a positive denominator in the expression for ie, ie, ! + ASP < (1 - AS)2 r < 
(1 - AS) Y-ASq or (b) that of a positive numerator and a negative denominator, ie, !+ASP > 
(1- As)2 r > (1- AS)Y - Asq. In order to have ie E (0,1), we need either 
(4.11) - 2 (1 - AS) Y - Asq > I + ASP> (1 - AS) r 
or (1 - As)2 r > ! +ASP > (1 - AS) y-ASq. The former implies both the denominator and 
the numerator of ie are positive, while both are negative for the latter. Note (1 - AS)y -
ASq>! +ASP or equivalently Y > l~is (p+ q)+~ guarantees k E (0,1). Let us assume 
(4.11) holds throughout so as to examine the market with ie, k E (0,1). 
Assumption 4.1 
> l+).s(nq) > (l-).s)~(I-).M)y+).Sq holds. 
Y 1-).s 1-).s 
In addition to restricting the threshold exploitation capacities, k and ie, over the open 
interval (0,1), this assumption implies the following. 
Lemma 4.1 There is at least a tmfficker who provides a border crossing service even without 
receiving a smuggling lee under Assumption 4.1. 
Proof. (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3) suggest a trafficker with k > (1 {~):PXSq is active even if 
I = 0. Since k E [0,1], such a trafficker exists iff Y > l+~~~~+q), which is met by the first 
part of Assumption 4.1. o 
As we mentioned in Section 4.2, this is an important feature of the migrant smuggling 
market. 
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Note both threshold exploitation capacities, k and ie, are exogenous, as shown in (4.8) 
and (4.10). The relationship between k and ie is ambiguous without restrictions on the para-
meters in the expressions. We have the following three possible situations under Assumption 
4.1. 
Proposition 4.1 The market equilibrium is characterised as follows under symmetric com-
plete information and Assumption 4.1: 
(a) (b) (c) 
Environment "YJ<r J<r $"YJ r$J 
Nonexploitative smugglers ~(k) ~(k) 0 
Exploitative smugglers 1 - ~(k) 1- ~(k) 1- ~(k) 
Inactive smugglers 0 ~(ie) - ~(k) ~(k) 
where "I is a constant greater than unity. 
Proof. (4.7) and (4.9) imply all the non-exploitative smugglers participate in the market 
iff r > j. (4.8) and (4.10) suggest all the exploitative smugglers participate in the market 
'ff k- k" ,0 ,- h - >.s(l->.s)~l->'M)~+(l->.s)Y->'Sq 1 d A t' 41 1 > # > "I were "I = (1 >'s [(1 >'s y >'s(p+q)] > un er ssump lon .. 
When k $ ie, there are ~(ie) - ~(k) smugglers who can exploit migrants profitably in the 
destination but do not participate in the market, for the cost of smuggling is too high, ie, 
ir(k> k) $ 1t 'V k E (k,kJ. o 
In case (a), every smuggling agent supplies a border crossing service. In case (b), there 
are ~(k) - ~(k) agents who can exploit their smuggled clients profitably, which negatively 
affects the overall profit via a reduction in their fees under symmetric complete information so 
that they decide not to supply border crossing services. As a result, "modestly exploitative" 
smugglers, ie, k E (k, ieJ, do not operate. Active smugglers are either non-exploitative, ie, 
k E [0, kJ, or "highly exploitative", ie, k E (ie,IJ. 
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In case (c), not only "modestly exploitative" but also non-exploitative smugglers do 
not supply border crossing services. However, "highly exploitative" smugglers continue to 
operate, (or they can profit (rom post-smuggling exploitation sufficiently enough to offset 
their low smuggling (ees. Note that, under symmetric complete information, any of these 
outcomes is Paret~efficient, and each worker pays according to the observable exploitation 
capacity of each smuggler. 
4.4. Asymmetric information 
Let us now suppose the exploitation capacity of each smuggler is private information. 
Potential migrants are then unable to distinguish between the smugglers with different ex-
ploitation capacities. Accordingly, the smuggling fee is determined independently of the 
type of the smuggler whom a migrant hires. Because workers are identical, everyone of 
them (orms the same expectation of exploitation in (4.7), ie, there is a single smuggling fee 
in the market. Let f be a function of the expected exploitation capacity denoted by K. 
In the previous section, we saw that the threshold exploitation capacities, k and k, were 
exogenously determined under symmetric information. In this section, we endogenise these 
in the expected exploitation via the smuggling fee, f (K). 
The exploitation condition, 7r (f (K) , k) > 0, can be rewritten as 
The exploitation decision of a smuggler thus depends on its k. If y > l':~s q, smugglers 
with higher exploitation capacities are more likely to decide to exploit their clients. This is 
the case under Assumption 4.1. 
Those with k at which j (k) ::; f (K) are non-exploitative and enter the market iff 
f (K) > J. as shown in (4.9). That is, the participation decision of a non-exploitative 
smuggler does not depend on its own type. 
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Those with k at which j (k) > f ("') are exploitative and enter the market iff it (J (Ii.) , k) > 
l't which can be rewritten as 
( 4.13) . 1 + ASP ( AS) f(K) > f{k) == - Y - --q k. 1- AS 1- AS 
It shows the participation decision of an exploitative smuggler depends on its k. If 
Y > l~is q, more exploitative smugglers have lower shut-down fees because of higher ex-
pected gains from exploitation in the post-smuggling period. Again, this is the case under 
Assumption 4.1. In addition, by Lemma 4.1, we know there is at least a trafficker who is 
active but need not charge a fee. 
Lemma 4.2 Non-exploitative smugglers cannot use a different fee to distinguish themselves 
from exploitative smugglers under Assumption 4.1. 
Proof. Assumption 4.1 suggests dj /dk < 0 in (4.13), while the non-exploitative smuggler's 
shut-down fee is fixed at 1 in (4.9). There exists at least a trafficker for whom j < 1 
because j < 1 <=> k > (I ,\:H:p!sq E (0,1) under Assumption 4.1, implying non-exploitative 
smugglers cannot use a lower-than-the-market fee for signalling. Since (4.1), (4.2) and 
(4.3) indicate d1i' (7i' > O)/df > 0, neither can a higher-than-the-market price be used for 
signalling. D 
This suggests there always are exploitative smugglers who are willing to mimic any fee that 
non-exploitative smugglers might charge. Hence rational workers should ignore any fee 
signalling by non-exploitative smugglers. 
Expressions (4.12) and (4.13) can be rewritten in a way analogous to (4.8) and (4.10) 
as follows: 
(4.14) k > ie' = AS! (K.) + ASP 
- (1 - AS)Y - Asq 
190 
and 
(4.15) k> ie' = 1 + >'sp- (1- >'s)/(It) 
- (1- >'s)y - >'Sq 
Notice, while k and ie are exogenously given in (4.8) and (4.10) under symmetric information, 
k' and ie' are dependent on the workers' expectation, It, via the market fee. Expressions 
(4.14) and (4.15) imply 
(4.16) 1 < 1 (It) # ie' (It) < k' (It) 
which leads to the following lemma. 
Lemma 4.3 The total number 01 active smuggling agents is non-decreasing in the lee, and 
the average exploitation is strictly decreasing in it. 
Proof. (i) If I> 1, (4.9) suggests all non-exploitative smugglers are active. (4.16) suggests 
all traffickers are also active. Hence the number of active suppliers totals to measure one. 
If 1 ~ 1, all non-exploitative smugglers are inactive. There are 1 - <p(k') active traffickers 
where (4.15) suggests 8ie'/81 < O. (ii) If 1 > 1, the average exploitation capacity is 
fl. kt/> (k)dk where (4.14) suggests 8k l /81 > o. If 1 ~ 1, it is ui. ¢ (k)dk)-l ft. k¢ (k)dk. 
(4.15) suggests 8ie' /81 < O. Hence the denominator and the numerator are both strictly 
increasing in I. But 'lticQ, ie~ E (0,1) with ieo > k~, we have fk~~ k¢ (k)dk < ft,~ ¢ (k)dk. 0 
1 1 
The following table summarises the two possible situations: 
(a) (b) 
Environment 1 < 1 (It) 1 (It) ~ 1 
Nonexploitative smugglers <P( k') 0 
Exploitative smugglers 1 - <p(k') 1 - <p(k') 
Inactive smugglers 0 <p(k') 
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Compared to the table in Proposition 4.1, there is no case where some traffickers are inactive 
while non-exploitative smugglers are active. Such a case was a possibility in the previous 
section because shut-down fees of "modestly exploitative" traffickers might be higher than 
non-exploitative smugglers' under symmetric information. 
Let us now characterise the market equilibrium. The set of exploitation capacities of 
the smugglers who are willing to participate in the market at a given fee is 
{ 
f > 1 for k $ ie' (I) } (4.18') K (I) = k E [0,11 : ~ . 
f > f (k ) otherwise 
Since every worker believes the average exploitation capacity in the market is 1\" (4.6) and 
m » 1 suggest each smuggler can charge for a clandestine border crossing service 
(4.17') f (I\,) = (1 - As)(1 - 1\,) r. 
Note, as shown in the table after Lemma 4.3, there is no environment where only non-
exploitative smugglers are active in the market. Therefore, I\, > 0, and hence -As is present 
in (4.17,).37 
As in standard adverse selection models, we define the equilibrium as the situation where 
the workers' expectation of the average exploitation capacity equals the actual average.38 
That is, we assume all the agents in the market know the distribution of the k parameter 
among the smugglers, and hence the workers' beliefs correctly reflect the actual average 
exploitation capacity of the smugglers who are active in the market. Accordingly, I\, = 
E[eklk E KJ. 
Definition 4.1 Under asymmetric information, an equilibrium is characterised by a pair 
of a smuggling fee, r, and a set, K*, of exploitation capacities being present in the market 
such that 
( 4.17) 
37For simplicity. we do not discount ->"s by the ratio between traffickers and smugglers. 
38S..., for in8tance Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995: 439). 
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where ",0 = E [eklk E K*j, 
(4.18) K" ~ { k E [0,1} , 1*>1 
1* > j (k) 
for k ~ Ie· } 
otherwise 
where ie* = ie' (1*) and, with ie* = ie' (10), 
(4.19) if 1* > 1 
otherwise. 
Proposition 4.2 Under asymmetric information and Assumption 4.1, if 1* ~ 1, the 
market equilibrium is chamcterised by adverse selection: only traffickers are active even 
though each worker is willing to pay r > 1 to a non-exploitative smuggler. 
Proof. (4.9) implies all non-exploitative smugglers are inactive iff 1* ~ f. (4.16) and (4.15) 
indicate traffickers with k > ie* are active regardless of r. By Lemma 4.1, such traffickers 
exist. o 
Thus, in this market for migrant smuggling, the equilibrium might be of adverse selection 
first characterised by Akerlof (1970): all non-exploitative smugglers are driven out of the 
market while migrants are willing to pay a high fee to hire such a supplier. 
The equilibrium is not necessarily unique, as in Wilson (1980). The multiplicity depends 
on ~ (k). Rose (1993) argued that multiple equilibria are rare possibilities in this type of 
adverse selection model. Hence let us focus on the environment where a static equilibrium 
is unique. 
Let us now analyse ceteris paribus effects of changes in policy instruments. There are 
two equilibrium situations: 1* > I and 1* ~ f. In the former case, all smugglers are active, 
while all non-exploitative smugglers are absent in the latter. The following proposition is 
(or the (ull participation equilibrium before a policy change. 
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Proposition 4.3 When all smugglers are active in initial equilibrium, ie, r > 1, we have 
the following: 
(i) Improved border apprehension, either 13M or f3s, does not directly affect the average 
exploitation by affecting exploitation decision making. However, it may drive away all 
non-exploitative smugglers from the market by raising their shut-down fee. 
(ii) An increase in the penalty for migrant smuggling, p, decreases the average exploitation. 
It increases both non-exploitative smugglers' shut-down fee and the equilibrium fee, and hence 
it is ambiguous whether it tends to drive away all non-exploitative smugglers from the market. 
(iii) An increase in the marginal penalty for exploitation, q, decreases the average exploita-
tion. It also maintains the full participation by increasing the equilibrium fee. 
(iv) Improved inland apprehension of successfully smuggled migrants, >'M, increases the av-
erage exploitation. It may drive away all non-exploitative smugglers from the market by 
reducing the equilibrium fee. 
(v) Improved inland apprehension of traffickers, >'s, increases the average exploitation if >'s 
. :ffi' l all (l/+q)k·+(l-AM)\I(l-It·)+p \ . rt' I 
remains su caent y sm: 2(1 AM )\1(1 It.) > AS m pa lCU ar. If this condition 
is met, it may drive away all non-exploitative smugglers from the market by reducing the 
equilibrium fee. (If this condition is not met, the average exploitation is non-increasing in 
it, and its effect on the equilibrium fee is ambiguous.) 
Proof. See Appendix B. o 
The intuition behind Part (i) of the proposition is that border control does not directly 
affect the exploitation decision making because exploitation takes place after border crossing. 
That is, the decision is made, assuming successful border crossing. However, it raises the 
shut-down fee for non-exploitative smugglers in (4.9). This also affects the shut-down fees 
for exploitative smugglers in (4.13). This increase is to compensate an increased risk of 
apprehension at the border. As (4.16) implies, the least capable of exploitation will exit 
the market first. 
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Parts (ii) and (iii) of the proposition result from the fact that these measures negatively 
influence the profitability of migrant exploitation via (4.1), and an increase in these implies a 
smaller number of smugglers to become exploitative. The marginal penalty for exploitation 
does not affect the profitability of smuggling, as far as the smuggler decides not to exploit its 
customer. Hence the full participation is maintained. However, the penalty for smuggling 
negatively affects both the profitability of exploitation and smuggling, as (4.1) and (4.3) 
imply. As a result, its effect on the number of active smugglers remains ambiguous. 
The intuition behind Part (iv) of the proposition is that a high probability of catch-
ing smuggled migrants reduces each worker's expected gain from migration. This will be 
reflected in the equilibrium fee in (4.17). A fall in f then lowers ic", which increases the 
average exploitation by increasing the ratio of exploitative to non-exploitative smugglers. 
Lemma 4.2 indicates that the higher the exploitation capacity, the lower the shut-down fee. 
Hence sufficiently high >'M will drive away non-exploitative smugglers from the market. 
Part (v) of the proposition suggests that the effect of improved inland apprehension 
of exploitative smugglers is similar to that of improved inland apprehension of smuggled 
migrants, as far as the apprehension rate remains low. If >'s exceeds a certain level given 
in the proposition as a result of improved apprehension effort, the average exploitation 
decreases because ic" would then be increased. Its effect on the equilibrium fee then becomes 
ambiguous, and hence it is not clear whether the full participation is maintained. 
Compared to this full participation case, we have a simple unambiguous result when the 
initial equilibrium is characterised by adverse selection, ie, the absence of non-exploitative 
smugglers. 
Proposition 4.4 When all non-exploitative smugglers exit the market in initial equilibrium, 
ie, r :$ 1, the number of active exploitative smugglers is decreasing in any of the anti-
smuggling measures, while the average exploitation in the market is increasing in it. 
Proof. See Appendix B. o 
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The implication is that, under adverse selection, policymakers face a dilemma of whether 
to reduce the average exploitation that each smuggled migrant suffers from or the availability 
of smuggling services to potential migrants. 
4.5. Over time 
Our static analysis has shown that a market equilibrium requires either the full partici-
pat ion of both smugglers and traffickers or the participation of only traffickers. Over time, 
however, the static equilibrium ratio between smugglers and traffickers is not necessarily sta-
ble. The reason is that the informational structure is likely to change when the experiences 
of migrants can be communicated only imperfectly to workers who intend to hire smugglers. 
Potential migrants often gather information about reliable smugglers via social networks 
that they trust very much, but traffickers usually know how to remain unidentifiable in the 
market. 
Consider overlapping generations of smuggling agents over the discrete time horizon 
t = 0, 1,2, ... , (X). Suppose each of them operates only for two consecutive periods. In every 
period, a cohort of potential smuggling agents arises in the economy, totalling to measure 
one. The distribution of exogenous exploitation capacities in each cohort is time-invariable, 
ie, ~ (k). Let 0 E [0,1] represent the time-invariable impatience parameter common to 
all smugglers: 0 = ° implies smugglers are completely impatient. In period 0, the first 
cohort of smuggling agents arises in the economy, and none of the workers is informed of 
the exploitation capacity of any particluar smuggler at the pre-smuggling stage.39 We call 
a smuggler who arises in the economy in period t a period-t smuggler. 
If social networks are so efficient that k of all period-t smuggling agents can be known 
to all potential migrants in period t + 1, the migrant smuggling market consists of two parts 
from period 1 onwards: one with period-t agents under symmetric information and the other 
wit h period-t + 1 agents under asymmetric information. In t his case, for all t = 1, 2, ... , 00, 
the symmetric part's equilibrium is characterised by Proposition 4.1, and the asymmetric 
39For l'Xample. we can imagine a sudden increase in the number of potential migrants who cannot obtain 
informal ion about migration via their social networks, eg, immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
(Hugh ..... 2(00). 
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part's by Definition 4.1. In period 0, the whole market is informationally asymmetric, and 
the equilibrium is characterised by Definition 4.1. The equilibrium fees in the market are 
stable over time because we assume the distribution of exploitation capacities is fixed. 
Let us now assume that social networks are so trusted that smugglers who do not 
exploit their clients in period t can charge r, the maximum fee a worker is willing to pay 
a non-exploitative smuggler, in period t + 1. This may generate an incentive for some 
smugglers to refrain from exploiting their clients initially even though their exploitation 
capacities are high enough to have 1i' (k) > O. For simplicity, let us also assume potential 
migrants do not trust traffickers at all: a period-t trafficker cannot charge a client i (k) 
by allowing its k to be known in period t + 1. A period-t trafficker then must belong to 
the informationally asymmetric part of the market during its two consecutive periods.4o 
Information transmission is thus imperfect. 
4.5.1. Deception via social networks 
Given the trust in social networks and the distrust in traffickers, we show a worker could 
hire a trafficker while he/she thinks it is a non-exploitative smuggler. Suppose a smuggling 
agent is active during its two consecutive service periods, ie, ft*, ft*+l > /. There are then 
four possible operations: EN, EE, NN and NE where, for example, EN means 'exploit in the 
first period and do not exploit in the second.' In the first period, it can charge it regardless 
of its service. In the second period, it can charge it+l if it exploits in the first period but 
r if it does not exploit in that period. The following table presents the expected profit, 
n, for each operation, where D == (1 - (3s) (1 - (3M) and C == {3sP + c. 
40 Alternatively. we can assume potential migrants seek only non·exploitative smuggling services. Without 
thiM assumption. we need allow period-t traffickers to choose between f (k) and ft+l' which complicates the 
dl'tcrminatioll of the ratiollsl workers' expectation of exploitation. 
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OPERATION PERIOD n 
EN 1st [/t + (1 - AS) yk - AS (ft + p + qk)J D - C 
2nd + {ft+1D - C} 5 
EE 1st [It + (1- >'s) yk - >'s (ft + p + qk)J D - C 
2nd + {[Itt-! + (1 - >'s) yk - >'s (Jt+1 + p + qk)] D - C} 5 
NN 1st ftD-C 
2nd +{rD - C}a 
NE 1st fiD-C 
2nd + {[r + (1 - >.s) yk - >'s (f0 + P + qk)J D - C} 5 
Let us first look at the second-period exploitation decision making. Suppose a smuggler 
exploited in the first period. It can then charge ft+1 and exploits in the second period iff 
nEE> nEN or equivalently k > k:+l' Suppose a smuggler did not exploit in the first period. 
It can then charge r and exploits in the second period iff nNE > nNN or equivalently 
k> ko == >'s (r + p) / [(1 - >'s)y - >'Sq]. 
Since r > /:+1' we have (a) those with k E [0, k;+1] who do not exploit in the second 
period regardless of their first-period exploitation decision, (b) those with k E (ki+1' kO] 
who exploit iff they exploit in the first period and (c) those with k E (kO, I] who exploit 
regardless of their first-period exploitation decision, assuming ko < 1. Given these three 
groups, we can now examine the first-period exploitation decision making. 
Those in group (a) exploit in the first period iff nEN > nNN or equivalently 
k (r - ft+1) 5 + >'s (ft + p) 
> (1- >'s)y - >'sq . 
Such asmuggier exists iff kt*+1 > 1"-1'·+1 O+ASU,"+p) which is equivalent to ('* - f*) >. > 1-AS Y-ASq t+1 t S 
Those in group (b) exploit in the first period iff nEE> nNN or equivalently 
k> [r - (1- >'s) ft*+1] r:h + >'s (ltrh + p) 
(I- As)y- ASq . 
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Such a smuggler exists iff fo > .I.:....---..:.-~;.:.z.:-4:t!..;......:::...I..:..!c...!o.:I:!....:.~ or equivalently (r - ft) l~1s > 
Those in group (c) exploit in the first period iff nEE> nNE or equivalently 
k (1 - AS) (r - It+l) {, + AS (It + p) 
> (l-As)y-ASq . 
Such a smuggler exists iff 1 > (l-As) flo~lI+~_6A:~s(J"+P) or equivalently y-(lt + P + q) l~Xs > 
(r - It+!) {,. 
The following table summarises the conditions regarding the first-period exploitation we 
derived above by the three groups. 
k A TRAFFICKER EXISTS IF ALL ARE TRAFFICKERS IF 
[0, k;+!] (It+! - It) AS > (r - It+!) {, N.A. 
(k;+!, kO] (r - fn l~is > (r - ft+!) {, (It+! - ft) As ~ (r - It+!) {, 
(kO,l] y - (It + p + q) ~ > (r - ft+!) {, (r - ft) ~ ~ (r - It+!) {, 
The last row of this table suggests there are those who do not exploit in the first period 
but do so in the second iff 
(4.20) y - (It + p + q) 1 ~SAS > (r - ft+l) {, > (r - ft) 1 ~SAS' 
To meet this condition, we require y - (I; + p + q) l~is > (r - ft) l~is or equivalently 
y> l-~~~~YM) which does not necessarily hold under Assumption 4.1. If this is the case, 
the above condition may be satisfied, depending on {,. Thus, it is possible to have a smuggler 
who does not exploit in the first period but does so in the second. This section thus derived 
a condition where some migrants might feel unfairly deceived by traffickers because social 
networks are so trusted. 
Proposition 4.5 When potential migrants seek non-exploitative smuggling services and 
trust social networks, there is a fraction of migrants who pay a high price with a belief that 
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they are hiring non-exploitative smugglers but are eventually exploited by them after border 
crossing iff the inequality (4.20) holds. 
To find out an equilibrium path over time, we need take into account the participation 
decision of each smuggling agent as well as its exploitation decision. This complicates the 
rational optimisation problem because, as the above table shows, g+l must be known in 
period t to decide on both exploitation and participation. But ft+l needs to take into 
account the exploitation and participation decisions of all smuggling agents in that period 
which in turn depend on ft.~2 and so on. In addition, Proposition 4.5 implies rational 
potential migrants need take into account the risk of hiring a trafficker at r. 
In the next section, we solve for the equilibrium path of a special case: all smugglers 
are completely impatient, ie, 0 = O. This significantly simplifies the analysis. 
4.5.2. Impatient smugglers 
When 0 = 0, the first-period decision making of smugglers does not depend on the future. 
Smugglers thus make their exploitation and participation decisions in the first period without 
taking into account the endogeneity of the second-period profit. This implies a static 
equilibrium in Section 4.4 is reached initially. Let us assume a full participation equilibrium 
is reached in period 0, ie, 1 < fa· Accordingly, there are ~(ko) non-exploitative smugglers 
and 1 - ~(ko) traffickers in period O. 
In period 1, there are 1 period-O smuggling agents and 1 new smuggling agents in the 
economy. Because all period-O non-exploitative smugglers are identified through social 
networks, they are able to charge the full information fee, r, in period 1 if there is no 
incentive for them to become exploitative in that period. 
Lemma 4.4 A n impatient smuggler who does not exploit its client in its first period neither 
does so in the second. 
Proof. (i) A period-t smuggler with k ~ k; exploits its client in period t + 1 if ii' (r, k) > O. 
However, ii'(r,k) > 0 {:} k > ko. Since r > it => ko > k; by Lemma 4.1, ii'(r,k) < 0 
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V k E [0, kilo (ii) A period-t smuggler with k :5 ki also exploits its client in period t + 1 if 
1T (r, 1i" = 0) :5 1i" (It+! , 1i" (It+! , k)) by charging It+! instead of r. This condition can be 
rewritten as 
which implies iff kl+! :5 ki there is such a smuggler whose capacity is k E [kl+!,ki]. By 
(4.14), kl+! :5 k; # 1- (1 - >'S)2 (1- Kt+!) :5 >'s (1- >'s) (1- Kt), which is impossible as 
o 
Part (ii) of the proof suggests non-exploitative period-t smugglers do not choose to remain 
unidentifiable in period t + 1. Lemma 4.1 implies, if there is any non-exploitative smuggler 
in the informationally asymmetric part of the market in period t, it then operates in the 
informationally symmetric part of the market in period t + 1. 
For period-O traffickers and all period-l potential suppliers, the exploitation capacity 
is private information. Hence they can charge Ii. They cannot pretend to be non-
exploitative smugglers and charge r because rational workers who could not hire a period-O 
non-exploitative smuggler who is identified via social networks should expect to hire in the 
informationally asymmetric part of the market. 
Lemma 4.5 The average exploitation capacity in the asymmetric part of the market is 
non-decreasing over time. It coveryes to K; in period x such that I; :5 J and 1;-1 > 1. 
Proof. Lemma 4.1 implies there are always some period-t - 1 traffickers operating in period 
t. The average capacity in period 0 is written out in (4.19). For period 1 onwards, with 
time-invariable ~ (k), it is 
(4.21) 
(2 f; k¢ (k) dk - fok;-l k¢ (k) dk - fok; k¢ (k) dk) (2 - <p(ki_d r1 
(I; k¢ (k) dk - f;= k¢ (k) dk) (1 _ <p(k;)) -1 
if It> J 
otherwise. 
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(4.17), (4.14) and (4.21) imply 1\:0 < ~i ~ Ii < 10 ~ ki < ko ~ ~o < ~i if Ii> j. When 
1;-1 > / and J; $ /, there is no active period-x non-exploitative smuggler. In addition, 
period-x -1 traffickers with k E (k;_l' k;] do not operate. Only period-x -1 and period-x 
traffickers with k E (k;, 1] are active. With time-invariable <I> (k), the average capacity does 
not change from period-x + 1 onwards. In period x, the fact that 1 - <I>(k;) period-x - 1 
traffickers with k E (k;, 1] are active results in I; $/. In period x + 1, there are 1- <I>(k;) 
active period-x traffickers with k E (k;, 1], so I;+l = I; $ j. o 
Lemma 4.5 suggests traffickers in their first period continue to be exploitative, if active, in 
the second. 
Corollary 4.1 An impatient smuggler who exploits its client in the first period also does 
so, if active, in the second. 
Lemmas 4.4 and 4.5 suggest the behaviour of an impatient smuggling agent over time is 
rather simple. They lead to the following proposition about the equilibrium over time. 
Proposition 4.6 Suppose 10 > f. If smuggling agents are impatient and if it is not possi-
ble for workers to identify traffickers, there exists a unique dynamic equilibrium path where 
the number of active non-exploitative smugglers decreases over time while the average ex-
ploitative capacity rises. In the long run, the equilibrium converges to the one characterised 
by adverse selection: only traffickers are active even though each worker is willing to pay 
r > / to a non-exploitative smuggler. 
Proof. If 0 = 0, Definition 4.1 characterises the period-O equilibrium. 10 > / suggests all 
smuggling agents are active in period O. (i) By Lemma 4.4, as far as It > /, there is at least 
one active non-exploitative smuggler in period t + 1, charging r. Lemma 4.5 suggests the 
number of non-exploitative smugglers who move from the informationally asymmetric part 
in t to the symmetric in t + 1 is decreasing over time. In period x, there is no active non-
exploitative smuggler in the informationally asymmetric part of the market because I; $ f. 
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Lemma 4.5 then implies there is no non-exploitative smugglers in either part of the market 
from period x + 1 onwards. (ii) In the informationally asymmetric part of the market, there 
are 1 period-t smuggling agents and period-t - 1 traffickers from period 1 onwards. All 
of them are active as far as It > t. Lemma 4.5 implies the number of non-exploitative 
smugglers is decreasing over time. In period x, only traffickers with k E (k:, IJ are active 
because I; :s /. By Lemma 4.5, we have It = I; and k; = k: for all t = x + 1, x + 2, ... ,00. 
(i) and (ii) then suggest the long-run equilibrium requires the participation of only traffickers 
and is stable once non-exploitative smugglers stop operating in the market. o 
The migrant smuggling market thus becomes increasingly exploitative in the long run 
because of the cumulative effect of incumbent traffickers. Since the equilibrium becomes 
stable once all non-exploitative smugglers stop being active, the market does not vanish 
but continues to exist with only traffickers. Although the result is a special case where all 
smuggling agents are impatient, its significance is that it is the very attempt of migrants to 
reduce the risk of hiring traffickers that subjects the migrant smuggling market to adverse 
selection over time. 
The dynamics of our model is similar to Janssen and Karamychev (2002) and Janssen 
and Roy (2004). In their model, the average quality in the market rises over time because 
the stock of high-quality suppliers increases relative to low-quality suppliers. As a result, 
all goods are eventually traded over time when the market price rises sufficiently high. In 
our model, there is information transmission via social networks, which is imperfect and 
divides the market into two parts. In the informationally asymmetric part of the market, 
the average exploitation capacity rises over time because non-exploitative smugglers exit to 
the informationally symmetric part of the market through social networks. A new entry of 
non-exploitative smugglers eventually ceases, and the market reaches a stable state where 
only exploitative agents are active, resulting in adverse selection in the long run. 
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4.6. Discussion 
This paper formalised the migrant smuggling market where migrants face a risk of being 
exploited by the service providers after successful border crossing. Our model is a variant 
of Akerlof's (1970) lemons framework. 
The comparative statics analysis provided us with policy implications by linking the 
fight against illegal migration with the risk of exploitation that migrants face when using 
smuggling services. 
We found that, in the market where all migrants are more or less exploited by smug-
gling agents (Proposition 4.4), policies that reduce the number of active smuggling agents 
inevitably raise the average exploitation. Policymakers are thus likely to face a dilemma of 
whether to minimise the mean exploitation of trafficked migrants or to reduce the availabil-
ity of smuggling services. Accordingly, if exploitation is becoming severer than before, it 
might be a byproduct of a successful reduction in the number of smuggling activities overall. 
We also found that, in the market where there are some unexploited migrants (Propo-
sition 4.3), unlike the adverse selection case, different policy instruments do not have the 
same effect on the average exploitation and the number of active smugglers. 
A severe marginal penalty for labour exploitation (Part iii) is a policy choice for those 
who are concerned with the welfare of smuggled migrants because it reduces the average 
exploitation. Regardless of how severe it is, an increase in the marginal penalty avoids 
the exit of all non-exploitative smugglers that results in a sudden increase in the average 
exploitation. 
A large penalty for migrant smuggling (Part ii) also reduces the average exploitation. 
However, it raises both non-exploitative smugglers' shut-down fee and the equilibrium fee, 
and it remains ambiguous whether a large penalty for smuggling can avoid a sudden increase 
in the average exploitation due to the exit of all non-exploitative smugglers. 
An improvement in border control (Part i) is not recommended because, while it has no 
effect on the average exploitation as far as the equilibrium fee is higher than non-exploitative 
smugglers' shut-down fee, it raises the latter by increasing the risk of conducting the illicit 
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business. Improved border apprehension then indicates the market moves to the adverse 
selection state. 
Improved inland apprehension of smuggled migrants (Part iv) is not a choice either if the 
welfare of smuggled migrants is important, while our result leaves ambiguity as to the effect 
of improved inland apprehension of traffickers on the mean exploitation and the number of 
active smugglers (Part v). 
If a sufficient resource is available under this initially non-adverse selection equilibrium, 
inland apprehension of smuggled migrants (>w) and border apprehension ((3 M and (3 s) can 
be used to first push the market to the adverse selection state, and then any instrument 
may be used to reduce the number of active smugglers to zero. However, such a sufficient 
resource is unlikely to be available in practice. 
Policymakers may also note the conflicting effects among the instruments. For instance, 
a combination of a large marginal penalty for exploitation (q) and a high probability of 
apprehending smuggled migrants inland (.AM) would imply that one effect is likely to offset 
the other. When q increases, a smaller number of smugglers decide to exploit because 
the profitability of post-smuggling exploitation falls. Accordingly, the mean exploitation 
decreases, and hence the market fee increases. On the other hand, when .AM increases, a 
migrant's expected gain from migration falls. As a result, the market fee falls. Then, the 
average exploitation increases because more exploitative smugglers have lower shut-down 
fees. An implication is that a combination of anti-trafficking measure q and anti-illegal 
immigration measure .AM might result in a situation where neither of the instruments appear 
effective ex post. 
We have also provided preliminary results for a dynamic case. The trust in social 
networks can be welfare worsening because it may generate an incentive for some traffickers 
to alternate their actions between not exploiting and exploiting over time. As a result, there 
may be potential migrants who pay high fees by thinking they are hiring non-exploitative 
smugglers but are eventually exploited in the destination. (Proposition 4.5) 
In the short run, the market may be supplied by both smugglers and traffickers. How-
ever, with impatient smuggling agents and potential migrants' distrust in agents who are 
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not introduced by social networks, non-exploitative smugglers eventually cease to operate. 
In the long run, the market converges to a state where only traffickers of various exploitation 
capacities serve potential migrants. (Proposition 4.6) 
This result may be a special case where no trafficker can be identified through social 
networks. If potential migrants can identify a fraction of traffickers, this might help keep 
the smuggling fee above the non-exploitative smugglers' shut-down fee and hence sustain 
the coexistence of smugglers and traffickers over time. 
Our analysis is limited in several ways. For example, we have assumed that exploitation 
capacities are exogenously distributed among smugglers. However, the assumption may be 
too strong, for smugglers could choose to invest in capacity building. In the case of endoge-
nous exploitative capacities, the impact of apprehension effort on the welfare of migrants is 
a priori ambiguous. One possibility is that initially non-exploitative smugglers may decide 
to invest in exploitative capacities in order to compensate a reduction in profitability in 
the smuggling business due to a stricter border control. In such a case, the endogeneity 
reinforces our result. 
Another major limitation is our simplifying assumption used in the dynamic section, ie, 
impatient smugglers. In order to generalise the results in the long run, our analysis needs 
to be extended to the case of patient smuggling agents. 
An additional research topic related to the exploitation of migrants is international 
cooperation. We analysed the topic in a single-country model where the government had two 
instruments: border apprehension and inland apprehension. We were interested in potential 
consequences of government action in the destination country. Study in a multi-country 
setting would be complementary, for it is suitable for examining the issue of international 
cooperation in the battle against the exploitation of migrants. 
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4.7. Appendix 
A. Excerpts from UN (2000a) and UN (2000b) 
• UN 2000b, Article 9(a) "Smuggling of migrants" shall mean the procurement, in 
order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the 
illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or 
a permanent resident; 
• UN 2000b, Article 9(b) "Illegal entry" shall mean crossing borders without com-
plying with the necessary requirements for legal entry into the receiving State; 
• UN 2000a, Article 9(a) "Trafficking in persons" shall mean the recruitment, trans-
portation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use 
of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the 
abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of pay-
ments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another 
person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, 
the exploitation of the prostituion of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, 
forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the 
removal of organs; 
• UN 2000a, Article 3(b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the 
intended exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant 
where any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) have been used; 
B. Proof of Propositions 4.3 and 4.4 (comparative statics) 
First, we show how the expected labour exploitation changes with respect to a change in the 
threshold exploitation capacity. Second, we show how the threshold exploitation capacity 
changes with respect to a change in each policy instrument. Using the obtained results, 
we summarise how the average exploitation changes with respect to a change in each policy 
instrument. Finally, we show how the gap between the equilibrium fee and the shut-down 
fee for non-exploitative smugglers changes with repect to a change in each policy instrument 
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because, as (4.16) implies, the number of active smuggling agents depends on the equilibrium 
fee in relation to the shut-down fee. 
(4.19) suggests dl\:* jdk* < 0 if r > f. Otherwise, dl\:* jdk* > 0 because k* E (0,1) 
although both the denominator and the numerator of 1\:* are decreasing in k*. That is, 
the size of the decrease in the numerator is smaller than that in the denominator. Note 
dl\:*jdk* E (-1,0) anddl\:*jdk* E (0,1). 
Let us rearrange k* (p, q, AM, As) in (4.14) as follows: 
o. 
By applying the implicit function theorem to F l , we obtain the following derivatives: 
dk* 
dp 
dk* 
dq 
dk* 
dAM 
dk* 
dAs 
= 
= 
AS 
oFdok* 
Ask* 
oFdok* 
-As (1 - As)y (1- 1\:*) 
oFI/ok· 
(y + q)k* + p+ (1- 2As)(l- AM)Y (1- K:*) 
oFI/ok* 
where oFdok* = (1- As)y [1 + As (1- AM)(dl\:* jdk*)] - ASq. Note that oFI/ok* > 
o <=> (1 - As) Y [1 + As (1 - AM) (dll:* jdk*)] > ASq <=> 
As (1 - As) (1 - AM) y(dl\:* jdk*) + ASq 
y> 1- As 
which is the case under Assumption 4.1. Hence dk* jdp > 0, dk* jdq > 0 and dk* jdAM < O. 
The sign of dk* /dAs is determined by the numerator. dk* jdAs > 0 if (y + q) k* + P + 
(1- 2As)(I-AM)y(I-I\:*»00r 
(y + q) k* + (1 - AM) y (1 - K:*) + p A 
2(1- AM)y(l- K:*) > s· 
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Let us rearrange ,,! (p, q, >'M, AS, 13 M' f3s) in (4.15) as follows: 
f3sP + c + 7f 
(1 - f3s)(l- 13M) + >'sP 
- (1- >'S)2 (1- >'M)y(l- It·) - [(1- AS)y - >'Sq] k· 
o. 
By applying the implicit function theorem to F2, we obtain the following derivatives: 
dk· f3s/ (1- f3s) (1- 13M) + >'s 
dp 
-8F2/8k· 
dk· >'sk· 
dq 
-
8F2/8k• 
dk· (1- AS)2y(1- It·) 
= 
-8F2/8k· d>'M 
dk· 2 (1 - >'s) (1 - >'M) y (1- K·) + (y + q) k· + P 
d>.s 
-8F2/8k· 
dk· (f3sp+c+7f)/(1-f3s)(1-f3M)2 
df3M -8F2/8k· 
dk· (p+ c+ 7f) / (1- f3s)2 (1- 13M) 
= 
-8F2/8k· df3s 
where -8F2/8k· = (1 - >'s)y [1- (1- >'s)(1- AM )(81t· /8k·)] -Asq. Note that 8F2/8k· < 
o <=> (1- AS)y [1- (1- >'s) (1- >'M) (8K·/8k·)] > >'Sq <=> 
(1 - >'S)2 (1 - >'M) y(8K· /8ic·) + >'Sq 
y> 1- >'s 
which is the case under Assumption 4.1. Hence the six total derivatives are all positive. 
To summarise the results so far, if f* > /, 
dK· dk· dK· dk· dlt· dk· 
-.--- < 0 -- < 0 -.--- > 0 and dk* dp , dk· dq , dk· d>'M ' 
dK* dk* 
-.--- > dk· d>.s 
< 0 otherwise. 
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If r $/, 
dK* dk* dK* die* dK' dk' dK' dk' 
-'-dR > 0, -'-dR > 0, -'--d > 0, -'--d > 0, dk* iJM dk' iJS dk* p dk' q 
dK* dk- dl\:' die-
-'-d' >O,and-·- d , >0. dk* /\M dk' /\S 
We now turn to the number of active smugglers in the market. As (4.16) and Lemma 
4.3 indicate, it is dependent on the gap between the market fee and the shut-down fee for 
non-exploitative suppliers. Let 
D({3M,{3S,P,q'~M'~S) - r-/ 
= (1-~ )(1-~ ) (1-1\:')- {3sp+c+it 
S MY (1-.Bs)(I-.BM)' 
Lemma 4.3 implies the full participation when D > O. The relevant threshold capacity is 
ie*. We have 
dD -({3sp+c+it) 0 
= 2 < d{3M (1-.Bs )(I-{3M) 
dD - (p + c + it) 
<0 = (1- {3S)2 (1- 13M) d{3s 
dD dl\:* die* .Bs 
dp -(I-~s)(I-~M)Ydie* dp- (1-{3s)(I-{3M) 
dD dl\:* die* 
= - (1- ~s) (1- ~M)Y----- > 0 dq dk" dq 
dD dl\:" die' 
d~AI 
- (1- ~s)y(l- 1\:*) - (1- ~s) (1- ~M)Y----- < 0 
dk* d~M 
dD dl\:* die' 
= - (1- ~M)y(l- 1\:*) - (1- ~s) (1- ~M)Y-----d~s dk* d~s 
When D $ 0, the relevant threshold capacity is k·. We then have all the six derivatives 
negative. 
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